U.S. conservative preconceptions of the Lee Jae Myung government demand careful attention

 

Choi Hoon
 
The author is the senior columnist at the JoongAng Ilbo. 
 
 
Despite the outward success of the recent Korea-U.S. summit, unease lingered over a message from U.S. President Donald Trump just before the meeting. On social media, he wrote, “What is happening in Korea right now? It looks like a purge or a revolution.” Speaking to reporters, Trump accused Korea’s new administration of “attacking churches in a very vicious manner” and of “entering U.S. bases to seize information” connected to a special investigation. His comments suggested that his perception of the new government is far from positive.
 
Trump remains the central figure of the American conservative right. How do his allies view the government of President Lee Jae Myung? Two recent opinion pieces in the Wall Street Journal offer a glimpse into their thinking.
 

 
The first, published on Sept. 14, was written by Nicholas Eberstadt, a Harvard Ph.D. and chair at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI is one of the most established conservative think tanks in Washington, long associated with figures such as former Vice President Dick Cheney and John Bolton, Trump’s first national security adviser. Its views often shape Republican administrations and overlap with Trump’s base.
 
Eberstadt’s column carried a blunt title: “Seoul and Washington’s Alliance Is Coming Unraveled,” with the subtitle, “The New Risk to the Alliance Comes From the Blue House.” He described Lee as a product of “the far-left wing of the left-leaning Minju [Democratic Party of Korea]” and raised the issue of the North Korea remittances scandal. For Lee, who has sought to emphasize pragmatism and at times identifies himself as a conservative, this framing is problematic.
 
Eberstadt characterized the Democratic Party of Korea as consistently conciliatory toward North Korea and China, the very powers U.S. Forces Korea are meant to deter. He argued that the new government’s appointments raised further doubts. According to him, the new director of the National Intelligence Service was once the leader of a group inside the Blue House dubbed “the Taliban,” and has long advocated for “self-reliance” in security matters. He also singled out Unification Minister Chung Dong-young, recalling that during an earlier term as minister, Chung apologized to Pyongyang for North Korean defectors who fled through Vietnam, and now plans to cancel the government’s annual North Korean human rights report.
 
 
The skepticism echoes remarks made two decades ago by Bolton, who as a State Department official during the Bush administration dismissed the Roh Moo-hyun government by saying, “The one advantage of your government is that we never have to worry about what you are thinking.” For U.S. conservatives, Korea’s Democratic governments have long been coded as heirs to Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in — leaders associated with conciliatory policies toward North Korea and China.
 
Eberstadt was responding to another Wall Street Journal column by Pulitzer Prize winner and former publisher Karen Elliott House, who asked whether Korea would seek nuclear weapons. House argued that trust in the alliance is eroding, noting that 35 percent of Koreans say they no longer trust the United States, and 60 percent doubt Washington would use nuclear weapons to defend Seoul. She warned that Kim Jong-un is seeking a stockpile of 300 warheads and a secure second-strike capability, leaving many Koreans to believe that only an independent arsenal can guarantee security.
 
Eberstadt countered that while Korean concerns over U.S. reliability are valid, the greater danger now originates in Seoul itself. He concluded that if Lee truly respects the alliance, he must recognize that “a double game” with Pyongyang and Beijing would put it at risk. The phrase “double game,” increasingly heard from American officials, underscores the unease. Whatever its label — Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine Policy,” Roh Moo-hyun’s “balancer” concept, or Moon Jae-in’s “peace regime” — to conservatives, it all looks like hedging between Washington and its adversaries.
 

 
The response required from Seoul is clear. The new government must actively engage with America’s conservative leaders to dispel these preconceptions and demonstrate its pragmatic course. It must prevent economic disputes, such as tensions over Korea’s $350 billion in planned investments, from spilling into issues of military security, particularly the U.S. troop presence. Ideas circulating within some ruling-party circles — such as stirring anti-Trump or anti-American sentiment as a bargaining tactic — should be firmly set aside. Trump’s own defense officials, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby, have long emphasized a flexible, evolving role for U.S. Forces Korea. Meanwhile, talk of an independent nuclear program is unrealistic.
 
Any move that could be portrayed in Washington as “playing both sides” with China or North Korea must be avoided. The wisest course may be a waiting game — moving half a step behind developments in U.S.-China and U.S.-North Korea relations, adjusting carefully but never rushing ahead. All of this, too, will pass. That, in the end, is the nature of international politics.

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.