Iran Update, August 14, 2025

Avery Borens, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Kelly Campa, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran since June 12, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival, according to three Iranian insiders speaking to Reuters on August 14.[1] One source stated that Iranian leaders support negotiations because they have “seen the cost of military confrontation“ and seek to prevent further escalation with Israel and the United States. Moderate and pragmatic officials in the regime have recently signaled openness to resuming negotiations.[2] Moderate Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, for example, stated on August 10 that resuming negotiations with the United States ”does not mean we intend to surrender.”[3] The Iranian regime continues to reject the US demand for Iran to halt uranium enrichment, which was the main sticking point in negotiations before the Israel-Iran War.[4] Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister for Political Affairs Majid Takht Ravanchi recently told Japanese media on August 11 that Iran could agree to limit its uranium enrichment levels but will not agree to halt enrichment altogether.[5]

A senior Iranian official told The Telegraph on August 13 that Iran would not be able to “endure” the reimposition of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran if the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggers the snapback mechanism.[6] Iran’s concern about potential snapback sanctions could push Iran to resume negotiations with the United States, although it is very unlikely that Iran would accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that requires it to halt uranium enrichment on Iranian soil. The Telegraph report comes after the E3 warned on August 13 that it would trigger the snapback mechanism unless Iran shows a commitment to negotiations before August 31.[7] The E3 has offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism, which is currently set to expire in October 2025, in order to provide Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. The senior Iranian official also told The Telegraph that the Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) instructed the Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry in July to revive negotiations with the United States.[8] The official added that the SNSC asked the Iranian presidential office at an unspecified time to pursue nuclear negotiations with the United States before the window for talks closes.[9] It is unclear if the SNSC contacted the presidential office before or after President Masoud Pezeshkian appointed pragmatic hardliner Ali Larijani as SNSC secretary on August 5.[10] Larijani has historically supported negotiations and could accelerate the SNSC’s push for negotiations with the United States. Larijani supported the 2015 nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and defended it against hardliners in parliament while he was parliament speaker in the mid-2010s.[11]  

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called on the Iranian regime to implement reforms and make concessions to the Iranian people to increase popular support for the regime, strengthen societal resilience, and reduce tensions with the West.[12] Rouhani argued on August 13 that “new circumstances,” including Iranian setbacks in the region and a perceived gap between the Iranian regime and people, encouraged Israel and the United States to attack Iran.[13] Rouhani expressed support for reducing tensions and negotiating with the United States and expanding relations with European and neighboring countries.[14] Rouhani called for the formation of strong political parties and implicitly criticized the Guardian Council for disqualifying electoral candidates. The Guardian Council is a 12-member regime body that is responsible for supervising elections, vetting candidates, and approving legislation.[15] Rouhani stated that Iranian leaders must prioritize Iran over other countries and only provide support to other countries to the extent that the Iranian public approves.[16] Rouhani was likely referring to public demands for the regime to focus on domestic issues rather than sending money and resources abroad, particularly to the Axis of Resistance.[17] Rouhani also stressed that the Iranian armed forces must focus on their inherent duties and not intervene in the economy, propaganda, and domestic and foreign policy.[18] Rouhani has previously criticized the involvement of the armed forces in the economy.[19]

Rouhani’s speech is consistent with his apparent effort to reenter Iran’s political scene by presenting the post-war period as an opportunity to reform governance, restore public trust, and recalibrate the regime’s trajectory. Rouhani and other moderate and pragmatic officials have sought to use the Israel-Iran War and its aftermath to try to reassert themselves in the Iranian political sphere. Opposition media reported on June 21 that Rouhani had met with senior clerics in Qom, including Mousa Shobeyri, Hossein Vahid Khorasani, and Nasser Makarem Shirazi, to encourage them to persuade Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to concede to key US and Israeli demands, including the suspension of uranium enrichment.[20] Rouhani framed his efforts as a bid to “save the Islamic system,” while Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media warned that “suspicious” insiders sought to compromise with Israel.[21] Rouhani was also reportedly considered for a “key role” in a contingency plan to govern Iran without Khamenei if he were killed or informally sidelined during the conflict.[22]  Rouhani, Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani, and Expediency Discernment Council Chairman Sadegh Amoli Larijani also reportedly tried to contact Khamenei during the war to encourage him to accept a ceasefire.[23]

Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem overstated the degree of Iranian support to Hezbollah during a meeting in Beirut on August 14.[24] Hezbollah reported that Qassem thanked Larijani for Iran’s “continuous support” for Lebanon and Hezbollah.[25] Iranian Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani claimed that Qassem and Larijani’s meeting underscored Iran’s continued support for Lebanon and Hezbollah.[26] Larijani also told Hezbollah supporters during his visit to former Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s shrine in Lebanon that Iran ”will always and forever stand by your side.”[27]

Larijani and Qassem’s statements regarding Iranian support for Hezbollah are largely performative, given that Iran has struggled to provide meaningful support to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance in recent months. Iran failed to meaningfully support Hezbollah during and after the Israeli campaign in Lebanon in late 2024.[28] Iran also failed to intervene to defend its Syrian ally, the Bashar al Assad regime, from the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led offensive that overthrew the regime in December 2024.[29] The fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the Lebanese state’s crackdown on Iranian smuggling through Lebanese airports and border crossings have hindered Iran’s ability to reconstitute Hezbollah.[30] Iran’s reduced ability to smuggle weapons and money to Hezbollah has forced Iran to send Hezbollah cash instead of large weapons shipments.[31] Lebanon has been able to interdict some of these cash transfers.[32] Iran will also likely seek to reverse the damage that Israel inflicted on its nuclear, missile, and drone programs during the Israel-Iran War in the near future, which may further constrain Iran’s support for its proxies and partners, including Hezbollah.[33]

Iran’s failure to meaningfully support its proxies and partners in recent conflicts may have weakened the Axis of Resistance’s trust in Iran as a reliable partner. Hezbollah notably did not participate in the Israel-Iran War, stating that it would “not unilaterally launch an attack on Israel in support of Tehran.”[34] An unspecified Israeli military official told Saudi media on August 13 that Hezbollah ignored calls from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force to respond militarily to Israel.[35] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim. Hezbollah’s reported decision not to enter the Israel-Iran War may reflect that Hezbollah calculated that the cost of supporting Iran in the war outweighed the benefit of doing so. Hezbollah’s response to the Israel-Iran War differed from its response to the October 7 War, when Hezbollah joined Hamas in attacking Israel on October 8, 2023.[36] Iran’s other partners and proxies in the Axis of Resistance, excluding the Houthis, similarly did not intervene to support Iran during the war.[37]

Al Qaeda (AQ)-aligned groups in Syria will likely not be able to meaningfully influence the direction and policies of the Syrian government given Hayat Tahrir al Sham’s (HTS) historic and continued suppression of these groups.  Al Monitor reported on August 11 that Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials told a Pentagon official in June 2025 that some AQ-aligned groups, including Hurras al Din, continue to operate with “some degree of autonomy” under the new Syrian government, citing a recent DIA assessment.[38] The DIA officials noted that these groups’ autonomy enables former Hurras al Din fighters’ “freedom of movement.”[39] Hurras al Din is a Syrian AQ affiliate comprised of former Jabhat al Nusra fighters who opposed the group’s split from AQ in 2016 and defected to form Hurras al Din. HTS gradually sidelined and dismantled Hurras al Din and its operations room between 2017 and 2020 and has been accused of working with the United States to target remaining Hurras al Din fighters in Syria.[40] Hurras al Din formally dissolved itself in January 2025. Some former Hurras al Din fighters have since joined HTS-aligned, AQ-affiliated factions, such as Ansar al Islam. Ansar al Islam is an AQ-affiliated faction that formally operated in a Hurras al Din-led operations room before HTS pressured the faction to end its affiliation with Hurras al Din during HTS’s crackdown on the latter group. Ansar al Islam continues to operate ”freely” in Syria, according to the United Nations (UN). A UN Sanctions Committee report from July 2025 stated that senior Hurras al Din leaders are working with HTS defectors in northwestern Syria to form new factions.

The DIA assessed that AQ will probably seek to influence the Syrian government’s formation and policies, according to Al Monitor.[41] There are few means through which Salafi-jihadists, particularly from HTS’s longtime former rival Hurras al Din, could meaningfully influence the direction of the Syrian state, however. Many Salafi-jihadi ideologues have distanced themselves from Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in recent months in protest against his moderate governance and cooperation with the West.[42] Shara has appointed former AQ fighters and Salafi-jihadists to key posts in his government and military, but these men have remained allied with Shara since he disavowed the Islamic State in 2013 and AQ in 2016.[43] AQ-affiliated civil war-era factions have limited influence within Shara’s HTS-dominated coalition. The United Nations reported that the Syrian government has not yet “asserted full control” over several of these groups, including Ansar al Islam, Ansar al Tawhid, and Central Asian and Caucasian armed groups Katibat al Tawhid wa Jihad and Ajnad al Kavkaz.[44] The non-Syrian groups are known for their extreme loyalty to HTS, and Ansar al Islam and Ansar al Tawhid have operated under HTS oversight in recent years.[45]

Sunni hardliners’ presence in the ruling coalition places some constraints on the Syrian government’s ability to pursue its objectives, however. Shara has consolidated a coalition of former HTS allies and adversaries, many of whom subscribe to hardline, but not necessarily Salafi-jihadist, views. The Syrian government faces a challenge of appeasing both hardliners and those who support moderate governance in order to maintain this fragile coalition. The Syrian government’s need to retain Sunni hardliners’ loyalty places constraints on the government. The Defense Ministry has reflagged AQ-affiliated Ansar al Tawhid as the 82nd Division. Recent footage that circulated on social media showed that 82nd Division fighters executed a medical volunteer at Suwayda National Hospital on June 16.[46] Such extrajudicial killings severely erode the Syrian population’s trust in government forces, which limits the Defense Ministry‘s ability to deploy forces to respond to future threats.  A Washington, DC-based analyst noted that the Defense Ministry arrested the 82nd Division perpetrators but did not publicize their arrest out of concern over potential backlash from Sunni hardliners.[47] How the Syrian transitional government holds its forces accountable for the atrocities that they commit will influence the government’s legitimacy and perception among minority groups. The government’s failure to hold forces accountable for abuses would likely reinforce perceptions among minority groups that the transitional government tolerates or enables such abuses.

Key Takeaways

US-Iran Nuclear Negotiations: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has reportedly approved the resumption of nuclear negotiations with the United States because the Iranian regime views negotiations as necessary for the regime’s survival. Iran is very unlikely to accept a new nuclear agreement with the United States that would require it to halt uranium enrichment.
Iran-Hezbollah Relations: Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani and Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem overstated the degree of Iranian support to Hezbollah during a meeting in Beirut on August 14. Larijani and Qassem’s statements regarding Iranian support for Hezbollah are largely performative given that Iran has struggled to provide meaningful support to Hezbollah and other members of the Axis of Resistance in recent months.
Government Formation in Syria: Al Qaeda (AQ)-aligned groups in Syria will likely not be able to meaningfully influence the direction and policies of the Syrian government given Hayat Tahrir al Sham’s (HTS) historic and continued suppression of these groups. Sunni hardliners’ presence in the ruling coalition places some constraints on the Syrian government’s ability to pursue its objectives, however.

Iran

See topline section.

Iraq

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba Secretary General Akram al Kaabi released a statement on August 14 warning the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel against “taking steps against Iraq.”[48] Kaabi stated that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are ready to “respond harshly” to any ”blatant transgression.”[49] Kaabi reaffirmed his support for the Popular Mobilization Authority Law.[50] The Popular Mobilization Authority Law, which the Iraqi Parliament has not yet voted on, would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing the structure and responsibilities of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[51] Kaabi’s statement comes after the US State Department spokesperson reiterated on August 12 that the United States opposes the law.[52] UK Ambassador to Iraq Irfan Siddiq separately emphasized in an interview with Iraqi media on August 8 that Iraq no longer needs the PMF after the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[53]

An unidentified “informed source” told Iranian anti-regime media on August 14 that Iran would target unidentified sites in Iraqi Kurdistan if Israel attacks Iran again.[54] An Erbil-based opposition source claimed that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) warned Kurdish opposition groups following Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Larijani’s recent visit to Iraq that Iran could target these groups if Israel attacks Iran again. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this report. The report comes after Larijani signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Iraqi National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji on August 11 to address the dual threats of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Kurdish opposition groups based in Iraqi Kurdistan.[55] Iran views Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear area from which anti-regime Kurdish groups can operate against Iran.[56] Iran has long accused Kurdish opposition groups of helping Israel facilitate attacks on Iran and has previously pressured the Iraqi federal government to remove Kurdish opposition groups from the Iran-Iraq border.[57]

Syria

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) clashed with Syrian Ministry of Defense (MoD) forces across the Euphrates River between al Baghiliyah and al Junaynah, Deir ez Zor Province, on August 14.[58] An anonymous MoD source told Syrian media that the clash took place after SDF fighters fired at MoD forces.[59] The SDF and MoD forces clashed with small arms and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), which injured a local fisherman but caused no SDF or MoD casualties.[60] The Syrian Army’s 66th Division separately clashed with the SDF across the Euphrates River between al Duwayr and Garanji, Deir ez Zor Province, on August 14.[61]  These clashes follow similar clashes between the SDF and MoD forces in Tal Maaz, Aleppo Province, on August 12, that killed one Syrian Army soldier.[62] The recent increase in clashes between the SDF and MoD forces comes amid disagreements between the SDF, the transitional government, and Turkey over the SDF’s integration into the MoD.[63] Current negotiations between the SDF and the transitional government in Damascus have stalled, according to Syrian media.[64] Distrust and poor communication between Damascus and the SDF could cause a minor clash to escalate int[65]o renewed conflict, similar to how a small robbery fueled widespread intercommunal violence in Suwayda Province in July.[66]

Unidentified gunmen abducted four off-duty SDF fighters in Garanji, Deir ez Zor Province, on August 13. The SDF claimed that the gunmen were affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), but local sources reported that the gunmen were likely recently mobilized Arab tribal fighters.[67] The SDF stated on August 14 that a group affiliated with ISIS abducted four off-duty SDF fighters in Garanji.[68] The SDF raided Garanji to free the abducted SDF fighters. The SDF killed one of the abductors and wounded three others during the raid.[69] It is unclear whether the SDF fighters have been freed at the time of this writing. Local Syrian media rejected the SDF’s claim that the abductors were affiliated with ISIS and claimed that the abductors were recently mobilized Arab tribal fighters.[70] This incident comes after several Arab tribes have mobilized against the SDF in recent days. Sheikh Faraj al Hamoud al Salama of the al Nasser “al Bu Shaaban” clan announced a general mobilization against the SDF on August 11. Salama announced the mobilization in response to a conference organized by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria in Hasakah on August 8.[71]  Sheikh Yasser bin Aloush al Mashaal of the al Saab clan separately announced a general mobilization against the SDF on August 11.[72] Five additional Arab tribes have announced their mobilization against the SDF as of August 14.[73] The SDF previously clashed with Arab tribal forces in 2023 after it attempted to remove the head of the Deir ez Zor Military Council.[74]

A pro-government Turkish journalist claimed that a joint military offensive by Turkey and the Syrian transitional government against the SDF is imminent, likely to put pressure on the SDF to integrate into the Syrian state.[75] The journalist stated that ”[Turkish] troops that have been successful in [previous cross-border military operations] have been readied for the operation against the [SDF]…Four divisions are awaiting orders.”[76] The journalist also claimed that the SDF has increased its ”armed sabotage attempts” in Deir Hafer, Hasla, Manbij, Deir ez Zor, and the Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood of Aleppo City. CTP-ISW previously assessed on August 12 that both the SDF and MoD forces may be executing reconnaissance operations near Deir Hafer.[77] The Turkish journalist claimed that a military operation against the SDF would be conducted jointly by Turkey and the transitional justice. [78] The journalist did not provide evidence for his claims and it is unclear which Turkish Army divisions he was referring to. Turkey is likely applying pressure on the SDF as it has become increasingly disillusioned with the integration negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian transitional government. Turkey recently pressured Syria to withdraw from the US- and French-brokered integration negotiations in Paris with the SDF, which undermines US policy objectives in Syria.[79]

Arabian Peninsula

The Houthis launched a ballistic missile targeting Ben Gurion Airport in Israel on August 13.[80] The Israeli  Air Force intercepted a missile outside Israeli territory on August 13.[81] The Houthis have launched hundreds of drones and ballistic missiles targeting Israel since the Houthis began their campaign to enforce an economic “blockade” on Israel in October 2023.[82]

The Houthis continue to pose a credible threat to international shipping, which has caused transit levels through the Red Sea to remain below pre-October 2023 levels despite a reduction in Houthi attacks against international shipping in 2025.[83] 944 vessels transited the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in July 2025, according to data from maritime intelligence firm Lloyd’s List.[84] Lloyd’s List reported approximately 905 transits through the Bab el Mandeb in July 2024 compared to around 2,200 transits before October 2023.[85] The Houthis have only attacked two vessels in 2025, compared to over 100 attacks on vessels in 2024.[86]

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah is reportedly restructuring its payment system to “ensure its continued organizational resilience.”[87] A Hezbollah-focused analyst told Saudi media on August 13 that Hezbollah recognizes that any decline in its ability to pay salaries and provide services to Lebanese civilians “pose[s] an existential threat” to Hezbollah because these activities are part of “its current justification for existence.”[88] Hezbollah, therefore, has implemented a “rationalization” policy and reduced the salaries of Hezbollah supporters who do not hold official positions in the group.[89] Unspecified informed sources told Saudi media that these salary cuts affected thousands of Hezbollah-affiliated workers across various sectors.[90] Hezbollah similarly reduced its financial support for an unspecified allied political party and Hezbollah members who recently returned from Syria.[91] Hezbollah has also reduced its coverage of school and university tuition fees.[92] The analyst noted that Hezbollah has reportedly continued to pay the salaries of unspecified groups “considered central to its ideological structure.”[93]

The unspecified informed sources said that Hezbollah’s decision to restructure its payment system comes amid “internal financial pressures.”[94] Hezbollah has struggled to maintain its financial commitments to its fighters and Shia support base following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024. Hezbollah’s main financial institution, al Qard al Hassan, temporarily froze compensation payments to fighters in February 2025 and later indefinitely suspended payments to fighters in June 2025.[95] Hezbollah’s financial struggles have caused its Shia support base to grow increasingly frustrated with the organization. Hezbollah supporters have demanded answers from Hezbollah about when they will receive reconstruction funds and have raised concerns over the group’s ability to maintain its financial commitments.[96] Hezbollah has historically used financial benefits, including pensions for the families of deceased fighters and compensation for individuals who lost their homes or property, to retain its support base among Lebanese Shia.[97] Disruptions to Hezbollah’s ability to provide its support base with promised benefits may not have an immediate effect on the population’s support for Hezbollah, but could diminish support for Hezbollah over time.

Lebanese officials have taken steps to prevent clashes between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah during the implementation of the LAF’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Unspecified informed sources told pro-Hezbollah Lebanese media on August 13 that the LAF will form a ”joint liaison committee” with Hezbollah as part of its four-stage plan to disarm the group.[98] The Lebanese government previously tasked the LAF on August 5 with creating a plan to establish a state monopoly on arms across Lebanon by the end of 2025.[99] The committee will reportedly identify and document Hezbollah arms depots to prepare for Hezbollah to hand over its weapons to the LAF ”without force.”[100] Pro-Hezbollah media reported on August 13 that Lebanese officials have discussed ways to prevent any confrontation between the LAF and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[101] LAF Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri on August 12 that the LAF will not ”clash with a key component of the country.”[102] Unspecified sources also reported that Haykal told Hezbollah that the LAF’s disarmament plan ”cannot be implemented by force.”[103]

Hezbollah’s allies have indicated that they also seek to prevent clashes with the LAF. Hezbollah-allied Amal Movement minister Tamara al Zein told Lebanese media on August 14 that Berri “will try until the end to prevent Lebanon from reaching a clash or tensions.”[104] Lebanese media previously reported on August 11 that Berri continues to mediate between the Lebanese government and Hezbollah to resolve outstanding concerns.[105] Zein noted that ”it is totally impossible to witness inter-Lebanese fighting.”[106] Hezbollah, however, has continued to reject calls to disarm and emphasized that it will ignore the government’s decision to disarm the group.[107] Hezbollah’s continued refusal to disarm will likely complicate the Lebanese government and LAF’s ability to implement the disarmament plan.[108]

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/diplomacy-or-defiance-irans-rulers-face-existential-choice-after-us-israeli-2025-08-14/

[2] https://en.mehrnews dot com/news/235102/Norwegian-Deputy-Foreign-Minister-meets-with-Araghchi; https://iranwire.com/en/news/142494-exclusive-senior-officials-cannot-reach-khamenei-ali-larijani-wants-to-rescue-iran/

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/diplomacy-or-defiance-irans-rulers-face-existential-choice-after-us-israeli-2025-08-14/

[4] https://farsi.khamenei dot ir/news-content?id=60355

[5] https://english.kyodonews dot net/articles/-/59014

[6] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/08/13/iran-fears-existential-threat-over-britains-nuclear-sanctio/

[7] https://x.com/jnbarrot/status/1955576587736240273

[8] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/08/13/iran-fears-existential-threat-over-britains-nuclear-sanctio/

[9] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/08/13/iran-fears-existential-threat-over-britains-nuclear-sanctio/

[10] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/14/3370075/

[11] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/larijani-has-the-credentials-but-not-the-charisma-to-be-irans-president/

[12] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484

[13] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484

[14] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484

[15] https://www.shora-gc dot ir/fa/news/5959/%D9%88%D8%B8%D8%A7%DB%8C%D9%81-%D9%88-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%B1%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%86%DA%AF%D9%87%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%86

[16] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484

[17] https://www.axios.com/2018/01/05/inside-the-classified-israeli-report-on-the-iran-protests-1515110949 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-quandary-how-stay-out-israels-war-hamas-2023-10-22/ ; https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/mahsa-amini-iran-protests-continue-public-rejects-regimes-propaganda-rcna51270

 

[18] https://www.rouhanihassan dot com/Fa/News/116484

[19] https://www.mehrnews dot com/news/4551984

[20] https://iranwire.com/en/features/142441-irans-senior-clerics-stay-silent-amid-war-as-former-president-seeks-compromise/ ;

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-report-june-23-2025-evening-edition

[21] https://iranwire.com/en/features/142441-irans-senior-clerics-stay-silent-amid-war-as-former-president-seeks-compromise/ ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/03/29/3338554/

[22] https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2025/06/inside-plot-push-khamenei-aside/683286/

[23] https://iranwire.com/en/news/142494-exclusive-senior-officials-cannot-reach-khamenei-ali-larijani-wants-to-rescue-iran/

[24] https://t.me/mmirleb/9836

[25] https://t.me/mmirleb/9836

[26] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/23/3376178

[27] https://x.com/AlMayadeenNews/status/1955704999909958032

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/israels-victory-lebanon ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-25-2025

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reshaping-iran%E2%80%99s-axis-resistance

[30] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-25-2023 ; https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2020/03/the-transformation-of-the-iraqi-syrian-border-from-a-national-to-a-regional-frontier?lang=en&center=middle-east ; https://newlinesmag.com/spotlight/life-returns-to-al-bukamal-after-iranian-militias-flee/ ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-7-2025

[31] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-28-2025

[32] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2025/03/02/lebanon-seizes-funds-bound-for-hezbollah-at-beirut-airport/

[33] https://www.brandeis.edu/stories/2025/june/inside-iran.html

[34] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/hezbollah-iran-israel-war/

[35] https://www.alhadath dot net/2025/08/13/رئيس-اركان-اسرائيل-من-جنوب-لبنان-لن-نسمح-للتهديدات-بالنمو-من-جديد- ; https://x.com/ariel_oseran/status/1955677992690065540

[36] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et

[37] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-special-edition-israeli-strikes-iran-june-13-2025-200-pm-et

[38] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/08/pentagon-al-qaeda-remnants-seek-influence-syrias-new-government

[39] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/08/pentagon-al-qaeda-remnants-seek-influence-syrias-new-government

[40] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/hurras-al-din-the-rise-fall-and-dissolution-of-al-qaidas-loyalist-group-in-syria

[41] https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/08/pentagon-al-qaeda-remnants-seek-influence-syrias-new-government

[42] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-24-2024

[43] https://www.csis.org/blogs/examining-extremism/examining-extremism-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-hts ; https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-fight-for-supremacy-in-northwest-syria-and-the-implications-for-global-jihad/ ; https://academic.oup.com/book/57951  ; https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2024/12/al-jolani-from-extremism-to-moderation/

[44] https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/482

[45] https://www.danielegarofalomonitoring.com/p/yurtugh-tactical-interview-with-their?ref=syriaaccountability.org ; https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-military-hts-blowback-concerns/33266542.html; https://www.counterextremism.com/armed-opposition-groups-nw-syria/jamaat-ansar-al-islam-jai ; https://www.counterextremism.com/armed-opposition-groups-nw-syria/ansar-al-tawhid-aat

[46] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1955306894459109737; https://x.com/suwayda24/status/1954520917066821658

[47] https://x.com/GregoryPWaters/status/1955309227343241330 

[48] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/171

[49] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/171

[50] https://t.me/Akram_Alkaabi/171

[51] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-6-2025 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2025

[52] https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-august-12-2025/

[53] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3s4gz6fAc1c

[54] https://www.iranintl dot com/202508140923

[55] https://ina dot iq/ar/political/240700-.html ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-iran-sign-deal-tighten-border-security-2023-03-19/ ; https://www.shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%80%D9%86/%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%86%D8%B7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86

[56] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2025

[57] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%BA%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%A8%D8%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AC%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%A9

[58] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769203/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/

[59] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769203/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/ ; https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D8%A7%D8%B4%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%83%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%88%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF

[60] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769203/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/

[61] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769203/%d8%a7%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a8%d8%a7%d9%83%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%a8%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%81%d8%a7%d8%b9-%d9%88%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%af%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b2%d9%88%d8%b1/

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025

[63] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025

[64] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769266/%d9%85%d9%81%d8%a7%d9%88%d8%b6%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d9%84%d9%87%d8%a7-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%aa%d8%b9%d8%b2%d9%8a%d8%b2%d8%a7%d8%aa-%d9%85%d8%a7-%d8%a7%d8%ad%d8%aa%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a7/#

[65] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2025

[66] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-july-14-2025

[67] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769228/%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%aa%d8%aa%d9%87%d9%85-%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%ae%d8%b7%d9%81-%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%87%d8%a7/ ; https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46277

[68] https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46277

[69] https://www.enabbaladi dot net/769228/%d9%82%d8%b3%d8%af-%d8%aa%d8%aa%d9%87%d9%85-%d8%aa%d9%86%d8%b8%d9%8a%d9%85-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%af%d9%88%d9%84%d8%a9-%d8%a8%d8%ae%d8%b7%d9%81-%d8%b9%d9%86%d8%a7%d8%b5%d8%b1%d9%87%d8%a7/ ; https://sdf-press dot com/archives/46277

[70] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/150184

[71] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7 ; https://www.facebook.com/farj.hamoud/posts/pfbid02T2naSj1SW1tnZogfMccc4M484uDGg3QFth8TRG46pgysnSXEkmPudwpWFAjt4duWl ; https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2555932148100626

[72] https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B6%D9%87-%D9%85%D8%A4%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B3%D8%AF-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%B9%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%B9%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B6%D8%AF%D9%87%D8%A7

[73] https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/150166 ; https://t.me/AbomosaabSharkea/150167 ; https://x.com/ALI_M9H/status/1955716367073653241

[74] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/sdfs-insurgency-challenge-deir-ez-zor

[75] https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/isgalci-ypg-sabirlari-tasirdi-operasyon-icin-son-uyari-1138003

[76] https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/isgalci-ypg-sabirlari-tasirdi-operasyon-icin-son-uyari-1138003

[77] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025

[78] https://www.turkiyegazetesi dot com.tr/gundem/isgalci-ypg-sabirlari-tasirdi-operasyon-icin-son-uyari-1138003

[79] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-12-2025

[80] https://t.me/army21ye/3295

[81] https://x.com/idfonline/status/1955803363221836001

[82] https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/12/briefing-on-developments-related-to-houthi-attacks-on-israel.php ; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/idf-says-houthis-have-launched-40-missiles-320-drones-at-israel-since-start-of-war/

[83] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154516/Houthis-offer-reassurance-to-compliant-vessels-with-Red-Sea-FAQs

[84] https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1154516/Houthis-offer-reassurance-to-compliant-vessels-with-Red-Sea-FAQs

[85] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[86] https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/756ca769315d4b879ca7fdd6bd4a82be

[87] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[88] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[89] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[90] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[91] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[92] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[93] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[94] https://aawsat dot com/العالم-العربي/المشرق-العربي/5174906-تراجع-الدعم-الخارجي-يرغم-حزب-الله-على-ترشيد-الإنفاق

[95] https://www.newarab.com/news/hezbollah-freezes-war-compensation-al-qard-al-hassan-report ; https://www.jns.org/hezbollah-struggling-to-pay-followers-in-wake-of-israels-offensive/ ; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/22/hezbollah-lebanon-iran-financial-crisis/

[96] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/02/22/hezbollah-lebanon-iran-financial-crisis/ ; https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/04/world/middleeast/hezbollah-weapons-lebanon.html

[97] https://ict.org dot il/hezbollahs-financing-ecosystem-crime-families-as-a-case-study/

[98] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض ; https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314684-report-army-hezbollah-panel-to-be-formed-to-implement-disarmament-plan

[99] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanon-tasks-army-with-limiting-arms-state-forces-challenge-hezbollah-2025-08-05 / ; https://x.com/nawafasalam/status/1952798986470916262

[100] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[101] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[102] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314684-report-army-hezbollah-panel-to-be-formed-to-implement-disarmament-plan ; https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[103] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314684-report-army-hezbollah-panel-to-be-formed-to-implement-disarmament-plan

[104] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314713-al-zein-says-barrack-paper-scary-govt-to-discuss-army-plan-on-sep-2

[105] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314647-report-berri-backs-full-army-role-as-he-negotiates-with-hezbollah

[106] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314713-al-zein-says-barrack-paper-scary-govt-to-discuss-army-plan-on-sep-2

[107] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ypld9rg21o ; https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-israel-hezbollah-disarmament-kassem-cabinet-7d8cca554405c85e80b010df0770b1ca

[108] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-11-2025