Lessons from the Romanian experience in NATO and the EU

Photo: ICES

LILIIA SHUTIAK: From late autumn last year until May this year, Romania was in the spotlight. It seems that Romania has miraculously avoided turning toward an anti-western path. Nicușor Dan’s victory brings a dose of optimism. But given the series of political crises in less than the last 365 days, where is Romania now?

RUFIN ZAMFIR: That’s by no means an easy question. There are many layers to unpack. But I think a good starting point for understanding Romania today, both the state and society at large, is this: Romania is discovering the benefits of being a democracy, while at the same time struggling to navigate the responsibilities that come with it. We’re still a very young democracy. Until 1990, Romania had never truly experienced democratic governance – not between the wars, and certainly not under communism.

So the Romanian people are only now beginning to understand the value of no longer living under an authoritarian regime. But at the same time, there’s a growing frustration: democracy comes with costs. There’s no longer a “nanny in the palace” making decisions for you and instead of you. Citizens must engage in their communities, in their regions, in national affairs. That’s part of the democratic deal.

When it comes to the state and institutions, things are more complicated. Romania currently lacks a national project – something clear and unifying, like we had during the push to join the European Union, NATO, or even the Schengen Area. Back then, we saw serious investment – diplomatic, economic, security – to reach those goals. Today, there’s no such overarching vision. The one consistent strategy is to keep Romania on a democratic path, within the frameworks of the EU and NATO.

That’s not just about popular support which, by the way, has grown stronger in recent years, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but also about institutional commitment. Ministries, the military, and other state bodies now seem even more convinced that Romania’s place is firmly within these western structures. Of course, we definitely need to touch on the forces trying to derail this democratic trajectory. But for now, I’m focusing on how Romanian institutions function, how well they work together, and whether that institutional synergy can actually shape a broader strategy.

At the same time, the war in Ukraine has reopened several important debates within Romanian public discourse. One of them is Romania’s role in NATO. The EU is still largely seen as a source of funding with minimal obligations. But NATO for the first time is now being openly discussed in terms of Romania’s deeper responsibilities and commitments as a member.

Do you also mean whether Romania should remain in NATO?

Virtually all political actors in Romania agree that the country should remain in NATO. Even those who occasionally voice opposing views tend to backtrack when pressed to justify their position. Membership in NATO is essentially a given and almost everyone supports it.

The real debate isn’t about whether Romania should stay in NATO, but rather about the role it should play within the Alliance. There’s a politicization of the perception that Romania holds a second-tier status in NATO. And in public discourse, technical facts often don’t matter. For instance, few people know that all NATO decisions require unanimity. This lack of awareness is exploited by manipulative actors who ask questions like, “Why is Romania treated the same as Albania or Montenegro in NATO when we’re so much larger?”

It’s a form of radical populism, capitalizing on ignorance – and for the first time since the war in Ukraine began, NATO has become a target for this kind of narrative. That said, these voices remain, at least for now, on the margins. At the political level, however, Romania finds itself in a troubling place. The quality of our democracy and of our political class is at its lowest in the past 30 years. Sadly, Romania is echoing global trends. Some of those were set in motion by Donald Trump in Washington, while others are evident among European politicians who openly challenge democratic principles or manipulate them to serve personal or party interests.

Right now, about a third of Romania’s parliament is made up of politicians whose platform is based on slogans like “sovereignty first” and economic nationalism. Once in parliament, not all of those ideas turn into policy, especially since these parties are in opposition and lack governing power. Still, they influence the political agenda in Bucharest. Their impact is felt less through direct action and more through inaction. I don’t expect the current government to adopt far-right policies. Rather, I fear they will avoid necessary reforms or shy away from sensitive issues, knowing that the far right could exploit them.

This political stagnation has consequences beyond Romania’s borders. The first affected neighbour is Moldova, which depends on Romania not only for economic aid but also for diplomatic backing, particularly in Brussels and other international settings. The second is Ukraine. I’m not suggesting Romania will suddenly reverse its position on supporting Ukraine. But I do believe that support may slow down or become more conditional. That’s just my assessment. Romania will follow Trump’s decisions regarding Ukraine. If Washington asks Romania to step up, it likely will. But if there’s silence or ambiguity, Romania may delay or scale back its support. Why? Because the issue has become politically sensitive. It was weaponized during the election campaign, and the ruling parties are reluctant to lose even more political capital by taking bold stances.

Romania and Ukraine share a great deal in common. What aspects of Romania’s experience could Ukraine draw on when it comes to building a political nation, integrating ethnic minorities, and moving towards EU membership?

Let me give you an example of a situation that could serve as a potential lesson for Ukraine and one we’re quite proud of at the political level in Romania. During the early stages of Romania’s accession to the EU and NATO, there was strong political consensus across the major parties. They all sat at the same table and negotiated how the goal of the EU and NATO membership could align with their respective agendas. In the end, they reached an agreement: no political actor or party would publicly oppose anything related to the accession process.

This meant that budget allocations – for example, to strengthen the military – were secured without major opposition in parliament. Public statements supporting the EU and NATO membership went largely unchallenged. This cross-party consensus allowed Romania to move forward more quickly with internal reforms, even if the process still took time. This agreement became known as the Snagov Dialogue, named after the small town where it was held.

With only minor exceptions, all major political parties worked together to implement the reforms needed for Romania to join both NATO and the EU. That was a positive lesson. But there’s also a cautionary tale in how these processes were carried out. The dialogue itself and the consensus were conducted and reached in a largely non-transparent way, driven by the political elite, with little meaningful communication to the public.

While the NATO accession didn’t create major problems in terms of public acceptance, EU membership was a different story. The EU accession process was presented to Romanians as something that would bring only benefits – more wealth, more rights – without any discussion of obligations. No one explained what EU membership actually meant. For example, people weren’t told that as a member state, Romania would be expected to uphold the rights of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. These topics remain sensitive and controversial in Romania today and have fuelled Eurosceptic narratives among some segments of the population.

Another misstep by the political elite was the failure to prepare citizens, particularly in rural and agricultural areas, for the uneven outcomes of EU membership. These communities, in many ways, have been left behind. No policies were put in place to mitigate the impact on them, and they remain among those who feel they have gained little, if anything, from EU integration. This is something Ukraine should carefully consider. Alongside structural reforms and diplomacy, public communication and social cohesion are essential to the long-term success of any integration process.

In Romania, there is a Hungarian issue tied to long-standing phobia that Hungary may seek to reclaim Transylvania or push for some form of autonomy in the region. These matters frequently surface on the parliamentary agenda, often due to the presence of parties like the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania. Currently, three members of the Hungarian party serve in the Romanian government, which reflects a strong political mandate. This raises a crucial question: how can a state grant minorities not only cultural autonomy but also meaningful political representation, support in ethnic community building, while at the same time avoid the risks of separatism, revanchism, or irredentism? How is Romania navigating this challenge?

Let’s begin by dividing the issue into two parts: first, the minority in relation to the majority; then, the majority in relation to the minority. The Hungarian minority in Romania has historically been vilified – not just during communism, but even before. Under Ceaușescu, there was a systematic effort to portray ethnic Hungarians as “the enemy within”. As a result, many Romanians, even those who had never met a Hungarian, developed negative perceptions. They might not have considered them outright enemies, but certainly saw them as problematic. Why? Because Hungarians were perceived as unwilling to integrate, despite the fact that no meaningful policies existed to support their social or cultural integration. Ceaușescu certainly wasn’t interested in that.

Naturally, this exclusion pushed the Hungarian community to look elsewhere for support. Over the past 12–15 years, that “elsewhere” has increasingly been Viktor Orbán and Budapest. The Hungarian government has invested heavily in Romania’s Hungarian minority – funding virtually all Hungarian-language media outlets in the country, and subsidizing Hungarian farmers. Meanwhile, Bucharest has done little to help these communities thrive. This disparity only deepens the perception that there is a group within Romania that is somehow ‘other’ – not fully part of the nation, and perhaps even obstructing its progress.

What’s important to understand about the current situation is that acknowledging the presence of a Hungarian minority is not enough. Appointing representatives of that minority to government, for instance, by forming coalitions with their party, does not absolve the Romanian state of responsibility for these citizens. For years, particularly under the Social Democrats, Romanian governments assumed that simply including them in governing coalitions would “solve” the Hungarian minority issue. It didn’t. This is partly why they still occasionally push for full autonomy in regions where Hungarians form a local majority. Do they genuinely believe autonomy is the solution? Probably not. But they feel the need to offer something – some vision – to their constituents. And since they struggle to deliver tangible benefits like better healthcare, education, or social services, they turn to symbolic goals like autonomy. It’s a political mirage.

This is a lesson Ukraine would do well to study carefully. From the outside, the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania might not seem alarming – and it’s not disastrous – but it’s certainly not as stable as it could be. Hungarian and Romanian communities are now more divided than before. It’s like two blocks of ice slowly drifting apart. The gap is growing, not closing. And what’s most troubling is that there’s very little political will to change that.

This publication was compiled by the Institute for Central European Strategy (ICES) with the support of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation within the framework “Whole-of-Society Accession” project. Its content is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union and the International Renaissance Foundation.

Rufin Zamfir is a senior expert at the GlobalFocus Center, where he specializes in the rise of the Romanian and European radical right and radical populism.

Liliia Shutiak is a regional coordinator of the Re:Open Ukraine initiative.

EU accession, NATO, politics, Romania