Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2025

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 30, 2025

Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, Olivia Gibson, and George Barros with Nate Trotter

August 30, 2025, 8:15 pm ET 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of Ukraine’s offensive in Kursk Oblast.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:15 pm ET on August 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces have seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025.[1] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized 210 square kilometers and 13 settlements just in northern Sumy Oblast — likely also since March 2025. Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces occupy 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 79 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 76 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 74 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. Gerasimov additionally claimed that Russian forces have seized roughly 50 percent of Kupyansk and seized 10 settlements in the Lyman direction since March 2025: Myrne, Katerynivka, Novomykhailivka, Nove, Lypove, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Zelena Dolyna, Kolodyazi, and Serednie.[2] Gerasimov claimed that Russian forces seized five settlements in the Velykomykhailivka direction since March 2025: Maliivka, Novoheorhiivka, Vorone, Sichneve, and Zaporizske.

ISW assesses that Gerasimov is inflating most of his claims. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory and seized 130 settlements since March 1. Gerasimov’s claims notably inflate Russian gains by roughly 1,200 square kilometers and 19 settlements. ISW assesses that Russian forces gained 212 square kilometers in northern Sumy Oblast, but only occupy nine settlements in northern Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces occupy roughly 99.7 percent of Luhansk Oblast, 76.7 percent of Donetsk Oblast, 73.2 percent of Kherson Oblast, and 73 percent of Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW assesses that Russian forces have only seized 6.3 percent of Kupyansk and that Russian forces have not seized all of Myrne, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Hrekivka, Kolodyazi, Serednie, Vorone, Sichneve, or Komyshuvakha. Gerasimov is not the first senior Russian military official in recent days to make aggrandized claims of Russian advances. Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov similarly claimed on August 29 that Russian forces are currently seizing 600 to 700 square kilometers per month, but ISW assesses that Russian forces advanced only 440 to 500 kilometers per month in June, July, and August 2025.[3] The Kremlin is likely attempting to influence Western policymaking by creating the false impression that Russian advances and victory are inevitable. The Kremlin appears to be trying to use large amounts of quantitative data to create the false impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield. The Kremlin is trying to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its war goals on the battlefield, such that Ukraine should concede to Russian demands and the West should therefore cease its support of Ukraine.

The Kremlin’s presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia’s advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield. Russian opposition outlets Meduza and Mediazona reported on August 29 that data from the Russian Register of Inheritance Cases (RND) suggests that at least 93,000 Russian military personnel died in 2024 — almost twice as many as in 2023 (about 50,000).[4] The outlets used a predictive model to estimate that at least 56,000 Russian soldiers had died since the start of 2025. The outlets caveated that the RND data is imperfect for assessing Russian losses as relatives of deceased have at least 180 days to open an inheritance case for dead or presumed-dead Russian soldiers, so the last six months’ worth of data (since about February 2025) is significantly incomplete. The outlets stated that the number of inheritance cases rose to 2,000 per week by mid-2025. There was a sharp increase in the second half of 2024 of Russian court cases recognizing missing persons as dead (including but not limited to missing in action [MIA] Russian soldiers whom the court deemed killed in action [KIA]). The outlets found that there was only an increase of cases involving missing persons in the RND since mid-2024 among men — not women — a phenomenon that the outlets stated can only be consistent with an increase in fatality rates in the war.

Russian forces have been suffering from especially high casualties since Winter 2024, and these losses have come at disproportionately small territorial gains.[5] ISW continues to assess that Russia’s high losses are unsustainable in the medium- to long-term.[6] Russia’s gains have been largely gradual and creeping for many months, and Russia’s rate of advance is incredibly slow under the norms of modern mechanized warfare. Russian forces have been using light motorized vehicles (such as buggies, ATVs, and motorcycles) and infiltration tactics to make gains across the front, but Russia’s rate of advance has yet to increase beyond a foot pace.[7] Russian forces have also not been able to consolidate and exploit their infiltrations, such as the recent penetration east and northeast of Dobropillya.[8] Any assessment of Russia’s battlefield performance and strength must examine both the tempo of advance and the resulting losses to make those gains. The Kremlin’s presentation of likely inflated territorial gain statistics without critical context for the losses for those gains is likely an attempt to manipulate perceptions about Russia’s military performance and buttress a longstanding Kremlin narrative that Russia’s victory on the battlefield is inevitable. It is not. 

Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched eight Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles from Rostov Oblast and Krasnodar Krai and 37 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles from over Saratov Oblast, the Black Sea, and occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also launched 537 Shahed-type and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatlovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 510 drones; six Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; and 32 Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K, and Kh-59 cruise missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that five missiles and 24 drones struck seven locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell on 21 locations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported that Russian forces struck a residential building in Zaporizhzhia City, killing at least one civilian and injuring dozens.[10] Zelensky reported that Russian drones and missiles struck primarily civilian infrastructure in Volyn, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Zaporizhia, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv, Rivne, Sumy, Kharkiv, Khmelnytskyi, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and Chernivtsi oblasts. Kyiv Oblast Military Head Mykola Kalashnyk reported that the Russian strike on Kyiv City lasted 10 hours and damaged civilian and energy infrastructure.[11] Ukrainian broadcaster Suspline reported that the strike damaged civilian infrastructure in Dnipro City.[12] ISW continues to assess that Russia used the lead-up to the August 15 Alaska summit to stockpile drones and missiles and conducted more limited strikes against Ukraine to falsely present itself as a good-faith negotiator to the US administration.[13] Russia will likely escalate its strikes against Ukraine in the coming weeks to leverage its replenished missile and drone stockpiles and degrade Ukrainian energy infrastructure ahead of the coming winter.[14]

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine. Putin signed a decree on August 29 abolishing the Presidential Administration’s Department for Interregional and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and Department for Cross-Border Cooperation, instead creating the Department for Strategic Cooperation.[15] Kremlin Presidential Administration Deputy Head Dmitry Kozak supervised both these departments prior to their dissolution. Russian outlet Vedomosti reported on August 29, citing two sources close to the Presidential Administration and another source in the office of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug, that Kozak is a candidate to become the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Northwestern Federal Okrug.[16] Two additional sources indicated to Vedomosti that there are discussions within the Kremlin about Kozak’s resignation from his Presidential Administration post — effectively pushing Kozak out of the Kremlin and Putin’s inner circle. The New York Times (NYT) reported on August 10 that Western and Russian sources indicated that Kozak lost his influence in the Kremlin after he advised Putin in the past few months to immediately stop fighting in Ukraine, start peace negotiations, and reduce the power of Russia’s security services.[17] Kozak had been one of Putin’s closest advisors and oversaw Kremlin strategy in Ukraine and Moldova before the Kremlin shifted this responsibility to Presidential Administration Deputy Head Sergei Kiriyenko after February 2022.[18] Reports indicating that the Kremlin is preparing to push an established senior Kremlin official from his position after expressing a desire to end the war in Ukraine are further indicators that the Kremlin has no plans to end the war, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has explicitly stated since the August 15 Alaska summit.[19]

Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 30 that Ukrainian elements, including from the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and Special Operations Forces (SSO), conducted drone strikes against the Syzran Oil Refinery in Samara Oblast and the Krasnodar Oil Refinery in Krasnodar Krai overnight.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Syzran Refinery can produce 8.5 million tons of gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, fuel oil, and bitumen per year and that the Krasnodar Refinery can produce three million tons of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel per year. The General Staff reported that there was a fire at the Syzran Refinery and numerous explosions at the Krasnodar Refinery. Geolocated footage published on August 29 shows a fire at Krasnodar Refinery.[21] Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows a fire at Syzran Refinery.[22] The Krasnodar Krai Operation Headquarters claimed on August 30 that drone debris damaged a processing unit at Krasnodar Refinery and caused a 300-square meter fire at the enterprise.[23] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia.[24]

A Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) source reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne on August 30 that the GUR destroyed a Russian explosives warehouse in Tula Oblast near the Aleksinsky Chemical Plant, which produces pyroxylin powder for small arms ammunition, artillery systems, and rocket engines.[25]

Russian Investigative Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year, following reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position. Russian President Vladimir Putin extended on August 30 Bastrykin’s term as the chairperson of the Investigative Committee until August 27, 2026.[26] Bastrykin was reportedly a candidate to become the chairperson of the Russian Supreme Court, but refused the position during a closed-door meeting with Putin.[27] Bastrykin reportedly asked Putin to remain in his current position for another year.

An unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City on August 30. The Ukrainian National Police reported on August 30 that an unidentified shooter killed Parubiy in Lviv City.[28] Sources reported to Ukrainian broadcaster Suspilne that the shooter shot Parubiy eight times, was wearing a Glovo delivery service uniform, and fled the scene on an electric bike.[29] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian authorities are investigating the murder.[30]

A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the Pokrovsk direction. The Ukrainian National Guard’s 1st Azov Corps reported that a soldier of the Russian 95th Motorized Rifle Regiment (5th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 51st Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) murdered an unarmed Ukrainian man standing in his yard in southeastern Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) and published footage of the murder.[31] The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) states that “intentionally direct attacks against the civilian population or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities” constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict within the established framework of international law.[32] Russian soldiers have notably committed extreme atrocities against civilians and soldiers in Ukraine as part of the wider military modus operandi.[33]

Key Takeaways:

The Kremlin appears to have launched a coordinated informational effort posturing military strength on the battlefield in order to shape Western thinking and falsely portray a Russian victory as inevitable.
The Kremlin’s presentation of territorial gains statistics ignores the significant losses that Russia is incurring and the gradual, creeping nature of Russia’s advances — painting an incomplete picture of Russian performance on the battlefield.
Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of August 29 to 30 — the third combined strike with over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.
The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions to demote a senior Kremlin official who reportedly advised Russian President Vladimir Putin in recent months to end the war in Ukraine.
Ukrainian forces continue to strike Russian military and energy infrastructure in Russia
Russian Investigative Committee Chairperson Alexander Bastrykin will stay in his current position for another year following reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin was considering moving Bastrykin to a new position.
An unknown assailant shot and killed former Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada Chairperson Andriy Parubiy in Lviv City on August 30.
A Russian servicemember recently murdered an elderly Ukrainian civilian in the Pokrovsk direction.
Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk and Novopavlivka, and Russian forces recently advanced near Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.    

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of three subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
Significant Activity in Belarus

Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation

See topline text for Ukrainian strikes in Russia.

Russian Supporting Effort – Northern Axis (Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the northern Sumy Oblast on August 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Sumy City near Bezsalivka, northeast of Sumy City near Yunakivka, and in unspecified areas of Sumy and Kursk oblasts on August 29 to 30.[34] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Yunakivka.[35]

A Russian milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes prevented elements of the Russian 2nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (reportedly of the Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS]) from attacking near Novyi Put (northwest of Sumy City across the international border).[36] The milblogger complained that the Russian military command frequently sends Russian soldiers across the international border to assaults despite heavy Ukrainian indirect fire.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked north of Kharkiv City near Hlyboke and toward Kozacha Lopan and northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk, Synelnykove, and Prilipka on August 29 and 30.[37]

A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces became more active north of Kharkiv City along the Kharkiv City-Belgorod City railway line and that Russian forces are fighting toward the Prudyanka, Hraniv, and Slatyne railway stations on this railway line.[38]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian Chechen Zapad-Akhmat Battalion are reportedly operating in the Kharkiv direction.[39]

Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Velykyi Burluk direction on August 30.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian Dnipro Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces recently recaptured Myrove (northwest of Kupyansk), indicating that Russian forces likely no longer hold positions in Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk and immediately south of Myrove) and likely also seized Sobolivka.[40] A Russian milblogger corroborated Trehubov’s reporting by claiming that Russian forces have not completely seized Myrove and that the area northwest of Myrove is a contested “gray” zone.[41]

Russian forces attacked toward Kupyansk itself, north of Kupyansk toward Kutkivka, northeast of Kupyansk near Kamyanka and Fyholivka, and east of Kupyansk near Petropavlivka on August 29 and 30.[42]

The commander of a Ukrainian regiment operating in the Kupyansk direction reported on August 30 that Russian forces are attempting to infiltrate into Kupyansk by moving through sewer lines into the settlement.[43] The commander noted that Russian forces continue to attempt to establish makeshift means to transport infantry across the Oskil River.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 352nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (11th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) reportedly continue to operate near Stepova Novoselivka (southeast of Kupyansk).[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Olhivka and toward Druzhelyubivka and entered Maliivka and Andriivka (all southeast of Borova).[45]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Borova near Zahryzove and southeast of Borova near Andriivka and Maliivka, and toward Druzhelyubivka and Olhivka on August 29 and 30.[46]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Hlushchenkove and Ridkodub (all north of Lyman).[47] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also seized the O-0527 Korovii Yar-Shandryholove highway and advanced east of Shandryholove (both northwest of Lyman).[48]

Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman and toward Shandryholove and Derylove; north of Lyman near Novyi Myr, Karpivka, Zelena Dolyna, and Ridkodub; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi and Myrne; east of Lyman near Zarichne; and southeast of Lyman toward Yampil on August 29 and 30.[49] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Shandryholove, Ridkodub, and  Novomykhailivka (northeast of Lyman).[50]

The spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported that Russian infantry are leveraging People’s Republic of China (PRC)-produced thermal imaging tents to conceal their heat signatures to approach forward positions in the Lyman direction.[51] A non-commissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Lyman direction reported on August 29 that Russian forces are conducting simultaneous assaults against forward positions and operations to infiltrate into the rear of Ukrainian forces.[52]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (3rd Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD]) reportedly continue to operate in the Lyman direction.[53]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and possibly advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk operations on August 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka and Hryhorivka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on August 29 and 30.[54]

A noncommissioned officer (NCO) of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Siversk direction stated on August 30 that Russian forces are operating with a four-battalion system in which three battalions are operating on the frontline and actively fighting against one Ukrainian battalion, while Russian forces always keep the fourth battalion in reserve.[55] The Ukrainian NCO stated that each Russian brigade has an electronic warfare (EW) company tasked with detecting and suppressing Ukrainian drones. The Ukrainian NCO stated that Russian forces usually launch over 200 artillery shells at Ukrainian forces per day in the Siversk direction and that Russian forces expertly hide the artillery systems from Ukrainian drones, forcing Ukrainian forces to expend large numbers of drones to strike each artillery system.

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 7th Motorized Rifle Brigade (3rd Combined Arms Army [CAA], formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating near Serebryanka.[56]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced up to the western outskirts of Predtechyne (south of Chasiv Yar).[57]

Russian forces attacked south of Chasiv Yar near Stupochky and Predtechyne on August 29 and 30.[58]

A Russian milblogger rejected claims that Russian forces advanced into Kostyantynivka (west of Chasiv Yar) from the east.[59]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in western Rusyn Yar (northwest of Toretsk).[60]

Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced east and northeast of Nelipivka (northwest of Toretsk).[61]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of Toretsk near Dyliivka; northwest of Toretsk near Pleshchiivka, Rusyn Yar, Poltavka, Kleban Byk, and Katerynivka; and west of Toretsk near Shcherbynivka on August 29 and 30.[62]

Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]), drone operators of the 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (8th CAA), and artillery elements of the 238th Artillery Brigade (8th CAA) are reportedly reconnoitering and striking the Ukrainian forces near Kleban Byk.[63]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage filmed on August 28 and published on August 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in southeastern Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk).[64]

Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske, Vilne, and Krasnyi Lyman; northeast of Pokrovsk near Volodymyrivka, Novoekonomichne, Sukhetske, Sofiivka, Shakhove, Zolotyi Kolodyaz, Mayak, and Zapovidne and in the Kapitalna Mine (just west of Novoekonomichne); east of Pokrovsk near Myrolyubivka and Promin and toward Myrnohrad; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka and toward Novopavlivka; south of Pokrovsk near Novoukrainka; and southwest of Pokrovsk near Zvirove, Udachne, and Kotlyne on August 29 and 30.[65] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Pokrovsk itself, near Volodymyrivka, and from Troyanda (southwest of Pokrovsk).[66]

An NCO of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Pokrovsk direction reported on August 30 that Russian forces are attempting to advance and accumulate in small assault groups and have been pulling forward a large number of self-propelled artillery systems since about August 22.[67] The NCO stated that Russian forces suffered heavy artillery losses due to Ukrainian drone strikes and are using tanks as artillery systems. The Ukrainian NCO stated that these Russian tanks engage in shoot-and-scoot tactics by driving to firing points and driving away after firing. The NCO stated that Russian forces in this direction are increasingly using unmanned ground systems (UGVs) for logistics and are attempting to use motorcycles and buggies to transport ammunition for use in later assaults.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka direction.

Assessed Ukrainian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on August 30 that Ukrainian forces recaptured Zelenyi Hai (southwest of Novopavlivka).[68] A Ukrainian battalion operating in the Novopavlivka direction reported that Ukrainian forces seized the settlement.[69]

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced east of Novopavlivka and on the southwestern outskirts of Muravka (northeast of Novopavlivka).[70]

Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on August 29 and 30.[71]

Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.

Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on August 30 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced in eastern Komyshuvakha (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[72]

Unconfirmed claims: The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on August 30 that Russian forces seized Komyshuvakha.[73] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade (5th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) seized the settlement.[74]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Andriivka-Klevtsove; east of Velykomykhailivka near Oleksandrohrad and Voskresenka and toward Novoselivka; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Vorone, Maliivka, Shevchenko, Komyshuvakha, and Zaporizske on August 29 and 30.[75]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) and elements of the 657th Anti-Tank Artillery Battalion (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Novoselivka and Sosnivka (both southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[76] Elements of the 305th Artillery Brigade (5th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Kalynivske (south of Velykomykhailivka).[77] Elements of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Berezove (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[78]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City)

Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30 but did not make confirmed advances.

Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed on August 30 that Russian forces advanced towards Novoivanivka (northeast of Hulyaipole).[79]

Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Zelene Pole and toward Novoivanivka on August 30.[80]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 30 but did not advance.

Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Mala Tokmachka, south of Orikhiv towards Novodanylivka, southwest of Orikhiv near Stepove, and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk, Kamyanske, and Plavni on August 29 and 30.[81]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat Detachment, subordinated to Airborne [VDV] Forces) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions near Stepnohirsk.[82]

Russian forces continued limited assaults in the Kherson direction on August 30 but did not advance.[83]

A Russian milblogger who frequently reports on Russian indirect fire missions against western Kherson Oblast claimed on August 29 that Russian forces will soon increase the number of artillery crews and strikes against the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.[84]

Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps [AC], Black Sea Fleet [BSF]) are reportedly operating in the Kherson direction.[85]

Geolocated footage published on August 30 shows smoke, reportedly from an explosion, near the Simferopol International Airport in occupied Aeroflotskyi, Crimea.[86] The cause of the explosion is unclear.

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

See topline text for reports of Russian strikes against Ukraine.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media, as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 

[1] https://t.me/mod_russia/56070

[2] https://t.me/mod_russia/56070

[3] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025

[4] https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/08/29/2000-chelovek-v-nedelyu-stolko-teryala-rossiya-na-pike-svoego-nastupleniya-v-donbasse

[5] https://isw.pub/UkrWar110924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111624; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-17-2024; https://isw.pub/UkrWar111924; https://isw.pub/UkrWar112424;

[6] https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russias-weakness-offers-leverage; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021625

[7] https://isw.pub/UkrWar070125; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-19-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081625; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081325; https://isw.pub/UkrWar081225

[9] https://t.me/kpszsu/41330

[10] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/15846 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12899

[11] https://t.me/Mykola_Kalashnyk/6805; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/desyatygodynna-tryvoga-na-kyyivshhyni-ye-vluchannya-v-liniyu-elektroperedach-zaliznyczi/

[12] https://youtu.be/qveGIDI4qOo ; https://suspilne dot media/dnipro/1102808-rosijska-armia-vdarila-po-dnipru-so-kazut-ocevidci/

[13] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025

[14] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-27-2025

[15] http://publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202508290048?index=3; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/08/29/1135239-ap-poyavitsya-upravlenie

[16] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/articles/2025/08/29/1135000-kozak-rassmatrivaetsya

[17] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/world/europe/putin-russia-ukraine-war-dmitri-kozak.html; https://iswwebstg.wpenginepowered.com/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025/

[18] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-kremlins-fake-de-escalation-donbas; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-31-2023 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-4 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-12-2024 ; https://meduza dot io/en/feature/2022/06/10/the-viceroy; https://iswwebstg.wpenginepowered.com/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025/

[19] https://isw.pub/UkrWar082425

[20] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28431

[21] https://x.com/neonhandrail/status/1961645381294436597; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1961586591131926951; https://x.com/Osinttechnical/status/1961586717011366279; https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12002; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30566; https://t.me/usf_army/862

[22] https://t.me/kiber_boroshno/12004; https://t.me/WarArchive_ua/30566; https://t.me/usf_army/862

[23] https://t.me/opershtab23/14038

[24] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-29-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-28-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-23-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-26-2025

[25] https://suspilne dot media/1102758-rosia-vdarila-po-zaporizzu-ermak-zustrivsa-z-vitkoffom-u-nu-jorku-1284-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756556156&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps

[26] https://meduza dot io/news/2025/08/30/putin-prodlil-na-god-polnomochiya-bastrykina-v-sledstvennom-komitete; publication.pravo dot gov.ru/document/0001202508300001

[27] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-25-2025

[28] https://t.me/UA_National_Police/47808;

[29] https://suspilne dot media/amp/lviv/1102956-u-lvovi-vbili-andria-parubia/

[30] https://www.president.gov dot ua/news/pripinennya-vognyu-potribne-i-todi-ce-bude-chitkij-signal-sh-99865;https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1961808807438242003

[31] *GRAPHIC*https://t.me/azov_media/7219 ; https://suspilne dot media/donbas/1103130-persij-korpus-ngu-azov-zafiksuvav-fakt-zagibeli-ludini-v-civilnomu-odazi-u-pokrovskomu-rajoni-na-doneccini/

[32] https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf

[33] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-may-5-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-occupation-update-april-28-2025; https://isw.pub/OccupationUpdate050125

[34] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33158 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4975

[35] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33158

[36] https://pikabu dot ru/story/boytsyi_2_msp_vks_vozle_vechnogo_ognya_v_np_kozinka_12659512 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4977

[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33192 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/severnnyi/4975 ; https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13982

[38] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13982

[39] https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/13982

[40] https://suspilne dot media/kharkiv/1102928-bila-kupanska-zsu-zvilnili-selo-z-akogo-rosiani-kontroluvali-trasu-na-misto/

[41] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41590

[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416

[43] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/netypove-pronyknennya-yak-rosiyany-namagayutsya-forsuvaty-richku/

[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41604

[45] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67111

[46] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33172 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416

[47] https://t.me/mod_russia/56070

[48] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41613 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67109 ; https://t.me/yurasumy/24479

[49] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67110 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67112 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33172 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865

[50] https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33172

[51] https://suspilne dot media/1102758-rosia-vdarila-po-zaporizzu-ermak-zustrivsa-z-vitkoffom-u-nu-jorku-1284-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1756544837&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vnsq2tu2Oo0&ab_channel=%D0%A1%D1%83%D1%81%D0%BF%D1%96%D0%BB%D1%8C%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8

[52] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/08/29/perekydannya-uskladnene-chornym-zherebczem-poblyzu-lymanu-voroga-vidbyvayut-na-peredovij-ta-v-tylu/

[53] https://t.me/dva_majors/78461

[54] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439 https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33180

[55] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/stysnuly-motoczykletnyj-bataljon-zsu-pro-protydiyu-taktyczi-voroga/

[56] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41620

[57] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41622

[58] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416;

[59] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41622

[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9897; https://t.me/blak93/11019

[61] https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/33157

[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865

[63] https://t.me/motopatriot78/41607; https://t.me/nm_dnr/14236

[64] (GRAPHIC): https://x.com/Bielitzling/status/1961810466218348924; https://t.me/azov_media/7219

[65] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25443

[66] https://t.me/wargonzo/28865 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/25443

[67] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/08/30/okupanty-pochaly-yizdyty-na-monokolesi-ta-vykorystovuvaty-tanky-yak-artyleriyu/

[68] https://www.facebook.com/pashtetof/posts/pfbid04v1rVpW9cgFikRVnvRpoZwqCaPV3XBF3WCLcR1kZ9PFYDYAL8j42d9ZHDgnBoavgl; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2952

[69] https://t.me/opforukraine/176 ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/22545

[70] https://t.me/z_arhiv/32296

[71] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865;

[72] https://t.me/osintpen/1707; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/9899; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1961762625156763998; https://t.me/voin_dv/16677

[73] https://t.me/mod_russia/56061

[74] https://t.me/voin_dv/16677; https://t.me/dva_majors/78497

[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/rybar/73216; https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2952; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67107

[76] https://t.me/voin_dv/16667; https://t.me/voin_dv/16675

[77] https://t.me/voin_dv/16671

[78] https://t.me/voin_dv/16680

[79] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67107

[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439

[81] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28439; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12898; https://t.me/wargonzo/28865; https://t.me/dva_majors/78465

[82] https://t.me/rogozin_do/7521

[83] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28418; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/28416; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12898

[84] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28659

[85] https://t.me/osvedomitell_alex/28654

[86] https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1961742404710441368; https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1961719020115181945; https://t.me/Crimeanwind/85450; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/explosion-heard-near-airport-in-simferopol-thick-column-of-smoke-in-the-sky/