Can North Korea become a ‘normal state’ while rejecting denuclearization?

Chang Se-jeong

The author is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo.
 
 
In September 2018, during the fourth Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Korean Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon sat side by side on stage for a rare public discussion. Moderating was Sergei Brilyov, a well-known anchor from Russian state television, who pressed Xi and Putin with unusually provocative questions.
 
Brilyov pointed out that when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un flew to Singapore in June of that year for his first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, China had provided Xi’s Air China state aircraft for his travel. The moderator then asked whether Beijing would be willing to extend a nuclear umbrella to Pyongyang in support of denuclearization. According to a former senior Korean diplomat who witnessed the moment, Xi’s expression revealed hesitation as he considered the question.
 

From left: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un are seen ahead of a military parade in Beijing on Sept. 3 to mark the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. [JOINT PRESS CORPS]

 
Xi ultimately avoided a direct response. He reaffirmed China’s existing line: cooperation on peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, along with recognition of Pyongyang’s security concerns. Putin, however, reacted more openly. “Why not?” he replied, according to the Kremlin’s official transcript. While expressing agreement with Xi’s remarks, he added that China had enough confidence thanks to its nuclear deterrent.
 
The image of Kim and Putin standing next to Xi on Tiananmen Gate during the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in World War II earlier this month revived memories of that episode seven years ago. Much has changed. At the 2018 forum, both Xi and Putin still showed public concern with a path toward denuclearization. In Beijing this year, neither mentioned it. The failure of the Trump-Kim summit in Hanoi in 2019, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the advent of Trump’s second administration this January — defined by a reliance on hard power — have all reshaped the geopolitical dynamics surrounding North Korea.
 
For two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to compete in courting Pyongyang, ignoring denuclearization entirely, appears irresponsible. As North Korea deepened its alignment with Moscow — reportedly supplying conventional weapons and even troops for the war in Ukraine — Xi grew wary. His invitation to Kim to visit Beijing was meant to prevent North Korea from slipping completely into Russia’s orbit. For Kim, the visit was a multipurpose event. With the possibility of Russian aid declining should the war in Ukraine end, he sought to secure China’s backing as a stable sponsor.
 
Another likely calculation was the further normalization of North Korea’s nuclear status. While neither Seoul, Washington nor European capitals accept such a reality, Kim may aim to treat nuclear arms reduction — not denuclearization — as the starting point in any future dialogue with Washington. On Tiananmen, he also displayed his daughter, Kim Ju-ae, often cited as a fourth-generation successor, underscoring regime stability and continuity. By wearing a business suit with a gold tie instead of his usual Mao-style outfit, Kim tried to project the image of a “normal state.” Yet clinging to nuclear weapons ensures that such recognition remains out of reach.
 

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, right, and Russian President Vladimir Putin ride together in a vehicle in this photo released by the state-run Rodong Sinmun on Sept 4. [RODONG SINMUN]

 
Kim’s diplomatic ambitions raise further questions. Could he attempt to attend the United Nations General Assembly this year, coinciding with its 80th anniversary? Might a meeting with Trump take place on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Gyeongju this October? At 41, Kim is more experienced, and confronting him will require careful strategy. Yet it is troubling when a Democratic Party lawmaker and former head of the National Intelligence Service recently suggested, recklessly, that Korea should recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.