Executive Summary
The 12-day Israel-Iran war sent shock waves across the globe. It not only enforced some strategic realignments but also further sharpened the existing geopolitical divisions between the two major camps: the US-led G-7 and the NATO alliance, versus the China-Russia-led Eurasian groupings, such as the SCO and, to a certain extent, BRICS. In the joint declaration after the Rio de Janeiro summit (June 6), member states described the recent Israeli and American attacks on Iran as a “violation of international law”. They expressed “grave concern” about the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East – a position contrary to that of the US-led bloc.
The conflict, in fact, crystallized and further expanded those fault lines in multiple ways and have an almost direct bearing on South-Southwest Asia involving India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
Firstly, the war, as well as the continued Israeli aggression against Gazans and Palestinians, not only eroded the moral and democratic credentials of the lead western countries but also exposed Israeli weaknesses like never before; for decades, Israel was used to intermittently mauling and claiming victories against small non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah. A sense of superiority and invincibility drove Israel’s high-handed conduct with smaller and handicapped countries such as Syria and Lebanon because of unquestioned support from the US and its closes allies such as UK and Germany.
Secondly, apparently steeped in a sense of racial superiority, Israel also considers itself as indispensable to the Western powers, whose direct or indirect support only reinforced the notion that “the UK is an active participant in genocide in Gaza” (in the words of Zara Sultana, a former UK Labour Party MP).
Thirdly, the Israel-Iran conflict drew widespread, across-the-board condemnation from within the Islamic countries in general. With over 850 million Muslim population in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Iran, the outrage over Israeli actions in Gaza and the attacks on Iran were even more pronounced. It only multiplied the anti-Israel sentiment as well as a sense of helplessness vis a vis the Israel-US partnership – largely because of the one-sided, self-serving rhetoric by Benajamin Netanyahu and President Donald Trump.
Fourth, massive expulsions of Afghans from Iran on charges of espionage for Israel put both India in particular spotlight; its refusal to condemn Israeli attacks and the alleged links of Indian IT engineers (working in Iran) with Israel caused bad blood between New Delhi and Tehran, which had until recently treated India as a close ally.
Fifth, India – being the only founding member close to the US in the BRICS ( beside Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa) grouping, drew the ire of President Trump who on July 7 threatened all BRICS members (also including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates since January 2024) with a ten percent additional tariff if any one of them attempted to decouple their trade from the US dollar.
“Any Country aligning themselves with the Anti-American policies of BRICS, will be charged an additional 10% Tariff. There will be no exceptions to this policy,” Trump posted on the Truth Social platform.
This way India faced a double whammy; it annoyed Iran and also faced “punitive” action by Trump if it continued
Sixth, the conflict prompted Russia to instantly recognize Afghanistan’s Taliban regime – making it the first country to do so – and allowed the new ambassador to hoist the Islamic Emirate flag on the Afghan embassy in the capital Moscow. China has yet to lend recognition but it already has a full-time ambassador in Kabul with a Taliban ambassador in Beijing.
Seven, whispers on Pakistan recognizing or at least establishing quasi diplomatic relations with Israel under the Trump-induced Abraham Accords were also seen as the immediate outcome induced by the Israel-Iran war – a possible strategic shift by Pakistan and acceleration of the Accords’ implementation process.
Though, the contents of the conversation over lunch that Donald Trump hosted for Pakistan’s army chief Asim Munir at White House on June 18, remain largely unknown, yet the speculation centred on Trump asking Pakistan for recognizing Israel. The quid pro quo is ignoring the continued military-led assault on opposition, subjugation of the judiciary, and the unprecedented muzzling of the media ( on July 8, a court, for example conceded government request to block 27 YouTube channels for being anti-system that means the civil-military regime). Secondly, a promise of US-led investments into Pakistan’s vast cache of rare minerals for the next two decades. A public campaign via some influential journalists/anchors in favour of relations with Israel perhaps validates the first quid pro quo. The second – as of July 9 – remains speculation.
Eight – and this ties into the previous point on the possible US-Pakistan minerals’ extraction deal – reflecting the US geo-economic goals. It couldn’t have been more pronounced than a post on X by former special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad on July 7, urging to counter China’s “hegemony” in the region’s rich mineral resources.
Nine, the two wars – India-Pakistan (May 7-10) and the Israel-Iran war (June 13-22) proved that both India and Israel – despite their technological edge -failed to assert themselves as invincible. Resilience by the Iranians and retaliation by Pakistan denied both Israel and India respectively the claim to military ascendancy, though both suffered considerable defense infrastructural losses never visualized before.
Lastly, both Israel and India literally disregarded the nuclear deterrence doctrines; Pakistanis had assumed that the nuclear capability would fend off any attack on its territory, but India blew that assumption apart by striking targets deep inside Pakistan.
In essence, nuclear deterrence did not prevent both India and Israel from taking on targets in Pakistan and Iran, respectively, thereby establishing a neo-normal that is pregnant with risks of further armed conflicts under the nuclear overhang, particularly in south Asia.
Both wars also underscored the marginalization of big surface forces – the army, infantry, or aircraft carriers – because of the ability for Distant Engagement through lethal hypersonic missiles and drones. The May-June events are likely to accelerate an arms race for more sophisticated, lethal long-range anti-ship missiles that can penetrate the defenses of the most potent carriers. Both India and Pakistan are now likely to push for weapons that are critical to the distant, kinetic warfare.