Counter-Counterattacks, Hungarian Humor, Duking It Out at Long Range

See? I told you the “Big Meeting” in DC with Trump, Zelensky and all the European leaders would be a Big. Fat. Waste. Of. Time. Image of a cartoon rendition of the US and Russian Presidents.

Meanwhile plenty has been happening in the real war. But first, tech marches on, I’m starting things off with an image of an enterprising Ukrainian drone crew who figured out how to deliver a 155mm shell by drone. A top-end 155mm precision-guided 155mm shell these days probably costs about $150,000 to $200,000.

This Ukrainian version of a precision-guided 155mm shell is of course a lot more susceptible to things like wind and anti-aircraft cannon, but, it can probably plop a 155mm shell with similar precision as the high-end NATO version, for about $4,000/strike if it’s dropped, and $30,000/strike if as a kamikaze.

Clever Ukrainians figure out a cheap way to get a 155mm shell to target without a howitzer.

More on the Assault Infantry

This week we saw Russian assaults continue at a typical pace, and more Ukrainian assaults than usual. The overall trend is still Russia gaining ground, but, it’s postage-size pieces of territory that really don’t have much effect the stability of the Ukrainian defenses.

On the Ukrainian side, I would say the most interesting news came from Monday, when headquarters AFU (Syrsky) announced that there was a new branch of troops called the Assault Infantry, and that one Valentyn Manko, a not completely obscure colonel, had been appointed to command them. Image from 225th Regiment during night training.

Some of you will remember that I’ve been arguing for several months that the Russo-Ukrainian War is anything from stagnant and that both sides continue to seek ways to make attacks, and that the Ukrainian solution seems to be heading towards infantry trained in and skilled in short-distance assaults, backed with tanks, drones, artillery and so on. These guys are called the “Assault Infantry.”

Manko was formerly head of one of these formations, 33rd Assault Regiment, and he also was a pretty active Vblogger usually recording content on the situation of the front, while he was driving to or from a particular section of the front.

Valentyn Manko: screen grab from his Vblog in which is provides a front update while driving his car.

In the pre-2014 days he was a successful farmer, Donetsk region, if you search you can find claims he was involved in hostile takeovers. When the Russians invaded for the first time he helped raise a big militia unit linked with Pravy Sektor and fought mostly in northern Donetsk region. From 2014-2021 he continued in business and tried to get elected to parliament – not successful in politics. Raised a bigger volunteer unit when the Russians invaded a second time, fought on every front you can pick, by 2025 is commanding a regular army regiment. As a commander prioritizes discipline, professionalism and planning.

So, once again, we have a case of basically a civilian, in no way a professional soldier, not only rising to a position of real responsibility in the AFU, but doing so on the strength of personal charisma, doubtless local connections, and especially the ability to implement new tactics – well, not precisely new, the Germans pretty much came up with infantry assault tactical doctrine in 1918 – within the AFU. Again, I have to ask, why is it that the AFU professional officer corps isn’t coming up with men like this? Why isn’t NATO training officers like Manko? Or more exactly and to the point: Assault infantry UNITS? Especially companies.

Why is it being left to the grass roots of the AFU to implement infantry tactics that the Imperial Germans figured out more than a century ago?

(If this is happening and I don’t know about it, please correct me and apologies.)

This is not to say that the assault infantry is the only AFU force that seems able to launch effective ground attacks, next section will offer up details. But I’m already reading that the assault infantry regiments’ role will be to act as “Syrsky’s fire brigades.” So at bottom this is another window into how unique an organization the AFU is, there are proper professional soldiers and right next to them there are effectively self-taught “amateurs,” and the thing is, the “amateurs” frequently seem to be able to find a faster path to combat effectiveness than the “professionals.”

Dobropillya and attack trends

The first half of this week saw the continued Ukrainian reduction of the Russian salient pushing towards Dobropillya, in the Pokrovsk region, but by the middle of the week fighting had stabilized and there were even reports of, er, Russian counter-counterattacks. As of today I would say the best read would be both sides in close contact and trying to hunt each other down. So from a map point of view, the upshot of a week’s fighting is it seems like the Russians were able to hold and at least partially reinforce about half of the salient, but it’s still not clear whether they can hold the half they have.

What is curious and possibly noteworthy is this: Although the clear trend is that across the front the Russians are attacking more than the Ukrainians, and gaining bit of ground or establishing fire dominance over bits of ground more than the Ukrainians, we are seeing more Ukrainian counterattacks than in the past. What’s more, the pace seems sustained – for the past four weeks it’s been possible to identify places where the Ukrainians put in counterattacks and pushed the Russians back a bit.

Whether this is Syrsky panicking and throwing reserves at problems, or Syrsky having judged the Russians are out of steam in places and vulnerable to counter-strikes, or Syrsky having accumulated assault-type infantry in sufficient quantity that he feels comfortable committing some of it in local assault, I don’t know. Image of two screen grabs from 93rd Mech Brigade in assault in this sector, from the week.

Two combat images published this week by 93rd Mech Brigade from fighting around Dobropillya

Saturday, Aug. 16

RU – Advanced at three locations, took control of Zeleny Hai.

UA – Attacks led by Air assault infantry and Azov cut Dobropillya salient into two pieces, Ukraine troops take village Novomykolaivka, Sumy region. 5th Heavy Mech liberates Andriivka-Klevtsovy, near Pokrovsk.

Sunday, Aug. 17

RU – Advanced at three locations.

UA – Village Varachyne, Sumy region liberated, 1,000-meter advance claimed near the village of Yablunivka.

Monday, Aug. 18

RU – Advanced at three locations.

UA – Kucheriv Yar in Dobropillya taken for good, 425 Assault Regiment reports it advanced 3 km. on Donetsk-Dnipropetrovsk border region near the villages of Kotlyarivka and Horikhove. Here’s a slick video of the regiment in action:

Tuesday, Aug 19

RU – Advanced at two locations

UA – Probably this day – 5th Heavy Mech advances in the western Donetsk region to recapture Tolstoi, days after retaking Andriivka-Klevtsove

Wednesday, Aug. 20

RU – Advanced at five locations

UA – Pankivaka village, Dobropillya sector taken.

Thursday, Aug. 21

RU – Advanced at four locations

UA – Dobropillya; Syrsky reports six villages cleared. Maps show Russian forces in two small pockets, both in forests. However, no fresh reports of Ukrainian advances.

Friday, Aug. 22

RU – Advanced at two areas in Serebriansky Forest.

UA -Captured Novopavlika plus Zeleny Hai (lost earlier in the week), late Friday capture of Yalta village near Dobropillya reported; all this by 1/37 Marines. 

The bottom line here is that anyone drawing a picture of relentless Russian advances isn’t looking at the actual front. It’s big picture static and small picture back and forth, with Russia having a moderate advantage in ground gains, but the Ukrainians are certainly not just sitting passive. Which is a bit of a change.

Russia blasts Ukraine and respects America

We here in Ukraine had all been anticipating it for weeks, and we all pretty much knew that after Trump got his photo op with Zelensky and the Europeans in Washington, the Russians were going to cut loose. The meetings took place on Monday the Aug. 18 and concluded at about 2000 GMT which, for those of us that check such things, was about 2300 Moscow time.

About two hours later the Russian bombers were in the air, and about four hours later the cruise missiles were coming off the rails and the Shahed drones started launching in their hundreds.

Again, I want to make this clear: About four hours after the US President Donald J. Trump telephoned Russian President Vladimir Putin to discuss peace in Ukraine, and during which conversation according to Trump Putin committed to a peace process and negotiations.

Anyway, by the time the explosions started in Ukraine it was Tuesday. From what I gather it was 270 Shahed drones, 5 Iskander-M missiles and 5 Kh-101 cruise missiles; the Ukrainians later claimed they shot down most of that but admitted 1 Iskander and 1 Kh-101 got through, along with maybe 40 Shaheds. The main target was the Kremenchuk oil refinery; by the time the explosions were finished the site was on fire from end to end. Poltava, Odesa and Lubny also got hit; in the first two it was clearly energy infrastructure the Russians were after. There also were strikes in Sumy, Dnipro and Kyiv. In Kharkiv an apartment building was hit, seven dead including an entire family of five. I’ve seen figures that nationwide 15 people were killed and 76 injured.

Kharkiv family, killed on Aug. 18 approximately five hours after Trump talked to Putin about peace.

Besides the death toll, this is about as cut-and-dried a case of the Kremlin spitting in America’s face, that one could possibly imagine. How a US leader tolerates such behavior from Russia is absolutely beyond me, but I’m biased.

There was just a reconnaissance attack on Tuesday-Wednesday, less than 100 Shaheds and I think a single missile; the general understanding is that this type of attack is intended to keep Ukrainian air defenses tired and hopefully to suss out their locations.

Then on Thursday the Russians launched what I believe to have been the second-biggest air attack on Ukraine, by count of incoming weapons capable of exploding, of the entire war. The final count was 614 munitions, including 574 drones and 40 missiles (4 Kinzhal, 2 Iskander-M, 19 Kh-101, and 14 Kalibr missiles); of which Ukrainian air defenses claimed 546 drones and 31 missiles destroyed. The strikes focused on Lviv, Mukachevo and west Ukraine. One person killed, three injured, dozens of buildings damaged.

Just in case Donald J. Trump did not get Vladimir Putin’s view on the importance of US influence over the peace process, a cruise missile smashed a consumer electronics factory in Mukachevo. The factory is owned by Flex, a Nasdaq-listed American manufacturer producing consumer goods like coffee machines.

US electronics factory in Mukachevo burns following Russian cruise missile hit, or hits.

I’ll close this section by recalling that on May 1, 2025, Ukraine under pretty heavy pressure by the Trump administration signed a natural resources exploitation deal that, per the White House, would help secure Ukraine because US investment in Ukraine would deter Russian aggression.

Hungarian humor and the Druzhba (Friendship) Pipeline

OK, to get the joke you are going to need some background. I’ll preface this by stating what I hope is already obvious: I have a great deal of fondness for Hungary and the Hungarians dating back even to my student days. But funny is funny, and as you read this, just remember, the translation of Druzhba (Дружба) is “friendship,” and the point of the Druzhba Pipeline back in the day was promoting economic cooperation and friendship in Europe.

At a key point along the Druzhba crude oil pipeline is a critical node called the Unecha pump station. It is in Russia’s Bryansk region, not far from the Belarusian border. This is a pretty important piece of energy infrastructure as it’s the node at which the Druzhba pipeline carrying both Russian oil heading to Belarus and points westward by land and to Petersburg for loading onto ships.

Russian media map of the Druzhba pipe line and the critical Unecha pump station.

Take out the pump station at Unecha, Belarus has serious problems getting crude, Russian crude oil exports take a hit and two countries friendly to Russia and not to Ukraine – Hungary and Slovakia – lose access to Russian crude oil and, as they are landlocked and their governments have seen fit to make deals with Russian rather than European energy companies, there’s effectively no other way for these two countries to get crude oil in quantity.

On Monday, Ukrainian long-range drones descended on Unecha pump station and blew it up. And if you believe the statements put out by Ukraine’s Unmanned Aircraft Command, big lengths of pipeline were smashed as well.

There already was some irony in that the head of Ukraine’s Unmanned Aircraft Command is none other than Robert Brovdi, another one of those self-taught Ukrainian commanders but, what’s important here, a Ukrainian officer almost certainly with relatives in Hungary; he’s an ethnic Hungarian and a member of Ukraine’s Hungarian minority. It’s safe to say he considers himself first and foremost a Ukrainian citizen, no ifs ands or buts.

One day later, on Tuesday, the Prime Minister of Hungary, an authoritarian man named Viktor Orbán, objected officially to Kyiv and sent a panicky message to Russia, complaining that the evil, warlike Ukrainians had just cut off all Hungary from Russian crude oil. The Orbán regime is, however, populist and they know about keeping voters calm: by the end of the day the Hungarian Foreign Minister, an equally odious gentleman named Péter Szijjártó, went on the air and told Hungary’s citizens: “Not to worry, Russia has Hungary’s back, the damage at Unecha will be put right shortly.”

Hungary’s Foreign Minister telling consumers everything is fine, Hungary will get Russian oil in spite of the nasty Ukrainians. He was right for about 24 hours.

On Wednesday in both Slovakian and Hungarian state-controlled media, there were reports about how those countries’ energy supplies were stable and that, even with Ukraine being all warlike and unwilling to surrender to Russia, all is well with Russian crude oil deliveries via the Druzhba line. I think it’s worth it to quote Szijjártó:

“Oil deliveries to Hungary via the Druzhba pipeline have been restored after the Ukrainian attack two days ago. I thanked Russian DepMin Sorokin for the swift repairs. We expect Ukraine not to strike this vital pipeline again. This is not our war. Hungary must be left out of it!”

On Friday Brovdi and his command published video, recorded at night with modern night-vision sensors, of Unecha once again burning merrily. They also published exact grid coordinates and took credit for hitting it again. The Hungarians and the Russians – perhaps not aware of the video confirmed Unecha pump station had been hit again, but said it was HIMARS rockets.

Unecha pump station burns following the third Ukrainian strike since Aug. 13, Ukraine drone troops video grab

Either way, as I write this about 12 hours later, there are still fires visible from space. I read this time the shut-down is expected to be serious. It’s worth noting the first attack (recently) was on Aug. 13; the Ukrainians clearly are intent on knocking this facility out.

The Ukrainian internet – which is really tired of Orbán whining that Ukraine is defeated and should just quit, when the AFU could probably overrun Hungary in a week – couldn’t resist, and in short memes and content started appearing about how the best sanctions on Russian oil exports to Europe, are Ukrainian sanctions, or how the real Energy Minister of Hungary, is Robert Brovdi.

The joke here is not just that Ukraine shut down Russian oil deliveries to Hungary, but that a Ukrainian with a Hungarian background – Robert Brovdi, lately of 414 Unmanned Aircraft Brigade – did it twice just this week. Brovdi is described here as “Hungary’s Energy Minister.”

Although it wasn’t directly related to Unecha, on Thursday Szijjártó’s Foreign Ministry put out a statement condemning war activity and Russian strikes near Ukraine’s border with Hungary, and then was obliged to retract the statement and edit out the word “Russian.”

The final chapter (so far) was when the Hungarians, on Friday, published a “handwritten personal note” from Trump to Orbán supposedly stating Trump was “very angry” about Unecha getting blasted. You can Google that if you like, the images are everywhere.

I would rather close this section with this: This week not only saw Vladimir Putin spit in the Trump administration’s face with long-range strikes Washington didn’t like. From the Ukrainian point of view, Unecha being ruined is doubly satisfying: It sticks it not just to Orbán and Putin, but their big buddy and fan Trump.

Feeling fuelish

For the record, it seems like the Russian energy industry media this week confirmed about 13-14 percent of all the fuel refining capacity in the Russian Federation is off-line, and that there are serious shortages particularly in the Far East, Buryatia. However, according to those sources the problem is not just Ukrainian drones blowing up Russian refineries, but also, the fact that the Russian government has price maximums for fuel sold on domestic markets, and that given those ceilings and the market price of refined fuel, in those regions it’s getting close to not profitable to sell retail gasoline and diesel.

The solution would be the central government reducing processed fuel sales abroad at the price of reduced foreign earnings, or increasing the wholesale price ceiling for domestically, which of course would help make inflation worse.

A Reuters report this week predicted two of the biggest oil refineries taken off-line by Ukrainian strikes, in Samara and Volgograd, would come on-line respectively at the end of August and September. Apropos of Unecha, one suspects the Ukrainians might attempt to shift that timeline.

Other Ukrainian strikes besides Unecha

As noted at the outset, the Ukrainian long-range strike guys have had an extremely busy week. Among the targets hit:

An FSB spy base next to Sevastopol A Russian general, Vice Commander of Group Forces North, driving on a road in Kursk region (survived but lost an arm and leg) A pair of ammo depots in Luhansk region A Shahed storage base, also near Sevastopol Fuel trains attempting to transit the Tavrida steppe Sea drones vs. Novorossiysk (seems like the attack failed but one boat blew up five Russian frogmen by accident) Oil refinery in Rostov region near the town of Novoshakhtinsk Power generation infrastructure in the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions Critical rail hub in Volgograd; logistics trains snarled, something like 70 tourist trains to Sochi and places like that delayed.

Click here some more detail but it’s far from all:

To reiterate what I suspect is now obvious to most, Russia’s new Mariupol-Melitopol rail line has become for all practical purposes a shooting gallery for Ukrainian drones, which no longer have to search for Russian fuel supplies to hit, they just have to wait until the Russians obligingly drive a fuel train across about 150 km. of open steppe.

The other point to take from this is that the Ukrainians aren’t just hitting Russia with drones, they are hitting with drones that they are mass-producing. The main, workhorse long-range kamikaze plane is the Forpost/Mohajet-6 – an aircraft that isn’t so pretty but seems to be pretty reliable, it has quite a long range and it seems like it manages to score hits.

According to Ukraine’s special ops people, several drones of the type on the right blew up a big depot of Russian kamikaze drones in Sevastopol, image on the left.

Ein bigger und besser Bundeswehr

This isn’t about the war per se but I came across the information and thought it interesting; at minimum so does the Kremlin.

We have courtesy of a pub called Hartpunkt some more detailed numbers on the planned German arms build-up. As some of you may recall, this is being financed by a change to the German constitution allowing slightly more deficit spending if for national security. For reference, the German state budget last year was about 580 billion Euros. What’s planned?

All in all, as I read the article, Germany is planning to pout about €400 billion extra spending into defense over the next five years. For reference, the annual US defense budget is slightly more than €700 billion.

According to the article the Germans plan to spend (over multiple years): telecommunications equipment – €15.9 billion; military vehicles and equipment – €20.8 billion; combat vehicles – €52.5 billion; ammunition – €70.3 billion; field and quartermaster equipment – €20.9 billion; ships, boats, and naval equipment – €36.6 billion; aircraft and missiles – €34.2 billion; and satellite-based communications – €13.3 billion. The most extensive commitment appropriations are planned for 2029 and 2030, with more than €52 billion expected to be spent in each of these years.

According to the plan, personnel will increase from 180,000 total to 200,000 regulars, 50,000 reservists and 50,000 civilians. Main battle tanks will increase from 300 to 1,300. Puma IFVs will increase from very few to about 600. Boxer APCs will increase from about 500 to 1,000. Fighters will increase from about 140 to about 180 conventional (Typhoon), plus from zero stealth to 35 stealth (Lightning). The navy gets 6 more frigates, 10 more corvettes and 6 to 8 more submarines. Patriot batteries will stay stable at 12, but, Germany will develop a Patriot replacement.

To me the most impressive is the communications: The way I read the article, by 2030 the US will lose the capacity to switch off digital navigation for the Bundeswehr and its allies, Germany will no longer be GPS-dependent. The second most impressive is ammo reserves: The plan calls for a half million shell reserve.

I have beaten this drum before, but again, right now the US maintains a total of four ground combat brigades in Europe. Of which two aren’t permanent, and one is a paratrooper unit that would get chewed up pretty quickly in conventional fighting.

Reprinted from Kyiv Post’s Special Military Correspondent Stefan Korshak’s blog. You can read his blog here.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.