Politics, Geopolitics & Conflict

Russian influence operations are saturating Moldova’s election cycle, targeting the pro-EU government with disinformation on energy insecurity, corruption, and minority rights. Moscow’s play is not necessarily to deliver a clean win for its preferred proxies, but to fracture Moldova’s EU consensus and force a hung or contested outcome. Monitoring teams are already tracking coordinated online pushes tied to Russian assets, while local opposition networks amplify the same themes on the ground. Western backers are trying to offset this by underwriting election oversight and energy subsidies, but the real vulnerability is political cohesion in Chisinau. The most acute risk is not a decisive opposition victory but post-election protests and legitimacy disputes, where Russian-linked groups could drive instability at the street level.

The Russian air incursion over Estonia and drone activity over Poland are probes. Moscow is testing NATO’s red lines, calculating that the alliance cannot risk uncontrolled escalation. Riga, Vilnius, and Warsaw want NATO procedures to evolve from warnings into enforceable engagement rules. Warsaw has already signaled it will not wait for NATO leadership and is prepared to act unilaterally if needed. London is likewise signaling it is ready to move directly against Russian aircraft, NATO or not. The CFR assessment this week underlines the point: Russia’s tactic is to exploit procedural ambiguity and sow…

Politics, Geopolitics & Conflict

Russian influence operations are saturating Moldova’s election cycle, targeting the pro-EU government with disinformation on energy insecurity, corruption, and minority rights. Moscow’s play is not necessarily to deliver a clean win for its preferred proxies, but to fracture Moldova’s EU consensus and force a hung or contested outcome. Monitoring teams are already tracking coordinated online pushes tied to Russian assets, while local opposition networks amplify the same themes on the ground. Western backers are trying to offset this by underwriting election oversight and energy subsidies, but the real vulnerability is political cohesion in Chisinau. The most acute risk is not a decisive opposition victory but post-election protests and legitimacy disputes, where Russian-linked groups could drive instability at the street level.

The Russian air incursion over Estonia and drone activity over Poland are probes. Moscow is testing NATO’s red lines, calculating that the alliance cannot risk uncontrolled escalation. Riga, Vilnius, and Warsaw want NATO procedures to evolve from warnings into enforceable engagement rules. Warsaw has already signaled it will not wait for NATO leadership and is prepared to act unilaterally if needed. London is likewise signaling it is ready to move directly against Russian aircraft, NATO or not. The CFR assessment this week underlines the point: Russia’s tactic is to exploit procedural ambiguity and sow hesitation, knowing that every violation without a firm response chips away at deterrence. The real test is not the individual incursions but whether European capitals can demonstrate credibility in deterring Moscow without being paralyzed by the fear of escalation.

Trump’s sudden backing of Ukraine’s claim to recover occupied territory is not a clean policy shift so much as a tactical adjustment. Until now he leaned toward easing pressure on Moscow, but this new line is a reminder that Washington can still lean hard if it chooses. Kyiv hears encouragement but not open-ended support (it comes across as conditional, tied to performance and political trade-offs elsewhere). Putin sees a warning that his bet on U.S. disengagement could be premature. The timing matters: Ukraine’s advances have slowed, Russia is grinding on, and Trump is using sharper language just as he looks for deals with Moscow in other areas, from energy to arms control. It fits his broader tactic of using conflict zones as pressure points in multiple negotiations, rather than treating Ukraine as a stand-alone commitment.

Washington is moving to sanction Serbia’s Russian-owned oil company NIS. President Vucic announced the decision himself, casting it as a political blow that threatens Serbia’s energy security. NIS is majority-owned by Gazprom Neft and has long been Moscow’s anchor in the Balkans fuel market. Sanctioning it drags Serbia further into the sanctions architecture and exposes the contradiction in Belgrade’s balancing act between EU accession and Russian energy dependence. For Moscow, losing NIS as a Balkan hub would be a setback; for Brussels, it is a test of whether Serbia is finally ready to align with EU energy policy. Vu?i?, meanwhile, has reason to dramatize the move. He faces unrelenting street protests and a government under visible strain, and presenting himself as a victim of Washington’s pressure allows him to reframe domestic weakness as national resistance.

Israel and Syria are advancing talks on a security agreement under U.S. pressure, but the shape of the deal remains contested. Jerusalem has tabled a detailed proposal that would formalize demilitarized zones in southern Syria and tie enforcement to the 1974 disengagement lines. Damascus is suggesting results could come “within days,” but without full normalization for the optics, which would result in massive public blowback. The pact would constrain Iranian and Hezbollah operations and anchor Israel’s military gains in legal form, but it would also deepen Syria’s sovereignty tradeoffs. Netanyahu admits a final deal is still “far off,” and the real test will be whether such an accord stabilizes the border or collapses under local resistance and regional sabotage.

Discovery & Development

ExxonMobil approved a $6.8B investment for the Hammerhead field offshore Guyana, its seventh Stabroek Block project. First oil is expected in 2029 at about 150,000 bpd, pushing Guyana toward its 1.5M bpd target by decade’s end. Exxon holds 45%, Hess 30%, and CNOOC 25%. The project will use an FPSO and further cements Guyana’s position as the fastest-growing oil province.

Eni sold a 30% stake in Ivory Coast’s Baleine offshore project to Vitol on Sept. 25. Ownership is now split between Eni at 47.25%, Vitol at 30%, and state firm Petroci at 22.75%. Baleine, discovered in 2021, already produces 62,000 bpd and 75 mmcf/d of gas from Phases 1 and 2, with Phase 3 expected to lift output to 150,000 bpd and 200 mmcf/d. The deal fits Eni’s “dual exploration model,” monetizing discoveries faster by bringing in partners.

Petrobras cleared a key hurdle in its push to drill in the Foz do Amazonas basin after Brazil’s Ibama approved results from an emergency oil-spill response test on Sept. 24. The exercise involved over 400 workers, vessels, helicopters, and a rig, and is considered the final step before a drilling license can be issued. Petrobras expects approval soon for what it calls its most promising oil frontier, geologically similar to Exxon’s finds in Guyana. The timing lands just weeks before Brazil hosts COP30, highlighting the tension between climate goals and new oil development.

Mergers & Acquisitions

SOCAR has agreed to buy Italiana Petroli (IP), giving Azerbaijan’s state firm more than 4,500 filling stations and two refineries across Italy. The purchase makes SOCAR a major downstream player in southern Europe and expands its footprint well beyond its Caspian base.

Shareholders of Saipem voted to merge with Norway’s Subsea7, creating a new global offshore contractor with stronger reach in subsea engineering, construction, and services. The tie-up is aimed at competing more directly with TechnipFMC and Schlumberger in large deepwater projects.

Chevron said that it expects a $200-$400 million Q3 impact from its $55 billion takeover of Hess. The acquisition gives Chevron Hess’s Bakken assets and a 30% stake in Guyana’s Stabroek Block, but near-term costs will weigh on earnings.