Over the past 20 years, Türkiye has witnessed a significant transformation and growth. Major advances have been made in areas ranging from education to health care, transportation to infrastructure, and security to the defense industry. In the first century of the republic, many of the shortcomings in citizens’ access to public services have been addressed, particularly within the last quarter-century. Looking at the current state, as Vedat Bilgin also emphasizes in his book “Türkiye Tartışmaları: Batılılaşmadan Modernleşmeye” (“Debates on Türkiye: From Westernization to Modernization”), three major turning points stand out in Turkish political life in this context. The first rupture occurred with the breakdown of the traditional state-society relationship, evolving into a system of bureaucratic domination. The second turning point saw Westernization policies become mainstream in the cultural structure. Thus, the second rupture served to reinforce the first, providing a general framework and shaping the flow of everyday life. The third has been the attempt to overcome the structure fortified by the first and second ruptures through democratization processes following the transition to a multiparty system.
The actors of the structure built through the first and second ruptures enjoyed a comfortable life in the country for a long period, thanks to the advantages they possessed. This group, with the resources at its disposal, held central positions in all spheres of life. The social networks they belonged to were continuously reinforced and expanded in education, culture, art, governance, economy and politics. Those outside of this group were viewed, through an Orientalist lens – particularly in line with the new discourse constructed during the second rupture – as passive segments of society that needed to be transformed.
Over time, the ability of those who based their politics on this discourse to represent society has steadily diminished. For political parties as well, the greatest risk is becoming alienated from society. However, time flows onward, and it rewards those who embrace its momentum. This is precisely where the strength of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has emerged: By capturing the country’s social change dynamic and momentum, it has been able to translate it into politics. After intense struggles and the traumas experienced in the process of constructing a new discourse – a process that has been ongoing since the 1950s – the rise of the AK Party, especially over the past 20 years, has carried this movement into a new phase. As a result, the third rupture has now fully materialized.
A new language in politics
At the current stage, the main characteristic of the transformation experienced in all areas is that it relies on the same language. Therefore, when we look at the new language that has become mainstream in recent years, it becomes evident that – despite its shortcomings – its core characteristic is an approach that, on the one hand, seeks to draw upon the country’s significant historical experience and heritage, and on the other, remains open to the achievements of the West and the contemporary world, striving to synthesize both. In other words, it is an initiative that considers the country’s past, its social fabric, and particularly its experiences over the past two centuries, while also attempting to respond to the challenges of the modern world. Moreover, it aims to encompass society as a whole.
In short, at this point – albeit after a significant delay – the approach of a new political language that places society and historical experience at its center while also embracing global developments has become mainstream, and its construction process is ongoing. The fact that this new language became mainstream just before a period marked by major waves of change across the world and the decline of the Western narrative is particularly significant and has strengthened Türkiye’s position.
Therefore, the third rupture is not a simple change but a profound transformation. The language of life is changing. Naturally, this deep transformation will bring with it its own pains, crises and new challenges. Türkiye, through the opportunities provided by this new language, has entered a very different phase compared to the past. At this stage, new problems have emerged that need to be addressed, and former approaches are no longer sufficient in solving them. In other words, if one does not learn to surf with the new dynamics of the new era, the costs will be much greater precisely because a growing Türkiye is being built. For this reason, this article will highlight two fundamental and increasingly visible problems that have emerged at this stage and urgently need to be resolved.
Are the middle classes collapsing?
The most distinctive feature of this period is the inclusion of the masses in the broader system. During this era, all segments of society – without discrimination – have been able to easily access public services ranging from education to health care, and from transportation to infrastructure. At the same time, with stable economic growth, the overall level of prosperity has continuously increased, and the middle classes have become significantly stronger. The greatest beneficiaries of this period have been the middle and lower socioeconomic classes.
In this context, an interesting pattern has emerged across the world. Especially since the 1980s, a process triggered by the spread of automation has led to the continuous erosion of the middle classes. Initially manifesting itself in employment, this pattern has resulted in the loss of existing jobs for middle-class workers with each wave of general-purpose technological transformation. They have increasingly been forced into lower-skilled – and consequently lower-paid – jobs. As these large segments of the workforce lose ground in labor markets, they gradually find themselves unable to access services that were once readily available to them. The quality gap in accessible services continues to widen. When people are unable to access quality services, a vicious cycle begins to take hold — one that affects large portions of the population. Each disadvantage increasingly leads to disadvantages in other areas as well.
Societies are being divided into two groups: a small number of high earners with vast opportunities, and large masses with very limited means. This process, felt acutely in the U.S. and in many European countries, is also reshaping politics. In particular, immigration policies and rising xenophobia are among the political consequences of this shift.
What is striking is that, at a time when the decline of the middle classes has nearly run its course in all developed countries, Türkiye has instead seen its middle classes – its large masses – move closer to the center and grow significantly stronger compared to the past. Economically, they have also reached a better position. However, in recent years, especially with mounting economic difficulties, these gains have been steadily weakening. In Türkiye as well, the disparities in the quality of services accessed are growing, and the cost of accessing higher-quality services is rising continuously –often to unaffordable levels for the majority. In other words, once the issue of basic access to services has been resolved, the focus now shifts to the quality of those services and the severity of the disparities in that quality.
Therefore, although this deep pattern affecting the entire world has not fully materialized in the country yet, it is already showing its early signs and the trajectory it is likely to follow. For this reason, every necessary measure must be taken to reverse this trajectory and to reinforce the middle classes –just as they were empowered at the beginning of this period. Because this is not merely an economic process; it is one that will impact and distort everything at a sociological level. Just as societies with a strong middle class tend to be more hopeful and resilient, the weakening of the middle class facilitates the emergence of numerous new problems whose solutions are extremely costly. In other words, the middle class functions like a society’s immune system. Its weakening poses a serious risk to societal health. Therefore, the top priority of all institutions and organizations should be to strengthen the middle class – the broad masses – in a way that enables them to withstand this transformation.
Is demographic advantage disappearing?
In the past century, a range of factors – such as industrialization, urbanization, increasingly difficult living conditions, the rise of individualism as a central life value, a focus on quality of life, and especially the gradual disappearance of the middle classes – have directly influenced the population growth rates of countries. In this context, another critical issue that we must now confront has emerged. The population, which has always been one of Türkiye’s greatest advantages, is gradually losing its capacity for renewal.
A detailed analysis of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) data reveals critical changes in two key indicators. The first is the shift in fertility rates. The fertility rate, which was 2.38 in 2001, dropped to 1.51 in 2023 and further declined to 1.48 in 2024. Considering that the replacement level fertility rate must be 2.1 for a population to sustain itself, this trend indicates that the population will continue to age, and the proportion of young people will decline. The second indicator concerns the change in the age group with the highest fertility rate. In 2001, the highest age-specific fertility rate was observed in the 20-24 age group, whereas by 2023, it had shifted to the 25-29 age group. Fertility is increasingly being delayed to later ages. This postponement of childbirth is also contributing to the overall decline in fertility rates.
In 2024, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released a report titled “How are demographic changes affecting education systems?”, which examines how ongoing demographic transformations are impacting education. The report evaluates how changes in the child population between 2013 and 2022 have influenced the education policies of various countries. The report’s most significant finding is that approximately 80% of OECD countries have experienced a substantial decline in the population of children aged 0-4. Türkiye is among the countries that have seen a decrease in this age group. As the report highlights, although the general downward trend in birth rates has led to a noticeable drop in the 0-4 age group, the effects of this trend have not yet fully manifested in the 5-14 age group. However, countries like South Korea, Italy and Greece have already experienced significant declines in that older age group as well. Across OECD countries, the number of children aged 5-14 increased by an average of 4.5% between 2013 and 2022. In Türkiye, however, the population growth in the 5-14 age group was below the OECD average.
While the report presents important findings regarding the past decade, it also offers significant insights for the near future. Indeed, based on projections for the 2022-2031 period, the report anticipates that 37 out of 47 countries with available data will experience a decline in the 5-14 age group. The largest projected decreases are expected to occur in South Korea (a 37% decline), Italy (an 18% decline), and Finland (a 16% decline). Although a decline is not projected for Türkiye during this period, the expected increase is seen to be very modest. Among the countries included in the projections, Israel stands out as the most remarkable case. Contrary to the declining trend, Israel shows significant growth in both the 0-4 and 5-14 age groups. Moreover, it is projected to have the highest increase (17%) in the 5-14 age group between 2022 and 2031.
In summary, the state of population renewal in the country is sounding a serious alarm. The risk is clear. Regardless of the underlying causes of the sharp decline in Türkiye’s population growth rate, it is possible to reverse this trend and ensure population renewal – provided that meaningful and effective socioeconomic policies are developed and implemented with determination. The frequent emphasis by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on having three children will serve as an important foundation for the development of such policies. In this context, several policies implemented particularly in developed countries can serve as examples: offering flexible working conditions for parents with multiple children, significantly increasing child-related payments to families, providing free access to preschool education, offering substantial tax deduction options, and granting advantages in home ownership are just a few of the measures adopted in this regard.
The designation of 2025 as the “Year of the Family” and the steps taken in this context are significant. On the other hand, policies aimed at strengthening the middle class will also contribute indirectly yet substantially to addressing this issue. This is because the greatest contribution to increasing birth rates in countries comes from the middle classes. The dramatic rise in birth rates during the 1960s – commonly referred to as the “baby boom” – was not a coincidence. These were periods when the middle classes were expanding, receiving the largest share of the economic pie, and becoming more empowered. During this time, the middle classes held stable, well-paying jobs, and rates of home ownership increased. As a result, the material conditions necessary for raising children were established. Ultimately, this allowed middle-class families to look to the future with greater confidence, facilitating earlier marriages and the decision to have more than one child.