The complete phaseout of Russian energy imports is one of the European Union’s most ambitious geopolitical objectives. This process has a particularly strong impact on nuclear energy, where various stages of the supply chain still rely heavily on Russian technology and capacities. This article assesses the EU’s exposure across the nuclear fuel cycle – from uranium procurement to conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication – and examines viable pathways toward long-term supply independence.

Reducing nuclear dependency: the EU’s exit from Russian fuel supply

The latest version of the REPowerEU Roadmap, published by the European Commission on 6 May 2025, sets out the complete phaseout of Russian nuclear fuel as a key objective, along with ending dependence on Russian natural gas and crude oil. The plan foresees the gradual restriction of enriched uranium imports from Russia through trade measures, as well as limitations on future fuel contracts with Russian suppliers. Several Member States – including Hungary and Slovakia – have criticised the proposals, citing energy security and competitiveness concerns.

Although the European Commission announced that measures targeting Russian nuclear fuel would be postponed, the long-term political trajectory is clear: the complete removal of Russian nuclear technology, on top of the raw materials and processed products originating from the country. The EU relies to varying degrees on Russian resources and technology across all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Limited alternative supply capacity, market trends, and rising demand for non-Russian sources make supply diversification a matter of both strategic and economic importance.

Ensuring the EU’s uranium supply without reliance on Russia

The EU’s supply of natural uranium is entirely based on imports from non-EU countries, making it highly sensitive to global geopolitical developments. In 2024, uranium imports into EU Member States exceeded 13,000 metric tons, representing roughly one-fifth of global demand. As shown in Figure 1, the origins of uranium imported into the EU are relatively diversified. In 2024, the four largest supplier countries were Canada (33 per cent), Kazakhstan (24 per cent), Australia (10 per cent), and Russia (15 per cent), together accounting for 84 per cent of total orders. Importantly, over 40 per cent of EU uranium imports still came from countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States – primarily Russia and Kazakhstan.

Nonetheless, notable progress has been made in diversifying uranium suppliers. This is reflected in a 36 per cent reduction of Russian imports in 2024 compared to the previous year, which witnessed a sharp 72 per cent increase. Imports from African producers also declined: for instance, Niger’s share dropped significantly after the 2023 military coup. Australia has taken over most of the uranium volume previously sourced from Russia, with Kazakhstan also contributing modestly. It is also worth noting that China entered the EU’s list of uranium suppliers for the first time in 2024.

Figure 1: Changes in volume and share of natural uranium imports to the EU (metric tons)

In 2024, the global market price of uranium experienced significant fluctuations, driven primarily by supply uncertainties in key producing countries. The spot price of uranium rose by 36 per cent from 2023, reaching 84.77 dollars per pound. Long-term uranium prices also showed a modest upward trend in 2024, with the annual average reaching 77.83 dollars per pound, representing a 10 per cent increase over the 2023 average. The market upswing in uranium contributed to the revival of multiple dormant mining projects worldwide, notably in Australia, the US, Canada, Namibia, and Malawi. As a result, global uranium production rose by 10 per cent in 2024 compared to 2023.

Overall, replacing Russian-origin uranium for the EU’s supply would not in itself pose a major market challenge. On the one hand, natural uranium is abundantly available on the global market; on the other, new mining capacities are entering production. Moreover, Russia accounts for only a small share – just under 5 per cent – of global uranium production. In 2024, the leading producers were Kazakhstan and Canada, which had, respectively, a 38 per cent and a 24 per cent share in global output. The distribution of uranium production by country is shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Uranium production by country (2024)Conversion bottlenecks: EU self-sufficiency falls short without capacity expansion

Conversion services, defined as the transformation of natural uranium into uranium hexafluoride (UF₆), are met domestically within the EU at a rate of approximately 20 per cent, with France’s Orano serving as the principal provider. Conversion services sourced from Russia account for a similar share, covering around 22 per cent of total EU demand (see Figure 3). In the past year, Rosatom’s share in EU conversion services declined by 16 per cent, while the United States’ share increased by 18 per cent.

Figure 3: Origin of uranium conversion services used by the EU (2023–2024)

However, an assessment of replacing the Russian conversion capacity must also consider the needs of a broader Western geopolitical region, which includes not only EU Member States but also Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan, Ukraine, South Korea, Australia, the United States, and Canada. From this wider perspective, current projections are far from optimistic. 

The total annual capacity of the conversion facilities of the Western geopolitical region is currently estimated at approximately 31,100 metric tons of uranium (tU). This quantity is insufficient to meet the combined needs of reactors in this group of countries. The estimated supply shortfall exceeds 10,000 tU per year; although this gap is expected to narrow slightly, to around 5,000 tU by 2029, a renewed increase is anticipated in the longer term. This trend is primarily driven by the widespread implementation of long-term operation (LTO) programs and the commissioning of new nuclear units.

Figure 3: Uranium conversion capacity and future needs in the Western geopolitical region (tU), Source: Euratom Supply Agency, Annual Report 2024.Western enrichment faces supply shortfalls: another critical juncture expected by 2040

When it comes to uranium enrichment, the European Union’s dependence on Russia stood at 23 per cent in 2024, marking a significant decrease from 38 per cent in 2023. Currently, the EU meets more than 60 per cent of its total enrichment needs from domestic sources. In principle, the combined capacity of enrichment plants operating within the EU is enough for self-sufficiency in enrichment services.

With the gradual entry of new enrichment capacity in the EU and in the Western geopolitical region, future increases in demand could also be met. To this end, both Orano and Urenco are planning to expand their facilities. These developments could play a key role in substituting a large share of enrichment services currently procured by the EU and the United States from Russian sources. Table 1 shows that European and Western facilities (Orano and Urenco) together account for 41 per cent of total operational capacity worldwide.

Table 1: Global uranium enrichment capacities (2022)

CompanyReprocessing plant capacity (tons of separative work unit, tSWU)Share of global capacityRosatom (Russia)27,10044%Urenco (UK, Germany, the Netherlands, US) 17,90029%Orano (France)7,50012%CNNC (China)8,90014%Other100Total nameplate capacity61,500100%

 

Expanding enrichment capacity typically takes 5 to 7 years, making a swift replacement of Russian services unlikely. Looking at long-term supply prospects across the Western geopolitical region, the outlook remains challenging. The current enrichment capacity stands at approximately 25,300 tons of separative work units (tSWU) per year, which is insufficient to meet the needs of its nuclear reactor fleet. The capacity shortfall exceeds 9,000 tSWU annually, although it is expected to narrow after 2027, when new enrichment units are scheduled to begin operation in France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. However, even with these planned expansions, total Western enrichment capacity may still fall short of projected demand. The gap is expected to shrink to around 500 tSWU per year by 2037, but is likely to widen again in the mid-2030s due to the commissioning of new nuclear reactors. From 2040 onward, the annual shortfall is projected to once again exceed 2,000 tSWU.

In 2024, enrichment service prices rose sharply: the spot market average reached USD 172.67/kg SWU (+20 per cent), while long-term contract prices climbed to USD 160.08/kg SWU (+10 per cent). If this trend continues, it could affect not only existing reactor fuel supply but also the emerging market for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), needed for next-generation small modular reactors (SMRs) and advanced modular reactors (AMRs), as their technology requires 5–20 per cent enrichment – much higher than today’s 3–5 per cent. Rising HALEU demand adds pressure to enrichment capacity and increases supply chain risks, especially for the EU, which is fully dependent on external sources: 50 per cent of its HALEU imports come from the US, the other half from Russia.

Alternative fuel solutions for VVER reactors: three strategic directions

Currently, 101 nuclear reactors are operating in the European Union, of which 19 are Russian-designed pressurised water reactors (VVER) units. These include four VVER-1000 reactors located in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, as well as 15 VVER-440 units operating in the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia, as illustrated in Figure 4. To reduce dependence on Russian nuclear fuel, three alternative pathways have emerged within the EU. 

The most established option is the Westinghouse-developed VVER-compatible fuel, already deployed not only in Ukraine but also in several EU Member States, including Finland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. The fuel assemblies are manufactured at Westinghouse’s facility in Sweden, and the project benefits from EU financial support. A second option involves the production of compatible fuel by Framatome under a Russian license. However, the licensing process for the German-based facility has stalled, and the timeline for launching production seems uncertain. The third approach involves the development of a fully European VVER-compatible fuel design, part of an ongoing EU-funded initiative launched in 2024. Although the project has the backing of a broad industry coalition, it is expected to take longer to complete and thus does not yet represent a viable short-term alternative.

The effort to phase out Russian nuclear fuel and services is underway across all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, critical questions linger over the timeline and cost of achieving full independence. Moreover, this is not solely a matter of the EU’s energy security: the entire Western nuclear ecosystem – from the United States to Japan – relies on the same limited conversion and enrichment capacities. Without rapid and coordinated investment in new infrastructure, the fuel supply for future reactors may face notable challenges in the long term.

Figure 4: VVER reactors in Europe

The data presented in this analysis are based on the Euratom Supply Agency’s annual report for 2024, published on 20 June 2025.