The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the G-20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023, presents a bold vision of economic integration and strategic realignment. Supported by India, the United States, the European Union, and key Gulf and Mediterranean states, the corridor seeks to create a modern logistics chain linking Indian markets to Europe via the Middle East.
IMEC features two main intermodal routes: an eastern corridor connecting India with the Arabian Gulf, and a northern route through Jordan and Israel to Europe. Countries such as Greece, Israel and Jordan are essential to the functioning of the corridor, envisioned to be powered by smart infrastructure, green energy and digital connectivity. The initiative positions itself as a direct alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but with a more sustainable, multilateral and private-sector-oriented approach.
However, a number of key regional powers have been left out, most notably Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has openly criticized IMEC for deliberately excluding Ankara and has instead advanced the “Development Road” initiative, proposing a rival corridor that connects the Gulf to Europe through Iraq and Türkiye. This divergence is more than just logistical; it reflects deep geopolitical misalignments.
Is it right decision?
Türkiye’s exclusion from IMEC stems from a combination of political estrangement and strategic rivalry. Over the past decade, Ankara’s increasingly independent foreign policy, marked by friction with NATO, acquisition of Russian S-400 missile systems, military interventions in Syria and Libya, and strained ties with Israel, has alienated the Western capitals backing IMEC. Moreover, Türkiye’s complex relationship with Israel contradicts the normalization framework embedded in the Abraham Accords, which underpins the northern stretch of IMEC. The fact that Türkiye is promoting a competing corridor via Iraq further reinforced the decision by IMEC’s architects to leave it out.
Yet, excluding Türkiye may also limit the corridor’s long-term viability. Geographically, Türkiye is a natural bridge between Asia and Europe with existing rail and port infrastructure. Bypassing such a critical transit country may create logistical inefficiencies and expose the corridor to heightened geopolitical risks in more volatile regions like Israel or Jordan. IMEC’s long-term success may eventually require either Türkiye’s inclusion or expensive workarounds.
IMEC’s momentum has also been disrupted by escalating regional instability. Since Oct. 7, 2023, Israel’s subsequent attacks on Gaza have caused considerable uncertainty, stalling progress on diplomatic normalization essential to the corridor’s success. Saudi Arabia, once seen as one of the important actors in normalizing ties with Israel, has since downplayed the possibility of a comprehensive agreement. While Riyadh has not directly withdrawn from IMEC, the current geopolitical freeze casts a shadow over the northern rail route’s feasibility.
Despite these challenges, some bilateral progress has been achieved. In 2024, India and the UAE signed an intergovernmental agreement to deepen cooperation on IMEC. This included launching a digital trade corridor and modernizing ports, contributing to a 20.5% increase in bilateral trade, which reached $65 billion and is expected to grow further in 2025. France and Italy have appointed special envoys to IMEC, and Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration recently announced new energy development projects within its framework, signaling continued interest in select aspects of the corridor.
At a broader level, IMEC symbolizes a shifting alignment in the political economy of global trade. It firmly situates India within a Western-oriented geopolitical framework, drawing it closer to the U.S., the EU and Israel, and moving it away from the historical narrative of the Global South and the China-led BRICS bloc. This strategic pivot may unsettle Beijing, especially as India now openly supports an initiative that challenges BRI’s primacy in Eurasian connectivity.
Economically, the stakes are significant. A report by Kotak Securities suggests that IMEC could make Indian exports more competitive in Europe by cutting transit times and transport costs. Sectors such as textiles, pharmaceuticals and automobiles stand to benefit, while planned investments in cross-border electricity grids, clean hydrogen pipelines and undersea digital cables align with India’s growing interests in renewables and technology.
IMEC’s envisioned reach spans economies representing a combined GDP of $47 trillion. Yet, such a grand ambition demands colossal investment. Indian authorities estimate that up to $600 billion will be needed by 2027 to finance port development, railway construction, and IT infrastructure across participating nations. Mobilizing such capital requires investor confidence – something currently undermined by regional instability and an absence of robust institutional guarantees.
The corridor also faces serious geopolitical and operational hurdles. The northern rail route cannot function without at least a minimal level of Saudi-Israeli normalization and Jordanian cooperation. Iranian-Israeli tensions, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes, and broader Middle Eastern volatility present constant threats to IMEC’s continuity. Without durable diplomatic engagement, corridor diplomacy risks stalling indefinitely.
Environmental considerations also cast a shadow. While IMEC touts green infrastructure, the environmental cost of new construction projects must be carefully assessed. Without climate-conscious planning, the corridor could replicate the same sustainability criticisms that have plagued parts of BRI.
Nevertheless, even in partial implementation, IMEC serves India’s strategic interests. It enhances New Delhi’s global standing as a connectivity actor and strengthens its hand in negotiating trade and energy deals. Symbolically, it positions India as a counterbalance to China’s global ambitions and offers an alternative economic vision rooted in openness and transparency.
In sum, IMEC embodies both India’s aspirations and its strategic dilemmas. If fully realized, the corridor could reduce India-Europe transport time by 40% and costs by 30%, a potential economic game-changer. But as of now, IMEC remains more a vision than a functioning system: a vision of India standing tall in the emerging order, of trade routes redrawn, and of a new model of transcontinental cooperation.
Its future, however, depends not on ambition alone, but on smart diplomacy, substantial investment, and the willingness to navigate the complex and often volatile politics of the Middle East.
**Researcher at Consortium for Asia Pacific Studies in Pakistan
Muhammad Asif Khan
