The aftermath of the newest war between Iran, America, and Israel is still the topic of headline news, with all regions yet to be made clear. The government of Iran claims to have dealt crushing blows to Israel and America and is claiming victory. Why cannot the Iranian leadership so readily acknowledge defeat? Why do they detain journalists and bloggers who attempt to inform people on what is going on in the war?
Were the Iranian people behind the Iranian government in the 12-day war? All the evidence is to the contrary. Reports by news agencies and eyewitness accounts verify that Iranians never expressed regrets for the loss of any one of the officials or military commanders who were killed during the war. The world witnessed how this war was not fought in the name of the Iranian people.
What was the real motive behind this war, then?
Everyone knows that the most important issue of this war was the Iranian regime’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. In its core, the regime’s main issue is to survive. For decades, in spite of popular resistance, global sanctions, and the enormous cost borne by the Iranian people, the regime has persisted in pursuing its nuclear course. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is reportedly having spent more than $2 trillion of the country’s funds on this program, deeming it vital to the theocratic regime’s very survival.
This comes after the regime’s past actions—like Ayatollah Khomeini’s brutal suppression of freedom, including shooting at a peaceful demonstration of half a million people in Tehran on June 20, 1981, all as an exercise in preserving the regime. Just as he did not bring an end to a disastrous war with Iraq, the leaders today perceive the nuclear program as a means of securing the survival of the regime, influence in the region, and ability to repress internally.
Long before October 7, 2023, two opposing fronts hardened in Iran for many years. After the revolution of 1979 that overthrew the Shah’s dictatorship, Ayatollah Khomeini promised to prevail on democracy and reform. Today, however, this regime holds thousands of political prisoners of every class of society—merchants, students, teachers, workers, pensioners, even housewives. Torture in Iranian prisons is no secret, and executions are appallingly common.
Meanwhile, amidst economic calamity, the regime spends tremendous sums on proxy militias in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. National protests in 2022 and 2023 against the murder of Mahsa Amini revealed widespread popular discontent—especially by women and youth. Shouts of “Death to the Dictator” and “Death to Khamenei” directly targeted the regime.
Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), comprising the organized opposition movement MEK, spoke to the European Parliament last June. She stated:
“The question of Iran extends far beyond the regime’s nuclear ambitions. At its heart is a struggle between the people and the Iranian resistance on one side, and the ruling religious dictatorship on the other.”
Iran’s Ayatollahs are gripped with fear of a society about to explode. One former lawmaker cautioned recently:
“Iran today is like a dormant volcano. Any spark could trigger an explosion. The government must try immediately to achieve the people’s satisfaction—otherwise, we are on the road to disaster.” (Pro-government newspaper, Didar News, June 30)
Increasing prices of essential commodities—driven by institutionalized corruption and plundering—have further fueled popular outrage. The specter of a popular uprising threatens the regime.
During her speech to the European Parliament, Mrs. Rajavi emphasized:
“Twenty-one years ago, I was in this very parliament and said that the solution for Iran is not appeasement or war—it is a third alternative: regime change by the Iranian people and resistance forces.”
Soon after the 12-day war concluded, Iran’s state-owned Arman-e Melli newspaper editorialized on July 2:
“In light of the present situation in the world, the likelihood of another full-fledged war is low. Any war that does break out will be of limited proportions. The real danger is not outside but inside—potential social and political explosion.”
Protests in recent years have shown us that Iran’s true conflict is one internal: between a suppressed people and an oppressive regime.
As a further consideration, even in 1988 when the regime mass-murdered 30,000 political prisoners, it could not eliminate the country’s main opposition, the Mojahedin. Is the recent spree of executions—1,370 during President Pezeshkian’s reign—capable of eliminating the threat of a new uprising and overthrow of the regime?