It is time for a One Korea policy

Sept. 17 (UPI) — Author’s note: The concept of a One Korea policy was introduced by lawyer Grace Kang at the Mongolia Forum in 2024 and in an essay in the Georgetown Security Studies Review.

Kim Jong Un has crossed the Rubicon. His declaration that South Korea is the enemy, his abandonment of even the rhetorical commitment to peaceful unification and his insistence on the total domination of the peninsula under his Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State mark a pivotal turning point.

These proclamations should end any remaining illusions about North Korea‘s intentions. Kim did not renounce unification because he believes in coexistence. He did so because he fears his own people. He knows that shared Korean identity threatens the very foundations of his hereditary system.

To justify endless sacrifice, mass suffering and his pursuit of nuclear weapons and advanced missile technologies, Kim requires an enemy, and the only logical enemy is the South. But the tragedy is not just in Pyongyang’s policy shift; it is in the lost hope for all Koreans.

For decades, the vision of eventual unification has been a point of continuity across both sides of the Demilitarized Zone. Kim has robbed the Korean nation of that shared vision. He seeks to replace it with perpetual fear, repression and blackmail diplomacy.

This moment demands a response. The Republic of Korea, the United States and the wider international community must recognize reality: There can only be one Korea. It is time to adopt a One Korea policy, not just as government doctrine, but as a movement led by civil society, the people of South Korea and free citizens everywhere who refuse to accept that 25 million Koreans should remain hostage to tyranny.

The case for a one Korea policy

A one Korea policy begins from a moral and strategic truth: There is only one Korea and one Korean people. The artificial division of the peninsula is sustained by the will of one family regime, not by the desires of the Korean nation.

A One Korea policy recognizes that North Korea is not a legitimate, permanent state. It is a mafia-like crime family cult with nuclear weapons, systemic repression and crimes against humanity as its foundation. Its survival depends on isolating its people and weaponizing fear.

South Korea stands as the only legitimate guardian of the Korean nation’s identity and future. The Republic of Korea has demonstrated resilience, prosperity, democracy and global leadership since 1945. It is from this position of legitimacy that Seoul and its partners must advance a unified vision of the peninsula: a secure, non-nuclear, economically vibrant and liberal democratic Korea.

Why Kim needs an enemy

Kim Jong Un’s abandonment of peaceful unification is not a display of strength. It is a confession of weakness. Naming the South as an enemy is not about strategy toward Seoul, but about narrative control inside North Korea. Kim fears resistance, subversion and the growing awareness among his people that their suffering is not inevitable.

The regime justifies the continued expansion of nuclear and missile arsenals by pointing to supposed foreign threats. Without an external enemy, the suffering of the population has no explanation. By presenting South Korea as the hostile aggressor, Kim can ask his people to endure continued sacrifice. In reality, his real fear is not the South, it is the Korean people themselves, their culture, identity and their growing desire for access to truth and freedom.

A strategic opportunity for South Korea

Kim has presented South Korea with an opportunity in disguise. By rejecting any shared future, he inadvertently gives Seoul the moral and political space to seize the initiative. The Republic of Korea no longer needs to frame itself reactively in response to Pyongyang’s overtures. Instead, it can define unification on its own terms.

By declaring and advancing a One Korea policy, South Korea can say to the North Korean people, to its regional allies and to the international community that we do not seek the domination of the North, but the liberation of all Koreans. This moral high ground has strategic value. It reframes the entire peninsula problem away from endless containment and deterrence toward the only path that can truly resolve the nuclear and humanitarian crises: unification.

The role of civil society

Governments are cautious. Their timetables are often slow, shaped by bureaucratic constraints, political risk and competing priorities. That is why the responsibility for pushing forward a One Korea policy does not rest entirely with Seoul or Washington. It rests with civil society, the networks of citizens, advocates, scholars, churches, NGOs, defectors, diaspora communities and human rights activists who refuse to accept the permanence of the division.

Civil society has played decisive roles in other historical transformations — from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the end of apartheid in South Africa. The Korean peninsula is no different. A “One Korea Global Campaign” can point the way for civil society and governments. Governments can negotiate and deter, but liberation and unification cannot happen without pressure, advocacy, and moral leadership from below.

Reframe the discourse

Civil society organizations in South Korea, the United States and allied democracies must consistently reframe peninsula policy around the idea of eventual unification.

Think tanks, advocacy groups and academic institutions should promote the language of a One Korea policy in conferences, media and track-two dialogues, signaling that the only real solution is unification, not coexistence with tyranny.

Empower North Korean voices

Defectors and escapees must be empowered to tell their stories globally. NGOs and civic groups should amplify their testimonies, supporting platforms in which North Korean refugees can speak directly to South Koreans, Americans and international audiences.

Civil society networks must demand policies that support information penetration into the North, including radio broadcasts, digital content and other means to break the regime’s monopoly on truth.

Mobilize diaspora communities

Korean diaspora communities across the United States, Europe and Asia should organize cultural and political campaigns affirming the vision of a unified, free Korea.

Diasporas must press their host governments to adopt the one Korea framing in parliamentary resolutions, policy discussions and civic education.

Link human rights to national security

Civil society must not allow human rights abuses in the North to be treated as peripheral issues. Advocacy groups must continually tie human rights to the security threat, emphasizing that the nuclear problem and the gulag state stem from the same regime. A One Korea policy resolves both by addressing the root cause.

Pressure democratic governments

In South Korea, public opinion matters. Civic coalitions can pressure candidates, legislators and political parties to commit openly to a One Korea policy in their platforms.

In the United States, advocacy groups should lobby Congress and the administration to adopt the language of one Korea in policy statements, as the United States once adopted a “One China” policy. Legislators should be encouraged to pass resolutions affirming the objective of unification under a liberal constitutional government.

Build international solidarity

Civil society across Asia and Europe should connect North Korea advocacy to broader democratic movements. Linking the struggle for a free Korea to global struggles against authoritarianism will broaden support and resources.

Transnational coalitions of NGOs should call for U.N. resolutions that explicitly endorse the principle of Korean unification, not merely sanctions or deterrence.

A policy of aspiration and action

The One Korea policy is more than a slogan. It calls for active measures: information campaigns, human rights advocacy, policy lobbying and public discourse that treats unification as the only acceptable end state. It rejects the false options of nuclear arms control with a regime that violates every agreement, or peaceful coexistence with a crime family armed with weapons of mass destruction.

This policy means telling hard truths. There can be no peace on the peninsula without unification. There can be no end to nuclear extortion without dismantling the regime that employs it. There can be no human rights for Koreans without replacing the Kim dynasty with a liberal constitutional order.

Conclusion: one Korea, one future

Kim Jong Un has ended the pretense of dialogue. By declaring South Korea the enemy, he has revealed the fear at the heart of his regime: fear of the Korean people and their desire for freedom. Again, his policy shift is not one of strength, it is a confession of weakness.

This moment should be met not with resignation, but with resolve. Governments in Seoul, Washington and allied capitals should declare openly that the only way forward is unification. But they will not do this alone. Civil society, Koreans and allies, scholars and NGOs, churches and defectors must lead the charge, pressing policymakers to embrace the One Korea policy and driving forward a vision of liberation that matches the courage of the Korean people themselves.

The One Korea policy is a moral imperative, a strategic necessity, and a cause that transcends governments. It is the pathway to a free and unified Korea: secure, stable, non-nuclear, prosperous, and governed by liberty and the rule of law. This is more than policy. It is destiny.

It is time for one Korea. It is time for the United Republic of Korea (U-ROK).

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation, where he focuses on a free and unified Korea. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society, and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.