The timing is critical.
Following the 12-day war with Israel—a conflict that laid bare Iran’s intelligence and security failures—the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) has undergone a reshuffle that appears to weaken the ultraconservative camp’s grip.
At the center of the uproar is Jalili’s August 7 post on X, in which he likened the postwar push for diplomacy to a scriptural episode: “It’s as if our nation hasn’t won at all,” he wrote.
“The Children of Israel, after defeating Pharaoh, turned to worshipping the golden calf when their prophet was absent for 40 days. Similarly, today, after the enemy attacked us in the midst of negotiations and the Iranian nation emerged victorious, some are now calling for a return to the same disastrous path as before!”
Jalili is a former chief nuclear negotiator and perhaps the most prominent face of anti-diplomacy in Tehran, whose latest presidential bid was defeated by Masoud Pezeshkian in 2024.
‘What Moses?’
The cryptic message sparked a wave of outrage, confusion, and interpretation.
“Who is Moses? What is calf worship? Who has gone to Mount Tur?” asked Tasnim News, the IRGC-affiliated outlet, which labeled Jalili’s post “wrong and radical.”
The rare, pointed critique from an IRGC platform was widely seen as a blow to Jalili’s once-untouchable persona.
Another conservative outlet, the daily Khorassan, took issue with the implied slight toward Ayatollah Khamenei’s absence from public view:
“Why do you think the Supreme Leader is absent? The nation you call calf worshippers deserves respect,” it wrote in a Thursday editorial.
Former IT Minister Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi was even more cutting:
“If you possess Moses’ miracle, strike your staff on the ground. If not, in these sensitive times, follow Aaron’s example and avoid sowing division.”
Ali Larijani (left) and Saeed Jalili are the two representatives of supreme leader Ali Khamenei on Iran’s Supreme National Security Council
Rivalry peaked
The recent appointment of Ali Larijani as one of Khamenei’s two representatives to the SNSC has been widely interpreted as a shift in direction—despite Jalili remaining in the same role.
The duo’s rivalry is deep and well documented.
Jalili is believed to have played a key role in disqualifying Larijani from the 2021 presidential race. Much of the hardline resistance to President Pezeshkian’s diplomatic outreach to Washington has originated from his camp.
Last year, Larijani accused Jalili’s affiliated Paydari party of leading a “political purification campaign” to monopolize power.
Even before Larijani’s return to the SNSC, frustration with Jalili had been mounting across the political spectrum.
‘Shoes off’
Reformists, moderates, and even some conservatives have criticized his obstructionist posture and refusal to offer viable policy alternatives. President Pezeshkian has said he offered Jalili several posts in his cabinet—all of which were declined.
While Khamenei’s decision to retain Jalili suggests the system still values his ideological loyalty, the rising chorus of criticism—especially from conservative and IRGC-linked voices—marks a potential shift.
Tasnim closed its editorial with a pointed remark:
“Exchanging views is healthy for any government, provided you take off your radicalism shoes.”
Time will tell whether that was merely advice or a written notice.