The man steering Turkey’s regional strategy against Israel

Although Fidan briefly sought a civilian post in 2013, trying his luck in two government ministries, Erdoğan blocked the move, returned him to the leadership of Turkish intelligence and promised: “The time will come when you will be appointed to an important role.” Two years ago, Erdoğan fulfilled that promise.

A long-time member of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), Fidan insists that the division of powers between him and the president is “transparent and clear.” Erdoğan, 71, has nurtured Fidan, 53, with the knowledge that he could be his eventual successor in the sprawling 1,000-room Presidential Palace in Ankara. For now, Fidan operates strictly within the domains assigned to him.

Fidan does not possess Erdoğan’s charismatic flair. In public appearances, he consistently praises the president and demonstrates full loyalty, offering no hints about his own future ambitions. Senior Turkish officials and even ordinary citizens describe Fidan as Erdoğan’s active right hand with a guaranteed place at the top of the hierarchy after him.

In his Ankara offices, Fidan frequently hosts Hamas leadership. Khalil al-Hayya, whether flying in from Qatar or on tours of Arab capitals, is received with near-royal treatment. Here, al-Hayya is safe—Israel would not attempt a strike on Turkish soil.

Dr. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak, a Turkey expert and native, describes Fidan as “a problematic actor for Israel, especially regarding the restoration of diplomatic ties.” As long as Erdoğan remains in power, Yanarocak says, there is no chance of improvement. Even if Fidan rises to power, the challenge will be no less daunting. Turkey expects Israel to blink first but it seems unlikely that any Israeli leader will succeed in opening a window to Ankara.

Recently, President Herzog had to adopt a long flight path to Northern Europe, following clear security directives not to fly over Turkish airspace. “They don’t want us there,” Yanarocak says. “The question is how far we’re willing to go to renew ties with Turkey. It won’t come from Erdoğan and certainly not from Fidan.”

Fidan’s attention is focused on the Arab world. He recently visited Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Cairo after a long period of diplomatic estrangement. If Erdoğan has distanced himself, Fidan works to tighten the ties—and now his gaze turns to Gaza.

In Damascus, Fidan wears two hats—former intelligence chief and current foreign minister. He knows President al-Sharaa well and must persuade Syria’s new leadership not to move too close to Netanyahu’s government. After all, Turkey is Syria’s primary ally in the new regional order, increasingly positioning itself to replace the displaced influence of Iran.

Turkey also seeks to restrain Syria’s rapprochement with northern Kurdish forces. Even after the Kurds agreed in principle to hand over weapons (though not yet completed), Ankara is keen to remind the Syrian president, intelligence chiefs and interior and foreign ministers of the deep-seated enmity between Erdoğan’s regime and the Kurds.

To al-Sharaa, Fidan delivered an unequivocal pledge: “Turkey will not allow Israel to operate in Syria, either positively or negatively.” In his explanation, Fidan warned that Israel, especially under Netanyahu, seeks to destabilize Syria, carving it into three to five autonomous regions along sectarian lines—Sunni, Kurdish and Druze. Israel, he argued, is “a cunning state,” one that cannot be trusted.

In Fidan, Turkey has a shrewd operator driving its strategic ambitions—undermining Israeli-Syrian rapprochement, expanding influence across the Arab world and ensuring Ankara remains a central power broker in the region.