Russia has reportedly been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since July 2025. A Russian insider source that has consistently provided accurate reports about changes in the Russian military command stated on September 21 that roughly 292,000 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) between the start of 2025 and September 15—an average of approximately 7,900 recruits per week or 31,600 per month.[1] The insider source stated that some of these recruits are joining the strategic reserve that Russia has been forming since early July 2025. The source did not specify how many recruits are going to the strategic reserve as opposed to the frontline in Ukraine.
The Russian military command may have assessed that Russia could afford to create a strategic reserve after Russian losses began to decrease in the summer of 2025. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia suffered roughly 32,000 to 48,000 casualties per month between January and July 2025—more casualties than the average reported monthly recruitment rate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russia suffered roughly 29,000 casualties in August 2025 and 13,000 casualties in the first half of September 2025—the only months so far in 2025 with casualty rates below the average reported recruitment rate. ISW recently assessed that Russian territorial gains were less costly in May to August 2025 compared to the spring of 2025, as Russian forces sustained a lower casualty rate per square kilometer seized.[2] The reduced casualty rates in Summer 2025 may have convinced the Russian military command that Russia could afford to transfer some new recruits to a strategic reserve while still maintaining the tempo of offensive operations on the frontline in Ukraine. Changes in Russian tactics on the battlefield in the past few months likely contributed in part to the reduced casualty rates. Russian forces have been conducting assaults in smaller infantry groups and are increasingly employing small group infiltration tactics that seek to find and exploit weaknesses and holes in Ukraine’s undermanned defenses.[3] The formation of the strategic reserve may indicate that the Russian military command assesses that Russian forces will be able to continue their current rate of advance using these small group tactics that allow the Russian command to deploy fewer personnel to the frontline.
Reports that Russia is creating a strategic reserve further indicate that the Kremlin is not interested in ending its war against Ukraine but remains committed to achieving its war goals on the battlefield and may be preparing for a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly put forward a theory of victory that assumes that Russian forces will be able to make slow, creeping advances on the battlefield indefinitely, enabling Russia to win a war of attrition against Ukraine.[4] The reported decision to create a strategic reserve and not deploy all new recruits to the frontline indicates that Putin and the Russian military command are content with the current rate of advance, even though Russian forces continue to only advance at a foot pace. The reported creation of a strategic reserve suggests that Russia plans to escalate offensive operations in Ukraine in the near-to-medium term rather than end the war. Russia may also be building out its strategic reserve as part of wider Kremlin preparations for a possible Russia-NATO conflict in the future, particularly as Russia intensifies its youth military-patriotic programs that aim to recruit Russian youth into the military in the years to come.[5]
Russia continues to test the limits of NATO’s air defenses over the Baltic Sea as Russia increases the frequency of its violations of NATO states’ airspace. The German Air Force reported on September 21 that NATO tasked the German Air Force with scrambling two German Eurofighters to intercept an unidentified aircraft without a flight plan or radio contact in international airspace over the Baltic Sea.[6] German forces later visually identified the plane as a Russian IL-20M reconnaissance aircraft. The German Air Force did not specify where over the Baltic Sea the incident occurred. Russia’s violation of standard operating procedures in international airspace is the latest in a string of aerial incursions into NATO territory since the Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.[7] US President Donald Trump reaffirmed on September 21 that the United States will “help” Poland and the Baltic States if Russia “keeps accelerating.”[8] ISW continues to assess that Russia is pursuing an aggressive campaign to test NATO air defenses and political will as part of a broader effort to collect actionable intelligence that Russia may then apply to a potential future conflict against NATO.[9]
Russian forces continue to develop drone technologies to increase the volume and precision of strikes against the Ukrainian near rear to further complicate Ukrainian logistics. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on September 21 that Russian forces developed fiber optic first-person view (FPV) repeater drones that could potentially quadruple the range of frontline drones.[10] Russia’s fiber optic drones are resistant to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference, and repeater drones contain a radio repeater that extends communication signals by acting as a relay station.[11] Russian drone operators may leverage the fiber optic repeater drones to protect other Russian drones from Ukrainian EW interference and increase the viability and precision of strikes against Ukraine’s near rear. The milblogger claimed that the newly developed fiber optic repeater drones can fly 50 to 60 kilometers, while traditional fiber optic drones are only able to fly 25 to 30 kilometers. Russia’s use of the longer-range repeater drones would allow Russian forces to strike more precisely and deeper into the Ukrainian near rear, particularly along ground lines of communication (GLOCs), further complicating Ukrainian frontline logistics. Russian milbloggers claimed on September 21 that Russian forces have created a “kill zone” (an area immediately near the frontline where a mass of tactical strike and reconnaissance drones pose an elevated risk to any equipment or personnel that enters that area) that extends roughly 45 kilometers from the frontline in both the Vovchansk and Kupyansk directions.[12] Ukrainian 11th Army Corps (AC) Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Dmytro Zaporozhets stated in a September 20 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article that Russian forces are now systemically targeting Ukrainian logistics routes, depots, roads, and evacuation routes, but that Russian strikes of this nature were infrequent in 2024.[13] A sergeant of a Ukrainian reconnaissance unit reported to the WSJ that the nets that Ukrainian forces are constructing over roads to protect against Russian drone strikes are imperfect solutions, as Russian drone operators strike the poles that hold the nets up. Ukrainian Donetsk Oblast Military Administration Head Vadym Filashkin reported to the WSJ that Ukrainian forces are constantly repairing damage to anti-drone netting. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces are achieving some effects of battlefield air interdiction (BAI) with drone strikes against Ukrainian GLOCs that are enabling Russian advances in eastern Ukraine, and that Russia’s recent drone innovations are likely to enhance these BAI effects.[14]
The Kremlin reportedly dismissed former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin from military service. Russian outlet RBK reported on September 21 that a source stated that Russian authorities dismissed Lapin from military service.[15] A local Republic of Tatarstan outlet, Tatar-Inform, reported on September 19 that sources stated that Lapin would serve as an assistant to Republic of Tatarstan Head Rustem Minnikhanov but that the Kremlin has not published an official decree on the appointment yet.[16] Russian business newspaper Vedomosti similarly reported on September 21 that a source close to the Republic of Tatarstan leadership stated that Lapin may become Minnikhanov’s advisor next week and that he will be responsible for recruiting contract personnel and possibly oversee security issues related to Ukrainian strikes against the republic.[17] The Republic of Tatarstan is the main recruitment hub for the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) Africa Corps and is home to Russian domestic drone production at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone.[18] Lapin served as the commander of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces at the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022; moved to be the Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces in 2023; and became the commander of the Leningrad Military District (LMD) and Northern Grouping of Forces in 2024.[19] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed in August 2025 that it replaced Lapin as the LMD and Northern Grouping of Forces commander with Chief of Staff of the Russian Ground Forces Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov.[20]
Lapin has proven to be an incompetent commander throughout the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin is likely punishing Lapin now as part of its ongoing campaign to scapegoat and punish high ranking officials for their failure to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. Russian President Vladimir Putin has generally been reluctant to dismiss commanders despite displayed command deficiencies, choosing rather to reappoint commanders than dismiss them.[21] Lapin’s complete dismissal from military service is a notable inflection. Lapin has faced heavy criticism for his failures as a commander throughout the war. Lapin commanded the Central Grouping of Forces in 2022, when Ukraine’s counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast in Fall 2022 forced Russian forces to withdraw from Lyman. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin were both highly critical of Lapin’s failures in Kharkiv Oblast in October 2022, accusing the Russian military command of failing to promptly respond to the deteriorating situation around Lyman.[22] Kadyrov’s and Prigozhin’s criticisms were especially noteworthy as Putin and his mouthpieces had been extremely tight-lipped about the performance of military commanders or their replacements. Lapin also commanded the Northern Grouping of Forces when Ukraine launched its incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024. The Northern Grouping of Forces under Lapin had been conducting offensive operations to create a buffer zone in northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts since May 2024 and March 2025, respectively.[23] Ukrainian forces have been successful in preventing Russian forces from establishing a significant and enduring buffer zone in both northern Kharkiv and Sumy oblasts, however. Lapin’s dismissal from military service is likely part of the Kremlin’s wider efforts to scapegoat and punish Russian authorities who failed to prevent Ukraine’s Kursk incursion. Russian authorities have detained and charged several high-ranking regional officials in Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod oblasts with mishandling the construction of defensive fortifications in Russia’s border areas.[24] The Kremlin notably did not punish Lapin for his numerous operational failures in Ukraine but is likely choosing to punish him now over his failure to protect Russian territory.
Key Takeaways
Russia has reportedly been forming a strategic reserve from new recruits since July 2025.
The Russian military command may have assessed that Russia could afford to create a strategic reserve after Russian losses began to decrease in the summer of 2025.
Reports that Russia is creating a strategic reserve further indicate that the Kremlin is not interested in ending its war against Ukraine but remains committed to achieving its war goals on the battlefield and may be preparing for a conflict with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Russia continues to test the limits of NATO’s air defenses over the Baltic Sea as Russia increases the frequency of its violations of NATO states’ airspace.
Russian forces continue to develop drone technologies to increase the volume and precision of strikes against the Ukrainian near rear to further complicate Ukrainian logistics.
The Kremlin reportedly dismissed former Northern Group of Forces and Leningrad Military District (LMD) Commander Colonel General Alexander Lapin from military service.
Lapin has proven to be an incompetent commander throughout the war against Ukraine, but the Kremlin is likely punishing Lapin now as part of its ongoing campaign to scapegoat and punish high ranking officials for their failure to repel Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk Oblast in August 2024.
Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in The Russian Federation
Ukrainian partisans reportedly disrupted a railway connected to a Russian defense industrial enterprise. The “Atesh” Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group reported on September 21 that Atesh agents executed a successful sabotage mission against a railway in Smolensk Oblast, blowing up the track leading to the Smolensk Aviation Plant, which produces Kh-59 type missiles, drones, components for battlefield aviation, and light aircraft for the Russian military.[25] Atesh reported that the strike disabled over 10 track control elements.
Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in northern Ukraine along the international border
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Sumy Oblast on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked in Sumy and Kursk oblasts on September 20 and 21.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in unspecified areas of Sumy Oblast.[27]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are reportedly operating near Kindrativka (north of Sumy City); elements of the 30th Motorized Rifle Regiment (72nd Motorized Rifle Division, 44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly operating near Oleksiivka (north of Sumy City); and elements of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th battalions of the 51st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (106th VDV Division) and the 2nd Battalion of the 119th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating near Yunakivka (northeast of Sumy City).[28] Elements of the 137th VDV Regiment (106th VDV Division) are reportedly operating in the Sumy direction.[29] Drone operators of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Sumy Oblast, and elements of the Anvar Spetsnaz Detachment (possibly referring to the BARS-25 Anvar volunteer detachment) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces and infrastructure in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts.[30]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1
Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Synelnykove and toward Bochkove on September 20 and 21.[31]
Russian milbloggers, including a milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces, claimed that Russian forces are consolidating positions on the left (south) bank of the Vovcha River in Vovchansk to create a bridgehead in the area.[32] The milblogger reportedly affiliated with the Northern Grouping of Forces claimed that a soldier from the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) operating in the Vovchansk direction complained that the Russian military command is sending infantry into highly attritional, infantry led assaults and does not care about the resulting high casualties.[33]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1009th Motorized Rifle Regiment (69th Motorized Rifle Division, 6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], LMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Vovchansk, and drone operators of the Black Raven detachment (purportedly a volunteer drone unit) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in Kharkiv Oblast.[34]
Russian forces attacked east of Velykyi Burluk toward Odradne on September 21 but did not advance.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2
Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 21 that Russian forces likely seized Kindrashivka (north of Kupyansk).[36]
Russian forces attacked near Kupyansk itself; northwest of Kupyansk near Myrove and Tyshchenkivka; north of Kupyansk near Kindrashivka; northeast of Kupyansk near Krasne Pershe and Zapadne and toward Petro-Ivanivka; and east of Kupyansk near Petropavivka on September 20 and 21.[37] Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces detected small Russian infiltration and assault groups near the Spartak Stadium and Dovhalivska Street in northern Kupyansk and near Myrove, south of Tyshchenkivka, and north of Sobolivka (west of Kupyansk).[38]
Mashovets stated that Russian forces are trying to exploit their numerical advantage in combat ready infantry to organize and conduct numerous attempts to infiltrate Ukrainian defensive lines in the Kupyansk direction in several areas at once.[39] Mashovets stated that Russian forces are primarily conducting combat operations on the west (right) bank of the Oskil River, as Russian forces are having problems transferring heavy equipment from the east (left) bank. Mashovets noted that Russian forces are not struggling to transfer personnel across the river, however.
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that likely elements of the Russian 27th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Guards Tank Army [GTA], Moscow Military District [MMD]), 68th Motorized Rifle Division (6th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Leningrad Military District [LMD]), and 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade (Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate [GRU]) are operating on the outskirts of Kupyansk.[40] Drone operators of the 1st GTA are reportedly striking Ukrainian drones in Kupyansk Raion.[41]
Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Borova near Nova Kruhlyakivka and southeast of Borova near Hrekivka on September 20 and 21 but did not advance.[42]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on September 21 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces seized Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman).[43]
Russian forces attacked northwest of Lyman near Shandryholove, Derylove, and Novoselivka and toward Drobysheve; north of Lyman near Novomykhailivka and Novyi Myr and toward Stavky; northeast of Lyman near Kolodyazi; east of Lyman near Torske; and southeast of Lyman near Yampil and in the Serebryanske forest area on September 20 and 21.[44]
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 254th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA, MMD) are attacking from Kolodyazi toward Stavky; that elements of the 448th Motorized Rifle Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th CAA) are attacking in Shandryholove; and that elements of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (1st GTA, MMD) are attached to the 20th CAA and attacking near Karpivka (northwest of Lyman).[45]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3
Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas, and advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northwest of Siversk near Dronivka, northeast of Siversk near Serebryanka, southeast of Siversk near Vyimka, and south of Siversk near Pereizne on September 20 and 21.[46]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 1st Volki Volunteer Reconnaissance-Assault Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Slovyansk direction (west of Siversk).[47]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Kostyantynivka near Chasiv Yar; southeast of Kostyantynivka near Toretsk, Shcherbynivka, Pleshchiivka, and Ivanopillya; southwest of Kostyantynivka near Stepanivka and Yablunivka and toward Berestok; south of Druzhkivka near Rusyn Yar and Poltavka; and southwest of Druzhkivka near Sofiivka and Volodymyrivka on September 20 and 21.[48]
Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that Ukrainian advances in the Volodymyrivka-Novotoretske direction and toward Sofiivka (all southwest of Druzhkivka) stalled due to Russian counterattacks near Mayak (southwest of Druzhkivka) and in the Poltavka-Rusyn Yar direction (south of Druzhkivka).[49] Mashovets reported that recently redeployed elements of unspecified Russian naval infantry brigades may be attacking near Sofiivka.
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 6th Motorized Rifle Division (3rd Army Corps [AC]) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian vehicles in the Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk direction.[50] Drone operators of the 27th Artillery Regiment (6th Motorized Rifle Division, 3rd AC) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka highway.[51] Drone operators of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly interdicting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) near Kostyantynivka.[52] Elements of the 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating in the Kostyantynivka direction.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Dobropillya tactical area on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Dobropillya near Nove Shakhove and Shakhove and southeast of Dobropillya near Zapovidne and Pankivka on September 20 and 21.[54] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Zapovidne.[55]
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of the Russian 114th and 132nd motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] AC, SMD) are holding a “significant” area south and southeast of Kucheriv Yar (northeast of Dobropillya) and are trying to expand the base of the Russian Dobropillya salient by attacking toward Nove Shakhove.[56] Drone operators of the 57th Spetsnaz Company (8th CAA, SMD) reportedly continue to strike Ukrainian positions near Shakhove.[57]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on September 21 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced west of Novoekonomichne (northeast of Pokrovsk) along the T-0504 Kostyantynivka-Pokrovsk highway.[58]
Unconfirmed claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced northeast of Chunyshyne and in central Novopavlivka (both south of Pokrovsk).[59] One Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Novopavlivka.[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced in Pivdennyi Microraion in southern Pokrovsk and complained that other milbloggers are exaggerating Russian advances in southern Pokrovsk.[61]
Russian forces attacked near Pokrovsk itself; north of Pokrovsk near Rodynske; northeast of Pokrovsk near Novoekonomichne, Krasnyi Lyman, Novotoretske, and Fedorivka; east of Pokrovsk near Promin and Kozatske; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of Pokrovsk near Chunyshyne, Novopavlivka, and Novoukrainka; southwest of Pokrovsk near Leontovychi, Zvirove, Udachne, Molodetske, and Kotlyne; and west of Pokrovsk toward Serhiivka on September 20 and 21.[62] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Chunyshyne and Malynivka and toward Boikivka (both northeast of Pokrovsk).[63]
Order of Battle: Mashovets reported that elements of Russian 1st and 110th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 51st CAA, SMD) advanced to the northern outskirts of Novoekonomichne.[64] Mashovets reported that elements of the 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade and likely elements of the 9th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the 51st CAA) are attacking in the Malynivka-Novoekonomichne direction. Drone operators of the 90th Tank Division (41st CAA, Central Military District [CMD]) are reportedly operating in the Pokrovsk-Novopavlivka area.[65] Drone operators of the 80th Sparta Reconnaissance Battalion (51st CAA) are reportedly striking Ukrainian drone control points in Myrnohrad (east of Pokrovsk).[66]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Novopavlivka direction on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked toward Novopavlivka itself, southeast of Novopavlivka near Dachne, south of Novopavlivka near Filiya, and southwest of Novopavlivka near Zelenyi Hai on September 20 and 21.[67]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velykomykhailivka direction.
Assessed Russian advances: Mashovets reported on September 21 that Russian forces seized Sichneve (east of Velykomykhailivka).[68]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced north of Berezove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[69]
Russian forces attacked northeast of Velykomykhailivka near Myrne, Andriivka-Klevstove, and Piddubne; east of Velykomykhailivka near Sichneve and Oleksandrohrad; and southeast of Velykomykhailivka near Komyshuvakha, Vorone, Zaporizske, Berezove, and Novomykolaivka, and Maliivka on September 20 and 21.[70]
Mashovets stated that Russian forces have a quantitative advantage in manpower and equipment in the Velykomykhailivka direction and that Russian forces have three to four battalions for every one Ukrainian battalion holding the defenses, with the ratio growing to five or six Russian battalions for each Ukrainian battalion in some unspecified sectors of the front.[71] Mashovets stated that the Russian personnel advantage is complicating Ukraine’s ability to maintain a continuous defensive line, as Ukrainian forces have to organize defense into separate positions, strongpoints, and lines that leave gaps in the line. Mashovets stated that Russian forces are attempting to exploit these gaps by sending small infantry groups to penetrate Ukrainian defenses, after which Russian forces try to consolidate new positions while waiting for additional small Russian groups to arrive for the next attack.
Order of Battle: Mashovets stated that elements of the Russian 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Tank Brigade (both of the 36th CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) are operating between Novoselivka (east of Velykomykhailivka) and Sosnivka (southeast of Velykomykhailivka).[72] Drone operators of the 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (GRU) are reportedly striking Ukrainian positions in the Vremivka (Velykomykhailivka) direction.[73] Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA, EMD) are reportedly striking Ukrainian vehicles northeast of Stepove (south of Velykomykhailivka).[74]
Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked northeast of Hulyaipole near Olhivske, Novoivanivka, and Poltavka and toward Novovasylivske on September 20 and 21.[75]
Order of Battle: Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported that likely elements of the Russian 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, 218th Tank Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), and 69th Separate Cover Brigade (35th CAA, EMD), with support from elements of the 57th and 60th motorized rifle brigades (both of the 5th CAA, EMD), are attacking near Novoivanivka, Novomykolaivka (northeast of Hulyaipole in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), and Olhivske.[76]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked southeast of Orikhiv near Bilohirya; southwest of Orikhiv near Novoandriivka; southwest of Orikhiv near Kamyanske; and west of Orikhiv near Stepnohirsk and Prymorske on September 20 and 21.[77]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the Russian 429th Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly striking Ukrainian forces near Mahdalynivka (northwest of Orikhiv).[78] Elements of the 7th Airborne (VDV) Division are reportedly operating on the southern outskirts of Prymorske.[79]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kherson direction on September 21 but did not advance.
Russian forces attacked east of Kherson City near the Antonivskyi Bridge on September 20 and 21.[80]
Ukrainian forces reportedly recently struck Russian helicopters and a radar in occupied Crimea. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 21 that Ukrainian forces struck three Russian Mi-8 helicopters and a Nebo-U long-range air defense radar in occupied Crimea.[81] Ukrainian outlet Militarnyi noted that GUR’s footage indicates that Ukrainian forces directly hit and destroyed at least one helicopter.[82] Militarnyi reported that Ukrainian drones hit the Nebo-U antenna, putting the radar out of operation.
Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the front line
Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of September 20 to 21. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 54 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones, of which about 30 were Shahed-type drones, from Kursk and Bryansk cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai.[83] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed or suppressed 33 drones and that 21 drones struck eight locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, damaging civilian and residential infrastructure.[84]
Ukraine’s State Emergency Service reported on September 21 that Russian forces conducted a “double tap” strike against Ukrainian rescue workers putting out a fire after an initial Russian strike against Nizhyn, Chernihiv Oblast.[85]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reported on September 21 that Russian forces launched more than 1,500 strike drones, 1,280 guided glide bombs, and 50 missiles of various types against Ukraine in the past week (roughly September 14 to 20).[86] Zelensky reported that Ukrainian authorities have found more than 132,000 foreign components in Russian weapons, including components from Europe, the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Japan.[87]
Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks
Nothing Significant To Report.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
Endnotes
[1] https://t.me/arbat/2163
[2] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/
[3] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-12-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-6-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-9-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-12-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-2-2025/
[4] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_7-6/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_27-5/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_10-5/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar071425 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar061925 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar060725 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar051725 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-8-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-6-2025 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar021825 ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2025/
[5] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-17-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-september-19-2025-2/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-occupation-update-august-7-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-13-2025/
[6] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-plane-entered-airspace-over-baltic-sea-sunday-germanys-air-2025-09-21/
[7] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-10-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-19-2025/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/
[8] https://nypost.com/2025/09/21/us-news/trump-warns-us-will-defend-poland-and-baltics-if-russia-keeps-escalating-we-dont-like-it/
[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-20-2025/
[10] https://t.me/rybar/73784
[11] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-31-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[12] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100182 ; https://t.me/sheyhtamir1974/138997; https://t.me/ukr_2025_ru/268493
[13] https://www.wsj.com/world/ukraines-supply-runs-turn-to-nightmares-as-drones-menace-roads-far-beyond-the-front-3d478ac4
[14] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-drone-innovations-are-likely-achieving-effects-of-battlefield-air-interdiction-in-ukraine/
[15] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/09/2025/68cfa4859a7947dc17939bf5
[16] https://www.tatar-inform dot ru/news/sensacionnye-naznaceniya-i-novye-prioritety-kto-vosel-v-komandu-rustama-minnixanova-5999763
[17] https://www.vedomosti dot ru/politics/news/2025/09/21/1140780-generala-lapina-mogut
[18] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-may-14-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-task-force-update-august-27-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-august-25-2025/; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-force-generation-and-technological-adaptations-update-july-25-2025/
[19] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/21/09/2025/68cfa4859a7947dc17939bf5 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2025/09/21/rbk-general-aleksandr-lapin-uvolen-s-voennoy-sluzhby-poslednie-poltora-goda-on-vozglavlyal-leningradskiy-voennyy-okrug; https://meduza dot io/feature/2025/09/21/voyna
[20] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/
[21] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_30-18/ ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-21-2025/
[22] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment_2-23/
[23] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025/
[24] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-4-2025/ ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122024 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar072225 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041625
[25] https://t.me/atesh_ua/8021 ; https://suspilne dot media/1120060-partizani-pidirvali-kolii-do-zavodu-u-rosijskomu-smolensku/
[26] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266
[27] https://t.me/severnnyi/5150 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/79817
[28] https://t.me/severnnyi/5156
[29] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34014
[30] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180484; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34014
[31] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34005
[32] https://t.me/severnnyi/5150; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34005
[33] https://t.me/severnnyi/5147
[34] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100181; https://t.me/notes_veterans/25206
[35] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289
[36] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[38] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[39] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[40] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[41] https://t.me/epoddubny/24848
[42] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266
[43] https://t.me/motopatriot78/42554 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67614
[44] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67614 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[45] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2988
[46] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[47] https://t.me/dva_majors/79823
[48] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[49] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2989
[50] https://t.me/sashakots/56432
[51] https://t.me/sashakots/56437
[52] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34014
[53] https://t.me/andrew_kots/921 ; https://t.me/sashakots/56433
[54] https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[55] https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[56] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2989
[57] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14316
[58] https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1969803102384714179; https://x.com/LloydUkrYT/status/1969803157279564162; https://t.me/soniah_hub/12400
[59] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67613 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180448 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42556
[60] https://t.me/tass_agency/338948
[61] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34019 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42557
[62] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/67613 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180448 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[63] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34019 ; https://t.me/motopatriot78/42561
[64] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2989
[65] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/100183
[66] https://t.me/nm_dnr/14315
[67] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330
[68] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[69] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/180448
[70] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Dnipro/18330
[71] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[72] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[73] https://t.me/voin_dv/16958
[74] https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/1969758677432152280 ; https://t.me/army29th/429
[75] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266; https://t.me/wargonzo/29355
[76] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2990
[77] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34029; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29289; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266; https://t.me/dva_majors/79817
[78] https://t.me/ZA_FROHT/46633
[79] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/34029
[80] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29268; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/29266
[81] https://t.me/DIUkraine/6956; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/21/prymary-gur-zdijsnyly-nalit-na-krym-znyshheno-try-gelikoptery-mi-8-ta-vorozhu-rls/ ; https://gur dot gov.ua/content/helikoptery-mi8-ta-rls-niebou-v-krymu-cherhovi-rezultaty-nalotu-prymar-hur-na-pivostriv.html ; https://t.me/ButusovPlus/23099 ; https://t.me/censor_net/76503 ; https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-ghosts-unit-strikes-three-mi-8-helicopters-satellite-images-confirm-at-least-one-destroyed/
[82] https://militarnyi dot com/en/news/ukrainian-ghosts-unit-strikes-three-mi-8-helicopters-satellite-images-confirm-at-least-one-destroyed/
[83] https://t.me/kpszsu/42807
[84] https://t.me/synegubov/17302; https://t.me/dnipropetrovskaODA/24468; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/21/u-dnipropetrovskij-ova-rozpovily-pro-naslidky-vorozhyh-udariv-po-regionu/; https://t.me/synegubov/17302
[85] https://t.me/dsns_telegram/49967; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2025/09/21/vorog-vdaryv-po-ryatuvalnykah-na-chernigivshhyni/ ; https://suspilne dot media/1119960-zelenskij-pidtverdiv-zustric-z-trampom-novi-sankcii-proti-propagandistiv-1306-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1758434444&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://t.me/astrapress/92633
[86] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16189
[87] https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/16189