Looking at India-Pak ties through prism of Indus Treaty: insights from a new book | Explained News

Much of the conversation on the issue has been driven by emotions, and has not always been factual. This is where a new book by Uttam Kumar Sinha, senior fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, and an eminent authority on the IWT, could be invaluable.

Trial by Water (2025), Sinha’s second book on the subject, assesses the relations between India and Pakistan through the prism of the IWT. It takes a scholarly look at the history and working of the Treaty over the last six decades, and also offers thoughts on where it may eventually end up.

Sinha’s first book, Indus Basin Uninterrupted (2021), was a historical and technical narrative of the way the Indus basin shaped the political boundaries and economic destiny of the land and its people over millennia, and described the historical and logistical backdrop to the division of the basin after India was partitioned.

Two sides, two views of IWT

That the IWT allowed about 80% of the water in the six rivers of the Indus system to flow uninterrupted to Pakistan has triggered much consternation in India in recent years. Sinha explains that the division of waters was based not on a volumetric assessment but on geography, terrain, gravity, and the natural course of the rivers.

India and Pakistan had different motivations for entering into the Treaty.

Jawaharlal Nehru believed that it would lead to peaceful coexistence with Pakistan. He “saw it (Treaty) as a stabilising gesture, an act of magnanimity that might anchor regional peace,” writes Sinha. Nehru believed that water disputes were a distraction from India’s larger developmental goals, and “on this issue, he was prepared to go further with Pakistan than he ever was on Kashmir, despite earlier lapses in judgment.”

Criticised for his generosity, Nehru had said, “We purchased a settlement, if you like; we purchased peace”, the book records. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar recently told Parliament that Nehru had purchased not peace, but appeasement.

Pakistan, which was more security-minded, was aware of the leverage that upper riparian states enjoyed, especially if the lower riparian was heavily dependent on the river.

Despite the seemingly favourable Treaty, no Pakistani leader has ever celebrated the 80:20 distribution — realising probably that the strategic balance remained in India’s favour, and that projecting ‘victory’ would weaken its strategy of victimhood, says the book.

Over the years, Pakistan has remained equally, if not more dissatisfied with the Treaty — though for a very different reason.

Pakistan’s deep insecurity

From the perspective purely of needs, the 80:20 distribution was not unfair to either country in the Treaty.

India got more than what it had originally asked for, which was the waters of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) — the Treaty gave it limited rights to the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) as well.

Over the years, India has made very little use of its rights on the western rivers. While this is in a way evidence that the Treaty did not starve it of water resources, India has objected to Pakistan’s use of IWT provisions to stall or delay projects that would have allowed it to exercise its rights to the western rivers.

“…Pakistan began to leverage Article IX (dispute redressal mechanism of the Treaty) as a tool in its broader rivalry with India, using it strategically to delay and obstruct Indian water projects in J&K,” writes Sinha.

What Pakistan desires is not more water, but control over river flows. It is nervous about the possibility of India disrupting the flows that it is reliant on. But the only way it can address this insecurity is by taking control of J&K, where most of these rivers flow before entering Pakistan.

And this is how the issue of river waters is inextricably linked to Pakistan’s larger gameplan. Its desire to annex Kashmir stems not just from its territorial ambitions and religious motivations, but also from deep insecurity about water. Sinha notes that soon after the Treaty was signed, Pakistan’s military ruler Gen Ayub Khan spoke of seeking physical possession of Kashmir.

Why the Treaty survived

The IWT not just survived, but worked uninterrupted through four wars, repeated terrorist attacks sponsored by Pakistan, and several periods of great tension between the two countries. It is often cited as a model for cross-boundary governance of waters.

The credit for this must go to India — for the main reason for the success of the Treaty is undoubtedly the fact that the primary obligation for running it lies with India, not Pakistan.

It is India that has to ensure minimum flows, and share adequate and timely data and other information with Pakistan. It is the action of the upper riparian state (India) that has impacts downstream. What the lower riparian does (or not) has no impact upstream.

Would the Treaty have survived wars and terrorist attacks if Pakistan had been the upper riparian? Suffice it to say that even from its relatively disadvantageous position as lower riparian, Pakistan has managed to make perverse use of the Treaty’s provisions to delay or stall legitimate water works in J&K.

What could happen now?

Pakistan realises that it already has the best deal possible, and will likely keep stonewalling India’s efforts for a modification or renegotiation of the Treaty.

India will almost certainly insist that the renegotiation is a bilateral affair, with no role for a third party like the World Bank that brokered the Treaty in 1960. This is an unsettling thought for Pakistan — and the reason why Pakistani experts sometimes talk about getting the other two Indus basin countries, China and Afghanistan, in the fold if at all the Treaty is to be renegotiated. About 8% of the Indus basin is in China and 6% in Afghanistan.

India may be in no hurry to break the current stalemate. Having freed itself from adhering to the Treaty provisions, India would like to get on with the job of finishing water projects in J&K, ignoring Pakistani objections.

India’s primary objective of keeping the Treaty in abeyance is to probably not disrupt flows — which Pakistan has been worked up about — but to free itself to make full use of its rights on the western rivers.

In fact, India may even be willing to share flow or weather data with Pakistan (as it recently said it has been doing) — though the discontinuation of the meetings of the Permanent Indus Commissioners means the shared data may not be as detailed or structured as before.

After six decades, India has finally exercised the strategic advantage of the upper riparian, after having exhausted all other means to stop Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism project. Introducing a little uncertainty with regard to the volume and timing of flows could have huge logistical implications for Pakistan. India is hoping that it could finally force Pakistan to see sense.