New Pentagon Task Force Aims To Accelerate Drone Defense At Home And Abroad

Faced with increasing threats from small drones at home and abroad, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has created a new task force to speed up the development and procurement of counter-small unmanned aerial systems (C-sUAS). However, the memo outlining the establishment of Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) can not address the many impediments to using these tools, especially domestically, that The War Zone has written about frequently. This initiative follows one Hegseth announced in July to surge the fielding of small drones, including weaponized types, across the entire U.S. military.

“There’s no doubt that the threats we face today from hostile drones grow by the day,” Hegseth stated on X Thursday afternoon. “Emerging technologies – we see it in battlefields, in far-flung places, and we see it on our own border in small unmanned aerial systems. [These drones] target and bring harm on all war fighters, our people, our bases, and frankly, the sovereignty of our national airspace. And that’s why today I’m directing the Secretary of the Army to formally establish” JIATF 401.

The Pentagon “must focus on speed over process,” Hegseth offered as a rationale for having the Army Secretary establish a new task force to replace the previously existing Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office (JCO). That office was set up in 2020 to coordinate counter-drone efforts. 

The Pentagon “has maintained pace with its adversaries in conventional warfighting capabilities,” Hegseth explained. “However, the small UAS threat continues to grow exponentially and is becoming increasingly sophisticated. The number of DoD organizations involved in C-sUAS since [JCO was created] has increased, and those organizations often are unconnected to each other.”

Specifically, the task force will be the lead organization for developing C-sUAS and its director will have the authority to procure these systems. It will also consolidate the Pentagon’s research, development, test and evaluation (RTD&E) efforts, except for service-specific and USSOCOM programs of record development activities. To help ensure these systems get fielded quickly, the JIATF 401 director can approve up to $50 million in funding for each CsUAS initiative.

Additionally, the task force will subsume Replicator 2, the previous Pentagon initiative to help speed up the acquisition and fielding of new counter-drone capabilities. The funding for those efforts being selected for Replicator 2 will be determined in collaboration with the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU). To further ensure that these initiatives can be paid for, the task force director will present options for unfunded requirements to Pentagon leadership.

This counter-drone system from Leidos demonstrated at Falcon Peak 2025 includes a drone that fires stringy streamers at other uncrewed aerial systems. (Howard Altman)

The JIATF 401 director will also have special authority to speed up “hiring the most talented individuals to support the JIATF 401 mission.” This includes bringing aboard those “with operations, acquisition, electronic warfare (EW), intelligence, or other C-sUAS competencies” who enjoy “access to their service’s decision-making officials.”

Hegseth’s directive also calls for placing the Army’s Joint Counter-small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C-sUAS) University at Fort Sill under the authority of the task force. The university seeks to educate leaders on the best ways to defend against small drone threats.

The task force will also have 30 days to find and create a test and training range. Meanwhile, there remains a question of who will run JIATF 401 and why it was so named.

Hegseth’s counter-drone plan comes after years of incidents where U.S. forces at home and overseas, but not in combat zones, have faced small drone incursions, many of which were of publicly unknown origin. We were the first to report about drones flying over Langley Air Force Base in December 2023 as well as incursions last year over Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Picatinny Arsenal, and others in the U.S. and four bases in England. These are just a small sampling of incidents.

In addition, we have written in-depth about drone swarms that have harassed U.S. Navy ships off the coast of California, as well as those flying over nuclear energy plants, other sensitive areas, such as military training areas and airports. The problem is vast and accelerating in scope and danger.

RAF Lakenheath in England was one of four U.S. bases to see drone incursions last year. (Photograph by David Goddard/Getty Images) (Photograph by David Goddard/Getty Images)

In conflict zones, a wide array of small drones have become a top weapon of choice. In Ukraine, among the many such variants, first-person view (FPV) drones are taking on an increasingly larger role. Meanwhile, Russia’s Shahed drones have become their primary long-range strike munition. In the Middle East, a wide variety of nefarious players use drones for surveillance and attacks. U.S. warships, air defense sites at forward bases, and aircraft have had to fight off many types of drones launched by Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis.

U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagles played a large role in shooting down Iranian drones in 2024. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Keegan Putman) Senior Airman Keegan Putman

Beyond these threats, Ukraine’s Spider Web attack on Russian aviation and Israel’s Operation Rising Lion attack on air defense systems and other military targets and personnel have shown the danger presented by near-field drone attacks that are launched deep within enemy territory, in close proximity to their targets. As we have pointed out for many years, military assets and other high-value targets are extremely vulnerable to these types of operations within the homeland.

You can see video of the Spider Web operation below.

Given all these threats, finding better ways to defend against them, and doing so in a far more aggressive, quicker manner, not only makes sense, it’s become critical to national security. However, it is one thing to have new tools to do so. It is something else entirely to have the authority to use them, which now exists only in very limited ways, especially in the homeland and to a lesser extent overseas at U.S. bases not in active combat zones. Hegseth’s memo does not address that concern because it is outside the DoD’s purview to do so, which raises the question of how much a of difference JIATF 401 can really make when it comes to actually engaging drones in some sensitive areas.

There is no mention in Hegseth’s memo about exactly what kinds of C-sUAS systems the Pentagon is looking to develop. As we have previously written, due to these restrictions, the U.S. military isn’t currently interested in fielding kinetic and directed energy capabilities, such as laser and high-power microwave weapons, surface-to-air interceptors, and gun systems, for defending domestic bases and other critical infrastructure from rapidly growing and evolving drone threats. Instead, the focus is on electronic warfare and cyber warfare, and other ‘soft-kill’ options, at least for the time being.

332d Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron train on counter drone tactics against small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS). (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Jeffery Foster) Tech. Sgt. Jeffery Foster

Often confusing legal and regulatory hurdles limit how and when counter-drone systems of any kind can be employed within the homeland. Concerns about risks of collateral damage resulting from the use of anti-drone capabilities factor in heavily, too. This all, in turn, raises questions about the potential for serious gaps in the currently allowable but still largely non-existent domestic drone defense ecosystem as well as those that would be developed under JIATF401.

With these issues in mind, the commander of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has said he wants to see an expansion of anti-drone authorities under the U.S. law known as “130i.” That’s a reference to subsection of Title 10 of the U.S. Code (10 USC 130i), covering current permissions for the “protection of certain facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft.”

Under 130i, the U.S. military has the authority to take “action” to defend against drones including with measures to “disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft” and to “use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

The law, however, does not go far enough, Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot testified before Congress earlier this year, saying it should be expanded to pertain to “all military installations and not just those that are covered,” he urged.

Guillot also asked senators to expand the distance from a base that countermeasures can be employed.

“I’d also like to see the range expanded to slightly beyond the installation, so they don’t have to wait for the threat to get over the installation before they can address it,” he proposed. That’s because “many of these systems can use side-looking or slant range [sensors]. And so they could surveil the base from outside the perimeter, and under the current authorities, we can’t address that.”

Beyond that, Guillot is also seeking a “proposed…a change to the rule of force” along the southern border, where thousands of troops are deployed to deter illegal immigration and drug smuggling. The change would “allow us to shoot down or bring down drones that are surveilling over our deployed and mobile troops…not just that are in self-defense, but anything that’s surveilling and planning the next attack on us within five miles of the border.”

Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot, commander of NORTHCOM and NORAD, wants greater authority to defend against drones. (Tom Williams/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images)

Overseas, at bases outside of combat zones, the U.S. still has to work under the rules and sensitivities of host nations, which can severely limit what defensive measures can be taken. In combat zones, this is far less of an issue, given the rules of engagement.

For years, The War Zone has raised concerns about dangers posed by drones, and had laid out a detailed case through dozens upon dozens of reports that adversaries were taking advantage of the lack of aerial domain awareness over and above the homeland. The issue of unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAP, is also tied up in this deeply, which is problematic in its own right. You can read all about this here. These issues significantly predate Hegseth’s tenure, leaving the U.S. playing catch-up on drone defense, something we have frequently pointed out.

We have reached out to the Pentagon, Army, NORTHCOM and INDOPACOM for more details about how all this will work and how the current limits on protecting against drones will factor into what JIATF 401 will attempt to accomplish. The Army and NORTHCOM deferred us to the Pentagon. We will update this story with any pertinent details provided.

Hegseth has given the new task force 36 months before it faces a review to determine if it should continue. While there are serious regulatory barriers that need to be broken down in order to mount a robust drone defense of key installations and assets in the United States, this is clearly a step forward into better orchestrating the response to the growing drone problem across the DoD.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com