The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has steadily evolved into one of the world’s most prominent regional groupings, reflecting the rise of Eurasian multilateralism. From its origins as a security-focused platform, it now extends into economic, political, and connectivity initiatives across a vast geography.
The inclusion of Türkiye and Azerbaijan in the upcoming SCO Summit in Tianjin, China (31 August – 1 September 2025) underscores this shift, highlighting the organization’s growing appeal beyond its traditional membership. However, India’s objections to their participation reveal competing visions of what the SCO should represent: an inclusive Eurasian body or a selective forum shaped by national interests.
Both Türkiye and Azerbaijan currently hold the status of SCO dialogue partners but have expressed ambitions to elevate their roles to full membership. Their participation in Tianjin reflects this aspiration, as well as growing support from China and SCO leadership for their eventual inclusion. Türkiye, despite its NATO membership, has actively participated in SCO activities in recent years, balancing its ties between Western and Eurasian blocs. In 2024, SCO Secretary-General Zhang Ming praised Türkiye’s constructive role, emphasizing that its involvement is not aimed against any state but serves to advance shared multilateral objectives. Azerbaijan, meanwhile, offers a strategic link between Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, enhancing the SCO’s outreach in terms of geography, energy connectivity, and regional cooperation.
The SCO Charter provides a clear framework for new members. Article 13 explicitly states that membership is open to states in the region that respect the objectives and principles of the Charter. These include cooperation on security, counterterrorism, development, and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s record reflects compatibility with these principles. Azerbaijan’s acceptance of the Russia-brokered Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire in 2020 demonstrated its commitment to multilateral negotiations. Similarly, Türkiye’s involvement in the Astana Peace Process (2016–2020) alongside Russia and Iran showed a pragmatic approach to conflict settlement. Their alignment with the SCO’s ethos of dialogue and peaceful cooperation strengthens the case for their elevation.
The addition of Türkiye and Azerbaijan would not only diversify the SCO but also add significant strategic depth. Türkiye, straddling Europe and Asia, could become a bridge between East and West within the SCO framework. Its geostrategic position, combined with its role as a NATO member, would enhance the organization’s international visibility and credibility. Azerbaijan, positioned at the heart of Eurasia, brings energy resources, transport routes, and cross-regional connectivity to the table. Its pipelines and logistics corridors link the Caspian region with Europe and beyond, aligning with the SCO’s focus on economic cooperation and connectivity. Moreover, the participation of these states would provide a new multilateral platform for the Pakistan-Türkiye-Azerbaijan trilateral partnership—popularly termed the “Three Brothers Alliance”—to advance shared regional interests.
Despite these potential benefits, India has objected to Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s participation in the summit. This opposition follows a pattern in New Delhi’s SCO engagement. At the June 2025 Defence Ministers’ meeting in Qingdao, India declined to sign the joint statement, citing its omission of terrorism—a reflection of India’s attempt to prioritize its own narratives within multilateral spaces. Similarly, India distanced itself from an SCO condemnation of Israeli strikes on Iran, which violated Iran’s sovereignty. India’s selective approach undermines the SCO’s collective spirit. By objecting to the inclusion of Türkiye and Azerbaijan, New Delhi risks projecting an image of exclusivity rather than inclusivity—contradicting the SCO’s founding principles of openness and cooperation.
If the SCO is to remain relevant as a pan-Eurasian organization, it must demonstrate its ability to accommodate diverse geopolitical alignments. The potential inclusion of Türkiye and Azerbaijan would show that the SCO is not limited to its founding members but is responsive to broader Eurasian realities. For Pakistan and other members, this presents an opportunity to strengthen multilateralism by supporting the elevation of Türkiye and Azerbaijan. Doing so would counterbalance unilateral objections, reinforce the SCO’s legitimacy, and expand its capacity for fostering East-West connectivity.
The SCO stands at a crossroads. Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s participation in the Tianjin summit, and their aspirations for full membership, highlight the organization’s growing global appeal. Yet India’s objections risk narrowing the SCO’s vision at a time when inclusivity and openness are essential for its credibility. By adhering to the principles enshrined in its Charter, the SCO can seize this moment to reaffirm its commitment to diversity, dialogue, and peaceful cooperation. Türkiye and Azerbaijan’s inclusion would strengthen not only the organization’s geographic and strategic reach but also its image as a truly representative body for Eurasian multilateralism.