The Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) was conspicuously absent during the unprecedented 12-day June war with Israel.

Its fighter jets are so antiquated that, with a few exceptions, the Israeli Air Force largely left them alone.

With another round of hostilities seemingly inevitable, and having waited in vain for Su-35 Flanker fighters it ordered from Russia years ago, the question of whether Iran will turn to China to modernise its air force is arguably more relevant than ever.

Shortly after Israel’s air force launched a devastating series of surprise airstrikes throughout Iran, including its capital, Tehran, on 13 June, a solitary Soviet-made IRIAF MiG-29A Fulcrum, tasked with defending Tehran’s airspace, was spotted after being scrambled far too late.

Days later, the Israeli military released footage of one of its drones destroying two American-made F-14A Tomcat airframes, which Iran acquired before the 1979 revolution, parked in Tehran’s Mehrabad airport.

Otherwise, IRIAF fighters stuck to patrolling around their airbases. They did nothing even to hinder the unprecedented Israeli aerial juggernaut.

Israel’s premier fifth-generation American-made F-35 Lightning II stealth strike fighters cleared the way for its non-stealthy fourth-generation F-16s to strike targets across Iran.

Those stealth jets likely destroyed most of Iran’s ground-based Russian-made strategic S-300 air defence missile systems in a previous one-night operation last October.

Iran’s F-14A and MiG-29A are its only fourth-generation aircraft and are both early models. Despite nominally close ties with Russia, Iran hasn’t had its MiG-29s, which it acquired in the early 1990s, upgraded.

Furthermore, the Su-35s that it had long counted on Russia delivering to help it upgrade its air force haven’t come, despite Iran reportedly having ordered and paid for 50 of them by 2021.

With its ineffective air force and an unreliable supplier in the form of Russia, it’s conceivable that Iran may turn to China for 4.5-generation Chengdu J-10C Vigorous Dragon fighters.

With its advanced radar and long-range PL-15 air-to-air missile, such an acquisition could substantially upgrade the IRIAF, especially if it ultimately serves as a stopgap solution until Tehran eventually acquires fifth-generation aircraft. China plans to offer its J-35 stealth jet for export.

Iran had previously requested that China sell it the J-10C, but Beijing refused, reportedly unhappy with Tehran’s offer to pay with oil shipments. Analysts previously made the case that Tehran’s best bet was to upgrade its air force with a mixture of 4.5-generation Chinese and Russian-made fighters such as the Su-35 and J-10C in the 2020s or early 2030s.

Subsequent events, mainly the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the June 2025 Israel-Iran War, could well have disrupted any such long-term plans.

The June war, and the successful combat debut of the J-10C and PL-15 in Pakistani service during the short May war with India, have reportedly revived Iranian interest in that Chinese fighter.

“Iran has long had a wish-list of Chinese fighters and naturally the defence minister hopes that he might be able to realise some of these wishes after his trip to China,” Arash Azizi, a visiting fellow at Boston U and author of ‘The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US, and Iran’s Global Ambitions’, told The New Arab.

Iranian Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh travelled to China in late June to attend a gathering of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation mere days after a ceasefire ended the June war. An unconfirmed Taiwanese news report claimed that Nasirzadeh requested J-10Cs.

“Iranians are particularly after J-16 Qianlong made by Shenyang and the J-10,” Azizi said. “The latter is especially resonant to Iranians since Pakistan used them to attack Iran last year.”

Islamabad responded to Iranian ballistic missile and drone strikes against alleged militant targets on Pakistani soil in January 2024, following an Islamic State attack inside Iran, with airstrikes in a brief but intense exchange.

Iran’s air force was conspicuously absent during the unprecedented 12-day June war with Israel. [Getty]

The contrast between Pakistan’s extensive use of modern fighter jets armed with standoff munitions in its retaliation and Iran’s exclusive use of uncrewed drones and missiles was instantly noticeable.

It demonstrated how the IRIAF has become much less relevant in the execution of Iranian military operations than its Pakistani counterpart.

“Some even dream of getting the fifth-generation J-35, which would need adjustments to work for Iranian needs,” Azizi added.

Pakistan is the first foreign country to acquire the J-10C, and China has already offered Islamabad 40 J-35s. However, it’s doubtful that Iran could follow a similar procurement path since Pakistan has long been a much closer military partner with China.

In the unlikely event China does agree to sell Iran any fighters, it would probably only agree to sell 4.5-generation fighters like the J-10C before even considering the possibility of a J-35 deal.

“Iran has multiple problems. The most basic one is money,” Azizi said. “The J-10, for instance, reportedly costs $50 million each. Iran will have a problem affording the billions necessary for a large number of them.”

And that’s if China even agrees to sell them in the first place.

To date, no Middle East country has acquired any fourth-generation Chinese fighter jets. The last time Iran acquired Chinese fighters was four decades ago, and those were less sophisticated third-generation aircraft. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has notably bought some L-15A Falcon jet trainers from Beijing in recent years. Aircraft like those may prove a more realistic option for Tehran.

“China is indeed more likely to agree to sell Iran a low-profile multi-purpose jet trainer like L-15 than a high-performance fighter jet like J-10, J-11 or J-16,” Farzin Nadimi, a defence and security analyst and Senior Fellow of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told TNA.

“Toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War, China sold Iran about 35 Chengdu F-7N and FT-7N fighters and jet trainers, but they were not delivered until after the war ended,” Nadimi said. “And the delivery of a handful of J-6 aircraft to the new IRGC (Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary) Air Force was never confirmed,” he added.

“Even if such a delivery actually took place, they never entered operational service.”

Ahmed Aboudouh, an associate fellow with the Chatham House Middle East and North Africa Programme, also believes Beijing is unlikely to provide Tehran with advanced fighter jets anytime soon.

“This is because it takes seriously the US, Israel, and the Gulf states’ preferences and the potential implications on its balancing strategy in the region,” he told TNA.

“China is also apprehensive about Iran’s ability to reverse-engineer its advanced aviation technology and preference to pay in oil due to the hard currency preservation policy, which is not preferred by the Chinese arms industry.”

Iran undoubtedly wants to replace its degraded air defences. It’s purportedly interested in acquiring HQ-9B systems, China’s equivalent of Russia’s S-300. According to at least one report in early July, China has already delivered unspecified surface-to-air missile batteries to Iran since the war. Beijing has officially denied this.

“I don’t think these reports on delivering air defence systems are accurate or reflect China’s policies in the region. Advanced military tech is not on the cards with Iran,” Aboudouh said.

“However, there might be an avenue for cooperation in dual-use equipment and sub-components related to Iran’s missile and drone programmes as Iran seeks to rehabilitate them,” he added. “This kind of cooperation is unlikely to be made public.”

The Washington Institute’s Nadimi also noted there is little precedent to suggest China would supply such high-end weapons systems.

“China has always been very cautious when it comes to selling military hardware to Iran, and on occasions has preferred to transfer limited production know-how to Iran instead, such as advanced missile guidance systems and anti-ship cruise missiles,” he said.

“But even in those cases, the cooperation was very limited and bumpy, and Iran had to pursue parallel reverse engineering paths in order to fully internalise those technologies.”

“It is very unlikely that China will sell Iran fighter jets or air defence systems,” he added. “But some limited but effective cooperation, like allowing Iran to use BeiDou military-grade signals or provide Iran with air defence integration equipment and software, is more likely.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.

Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon