Iran Update, August 29, 2025

 

 

 

 

Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, Carolyn Moorman, Parker Hempel, Henry Jenks, Andie Parry, and Annika Ganzeveld

Information Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) publish the Iran Update, which provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. CTP-ISW publishes the Iran Update daily.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of assessed control of terrain in Syria, and here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. The Syria map is updated daily alongside the static Syria maps in this report. CTP-ISW ended daily maps of Israeli ground operations in February 2025.

Click here to see ISW-CTP’s interactive map showing the total strikes in Iran during the Israel-Iran War, as well as an interactive timelapse showing the strikes day-by-day.

Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.[1] The bill would require Iran to leave the NPT and the Additional Protocol, end all negotiations with the United States and the E3, and terminate cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] The Iranian parliament recently passed a law on June 25 that suspended Iranian cooperation with the IAEA, which makes the last clause largely performative.[3] The E3 triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28.[4] The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran in the event of Iran’s “significant non-compliance” of JCPOA commitments.[5] The process to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran lasts 30 days, and Iran likely seeks for the E3 to reverse its decision to reimpose these sanctions during the 30-day period.

The introduction of this bill may reflect differences between various regime institutions about how the regime should respond to the E3 decision to trigger the snapback mechanism. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi wrote a letter to the European Union on August 29 in which he stated that Iran “remains committed” to diplomacy and is willing to resume negotiations to reach a “fair and balanced” agreement.[6] This statement contrasts with the three-part bill, which would suspend all negotiations between Iran and the United States and the E3. The difference between parliament and the executive branch’s views comes after hardline parliamentarians recently criticized the Iranian government for allowing IAEA inspectors to return to Iran. Parliamentarians claimed that the decision violated the law that parliament passed on June 25.[7] IAEA inspectors returned to Iran on August 27 to supervise a fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. IAEA inspectors do not have access to other Iranian nuclear facilities, such as Natanz or Fordow.

Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until at least April 18, 2026.[8] The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. Iran’s Mission to the UN said on August 28 that UNSC members face a “decisive” choice between backing the Russian–Chinese resolution and preserving diplomacy or reimposing UNSC sanctions, which it claimed would cause “grave consequences.”[9] Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months, arguing that extending the snapback deadline gives the E3 more time to reimpose UNSC sanctions on Iran.[10] The E3 offered to extend the snapback deadline in return for Iran resuming full cooperation with the IAEA, resuming negotiations with the United States, and accounting for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile.[11] The Russian-Chinese resolution does not appear to include these conditions and simply urges all parties to resume negotiations, which makes this resolution much more favorable for Iran than the E3 proposal.[12] The Russian-Chinese resolution also reportedly bans the E3 from reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran during the six-month extension period.

Key Takeaways

Iranian response to the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism: Iranian parliamentarians introduced a three-part bill on August 28 to withdraw Iran from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), likely to pressure the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) to not reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.
Iranian cooperation with Russia and China to avoid snapback sanctions: Iran called on the UNSC to approve a Russian-Chinese draft resolution that would extend Resolution 2231 and the JCPOA until April 18, 2026. Iranian officials previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the October 2025 snapback deadline by six months.

Iran

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s representative to Sistan and Baluchistan Province, Ayatollah Mostafa Mahami, met with Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Ground Forces Quds Operational Base Commander Brigadier General Hassan Mortazavi on August 29.[13] This meeting comes after IRGC Ground Forces conducted counterterrorism operations in Iranshahr, Khash, and Saravan in Sistan and Baluchistan Province on August 27 that killed 13 Jaish al Adl fighters and an Iranian security officer.[14] Iranian security forces also seized a Jaish al Adl weapons cache in Iranshahr on August 28 that included improvised explosive device (IED) components and hand grenades. Jaish al Adl, which is a Baloch Salafi-jihadi militant group, likely intended to use this equipment to attack local security forces.[15] Jaish al Adl has increased its rate of attacks targeting Iranian security forces in southeastern Iran in recent weeks.[16]

Iraq

Iraqi National Intelligence Service Director Hamid al Shatri discussed counterterrorism, border security, and bilateral relations with Syrian President Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on August 28.[17] Shatri is reportedly affiliated with the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.[18] Kurdish media reported that Shatri and Shara also discussed the restoration of the Kirkuk-Baniyas crude oil pipeline.[19] Syria and Iraq shut down the pipeline in 2010 after it sustained damage during counterterrorism operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).[20] Syria and Iraq agreed on August 12 to form a joint technical committee to assess the pipeline’s current status.[21] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Syrian transitional government may seek to reopen the pipeline to compensate for lost Iranian oil exports to Syria after the fall of the Assad regime.[22] Shatri and Shara’s meeting occurred while the Special Missions Unit of the 27th Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) Brigade, which is affiliated with the Badr Organization, deployed to the Syria-Iraq border in western Anbar Province.[23] The 27th PMF Brigade typically operates in Salah al Din Province.[24] An Iraqi Border Guard officer responsible for the al Qaim-Albu Kamal border crossing told Saudi media on August 29 that the deployment of the brigade to the border was “routine” and does not have political or security implications.[25]

Syria

Syrian President Ahmed al Shara appointed members to the National Transitional Justice Commission on August 28.[26] The 13-member commission aims to investigate former regime members, hold individuals accountable for crimes committed during the Syrian Civil War, compensate victims, and support national reconciliation.[27] Shara established the commission and appointed Abdul Basit Latif as its chairman in May 2025, but Shara did not appoint other members of the commission at the time.[28] Latif held political positions in the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Coalition during the civil war.[29] The appointment of members to the commission will likely enable the commission to begin its transitional justice efforts and could increase Syrian citizens’ confidence in the Syrian transitional government. Charges and convictions against individuals who committed crimes and atrocities could reduce revenge killings that target former regime members because the committee would act as a formal mechanism to achieve transitional justice. CTP-ISW recorded five revenge killings targeting former regime-affiliated individuals in Syria between August 22 and 29.[30] These killings reflect that some Syrians believe that there has been no justice for the atrocities that the Assad regime committed. The National Transitional Justice Commission could alleviate some of these grievances, but the transitional government must charge, prosecute, and sentence former Assad regime members through this commission to demonstrate its commitment to transitional justice and build trust among targeted communities.[31]

The United States eased licensing requirements for US exports to Syria on August 28.[32] The US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced that US goods and technology that have “purely civilian uses,” such as consumer communications equipment and some civil aviation-related items, can now enter Syria without an export license. The BIS will review dual-use items on a case-by-case basis and continue to restrict exports to malign actors in Syria who are still sanctioned by the United States.[33] Syrian Central Bank Governor Abdul Qadir al Hasriya said on August 29 that the Syrian Central Bank and Finance Ministry will work with the US Treasury Department to continue Syria’s integration into the international financial system.[34] The easing of export license requirements follows President Donald Trump’s June 30 executive order to end US sanctions on Syria.[35] The export of US technology and goods to Syria will help the Syrian transitional government recover from the 14-year civil war and grow Syria’s domestic civil aviation, power generation, and telecommunications industries.[36]

Arabian Peninsula

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Houthi Prime Minister Ahmed Ghalib al Rahwai in an airstrike in Haddah District, southern Sanaa City, on August 28, according to local sources.[37] Rahwai held limited authority over Houthi forces and largely had a “ceremonial” role, according to local sources.[38] A Yemeni journalist denied Israeli media reports that the airstrike also targeted and killed Houthi Chief of Staff Mohammad Abdul Karim al Ghamari and Defense Minister Mohammad Nasir al Atifi, citing an unspecified security source.[39] Anti-Houthi media claimed that IDF airstrikes in Haddah District killed and injured several other senior Houthi officials.[40] Other Yemeni outlets reported that the IDF conducted airstrikes targeting a Houthi weapons depot near the Presidential Palace complex in al Sabeen District, southern Sanaa City, and a Houthi military site in the Attan area of western Sanaa City.[41] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify the claims that IDF airstrikes targeted other Houthi officials and additional Houthi sites at the time of this writing.

Palestinian Territories and Lebanon

Hezbollah and Hezbollah-aligned media appear to be attempting to sow doubt about Lebanese security forces’ willingness to disarm Hezbollah. Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Brigadier General Rodolphe Haykal reportedly told senior Lebanese officials that he would prefer to resign rather than have “Lebanese blood shed by the [LAF],” according to unspecified sources speaking to pro-Hezbollah and Saudi media on August 29.[42] The sources added that LAF leadership has refused to develop a disarmament plan that includes a list of objectives or a timeline.[43] The Lebanese Council of Ministers is reportedly set to discuss an LAF disarmament plan on September 5, however.[44] The LAF has not directly responded to these claims but did issue a statement on August 29 reaffirming its commitment to its national duties.[45] Unspecified military sources separately told pro-Hezbollah media on August 13 that external pressure to disarm Hezbollah could divide Lebanese security forces, specifically the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (ISF).[46] The ISF is Lebanon’s police force and has largely avoided direct confrontation with Hezbollah over the past two decades.[47] The sources added that ISF members are divided over their willingness to act against Hezbollah.[48]

Hezbollah may be amplifying reports about Lebanese security forces’ alleged unwillingness to disarm Hezbollah to capitalize on Lebanese and foreign officials’ concerns about the LAF’s capabilities and the potential for internal conflict in Lebanon. Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa reportedly called for the LAF to not be burdened “beyond its capacity” during a previous Lebanese government cabinet session.[49] US Special Envoy Thomas Barrack stated in July 2025 that the LAF lacks the resources and manpower to disarm Hezbollah.[50] United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Spokesperson Andrea Tenenti similarly told Saudi media on August 29 that the LAF does not have the capability to deploy to southern Lebanon to backfill Israel and UNIFIL.[51] The LAF is expected to establish fifteen border posts in southern Lebanon as part of the US proposal to disarm Hezbollah, which the Lebanese government agreed to on August 7.[52] LAF and Lebanese government officials have also continuously expressed concerns about internal conflict arising between the Lebanese state and Hezbollah during the disarmament process.[53] The LAF reportedly told senior Lebanese officials and Hezbollah that it will not take any action that could undermine internal stability.[54] Haykal also told Lebanese Parliament Speaker and Hezbollah ally Nabih Berri on August 13 that the LAF will not engage with “a key component of the country.”[55]

Lebanese officials have continued to emphasize that the Lebanese state and armed forces need financial support to implement their plan to disarm Hezbollah.[56] Western and Arab governments have reportedly said that they will not provide financial support to Lebanon until the Lebanese government disarms Hezbollah.[57] Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam told the Financial Times on August 29 that Lebanon needs financial and military support for the government and the LAF to successfully disarm Hezbollah.[58] Lebanese officials have recently conducted several visits to European and Arab countries to secure military and economic support.[59] The World Bank estimated in March 2025 that Lebanon would need approximately $11 billion to address its reconstruction and recovery needs following the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in late 2024.[60] The LAF has historically faced resource deficits, which have weakened its ability to successfully counter Hezbollah.[61] Western and Arab governments have reportedly indicated that they will provide financial support to Lebanon once Lebanon takes “concrete steps” to disarm Hezbollah.[62] The US proposal states that the Lebanese government will completely disarm Hezbollah by December 31, 2025, and that Lebanon will secure reconstruction funding within 90 days of the proposal coming into effect.[63] Lebanon’s economic needs and foreign countries’ stipulations on financial support could potentially push the Lebanese government to approve and implement the LAF’s plan to disarm Hezbollah.

[1] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/241962

[2] https://nournews dot ir/fa/news/241962

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-parliament-approves-bill-suspend-cooperation-with-un-nuclear-watchdog-2025-06-25/

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/europeans-launch-un-sanctions-process-against-iran-drawing-tehran-ire-2025-08-28/ ;

https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf

[5] https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf

[6] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/07/3387303/

[7] https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1089254 ;

https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1089154 ;

https://www.asriran dot com/fa/news/1089243

[8] https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1961087451637698735

[9] https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1961087451637698735

[10] https://snn dot ir/fa/news/1297523/ ;

https://donya-e-eqtesad dot com/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%B3%D8%A7%DB%8C%D8%AA-%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86-62/4206921-%D8%B9%D9%84%DB%8C-%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B1%DB%8C%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%AA%D9%85%D8%AF%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D9%85%D9%87%D9%84%D8%AA-%D9%85%DA%A9%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C%D8%B2%D9%85-%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%87-%D8%B1%D8%A7-%D9%86%D9%85%DB%8C-%D9%BE%D8%B0%DB%8C%D8%B1%DB%8C%D9%85

[11] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/russia-puts-forward-draft-resolution-on-extension-of-snapback ; https://www.axios.com/2025/07/15/iran-snapback-sanctions-nuclear-deal

[12] https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/russia-puts-forward-draft-resolution-on-extension-of-snapback ;

https://media.un.org/unifeed/en/asset/d344/d3441455

[13] https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/773677

[14] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/05/3386222; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/05/3385738/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Jaysh al-Adl Confirms Death of Several Fighters in Clashes with Iranian Police, IRGC in Sistan and Balochistan” August 27, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com

[15] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/06/06/3386843/

[16] SITE Intelligence Group, ”Claiming Attack on Iranian Police in IranShahr, Jaysh al-Adl Advises Military/Security Personnel to Seek ’Honorable Occupations’” August 22, 2025, available by subscription at www.siteintelgroup.com. ; https://x.com/IranIntl_En/status/1956451382728269920 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1404/05/04/3362088

[17] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%AC%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%81%D8%A9-%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%B4%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%82%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B1%D8%B9-%D9%88%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B4-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A9 ; https://t.me/damascusv011/34103

[18] https://shafaq dot com/ar/%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA/%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%80-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%AF%D9%85%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%A8-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A

[19] http://www.nrttv dot com/detail/52298

[20] https://www.iraq-businessnews dot com/2025/04/25/iraq-to-discuss-rehabilitation-of-oil-pipeline-through-syria/ ; https://shafaq dot com/en/Economy/Syria-on-Kirkuk-Baniyas-pipeline-revival-Not-a-Priority

[21] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/64832

[22] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-april-25-2025

[23] https://al-hashed dot gov.iq/?p=548602 ; https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/290820251

[24] https://www.rudaw dot net/sorani/middleeast/iraq/290820251

[25] https://www.alaraby dot co.uk/politics/%D9%81%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A-%D9%85%D8%B3%D9%84%D9%91%D8%AD-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%86-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%87-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%AF%D9%88%D8%AF-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9

[26] https://sana dot sy/presidency/2273842/

[27] https://sana dot sy/presidency/2273842/; https://www.alhadath dot net/syria/2025/08/28/الشرع-يصدر-مرسوما-بتشكيل-لجنة-الهيئة-الوطنية-للعدالة-الانتقالية

[28] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025

[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025; https://www.enabbaladi dot net/311183/%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84/

[30] https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1959173806288744455; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1959548899447677129; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1959658222043697199; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1959720585141072180; https://x.com/QalaatAlMudiq/status/1960651088475889874

[31] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-19-2025

[32] https://media.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-eases-export-controls-syria

[33] https://media.bis.gov/press-release/commerce-eases-export-controls-syria

[34] https://t.me/TelevisionSyria/65964

[35] https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/06/termination-of-syria-sanctions

[36] https://x.com/USAMBTurkiye/status/1961295689717104752

[37] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1961184455168815265 ; https://x.com/A_ALGABARNI/status/1961184976327852134 ; https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/325101

[38] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1961184455168815265 ; https://x.com/A_ALGABARNI/status/1961184976327852134 ; https://almasdaronline dot com/articles/325101

[39] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1961127122120143171 ; https://x.com/N12News/status/1961113600514257337 ; https://x.com/Osint613/status/1961075938956902592 ; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/10/06/the-houthis-leadership-structure/

[40] https://x.com/BashaReport/status/1961478823561891972

[41] https://x.com/FaresALhemyari/status/1961148932073164844 ;

 https://x.com/defenseliney/status/1961177528334270917

[42] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/856912/قائد-الجيش–أستقيل-ولا-أسفك-الدماء ; https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/mena/2025/08/29/lebanese-army-chief-threatened-to-quit-over-hezbollah-disarmament-plan-sources-reveal/

[43] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/856912/قائد-الجيش–أستقيل-ولا-أسفك-الدماء

[44] https://x.com/grandserail/status/1961482153876697332 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1475482/haykal-says-army-will-succeed-in-its-mission-while-maintaining-civil-peace.html

[45] https://x.com/LebarmyOfficial/status/1961344508974571796

[46] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[47] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض ; http://www.lebanon dot com/isf/

[48] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[49] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[50] https://www.thenationalnews dot com/news/us/2025/07/11/tom-barrack-lebanon-hezbollah/

[51] https://www.alarabiya dot net/arab-and-world/2025/08/29/اليونيفيل-لـالعربية-سنساعد-الجيش-اللبناني-بعمليات-نزع-السلاح

[52] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/lebanons-moment-truth ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-plan-sees-hezbollah-disarmed-by-year-end-israeli-withdrawal-2025-08-07/

[53] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314684-report-army-hezbollah-panel-to-be-formed-to-implement-disarmament-plan ; https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-15-2025 ; https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-cabinet-meets-discuss-hezbollahs-arms-after-us-pressure-2025-08-05/

[54] https://t.me/alakhbar_news/60930

[55] https://www.naharnet dot com/stories/en/314684-report-army-hezbollah-panel-to-be-formed-to-implement-disarmament-plan ; https://www.al-akhbar dot com/lebanon/854562/هيكل-يرفض-الصدام-مع-مكون-أساسي-ويدعو-إلى-حوار-وتفاهم–تحريض

[56] https://www.ft.com/content/83709f3a-0a0c-41de-a1f2-ec05f12d4f78

[57] https://www.ft.com/content/83709f3a-0a0c-41de-a1f2-ec05f12d4f78 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1475467/its-time-for-hezbollah-to-go-says-senator-lindsey-graham-from-tel-aviv.html

[58] https://www.ft.com/content/83709f3a-0a0c-41de-a1f2-ec05f12d4f78

[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-august-27-2025

[60] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2025/03/07/lebanon-s-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-estimated-at-us-11-billion

[61] https://www.dw dot com/en/lebanon-the-history-of-a-weak-state/a-70350956 ; https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2024/05/01/lebanons-military-stagnates-amid-economic-turmoil-hezbollah-influence/ ; https://israel-alma dot org/is-the-lebanese-army-capable-of-enforcing-a-new-political-outline-in-southern-lebanon-and-being-a-counterweight-to-hezbollah/ ; https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/lebanons-military-can-barely-fighteven-after-3-billion-from-the-u-s-a1d24969?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=ASWzDAixx8tTsbtO7ySYc3rwirNGTTUoZEShuFofEhlnppfi6XcBhA81Q-Kz&gaa_ts=68af5306&gaa_sig=-vuWuORWoZBiZvmmaA3BsPbozPlAVtmMicoGmdrfHellfVLnbiWc77PzScfrvm2SFQotZW0KBvph7yxWP3MUCQ%3D%3D

[62] https://www.ft.com/content/83709f3a-0a0c-41de-a1f2-ec05f12d4f78 ; https://today.lorientlejour dot com/article/1475467/its-time-for-hezbollah-to-go-says-senator-lindsey-graham-from-tel-aviv.html