At a time when the US President Donald Trump has rattled the world by launching a tariff war against its major trade partners, including allies, a recent development in the Asian theatre has engaged security analysts looking for an answer as the ramification of the development is huge.

On 17 September 2025, during Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement in Riyadh. The most striking aspect of the pact is that Pakistan is the only nuclear-armed Muslim majority country and a key clause of the pact declares that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”.

This expression has rattled policy makers in many Asian nations as the language is strong and echoes collective-defense pledges like NATO’s Article 5. Some analysts however opine that it largely codifies an existing strategic partnership rather than marking a radical new commitment. Their argument is premised on the fact that Pakistani forces have been present in Saudi Arabia for decades in training, advisory, and security roles. The present number of forces totals around 1,500 to 2,000. This shows that the two countries have enjoyed close military ties since the 1960s. Based on an understanding between the two states, Pakistan first deployed troops to protect Saudi frontiers during regional conflicts. It seems that over 8,000 to 10,000 military personnel of Saudi Arabia have benefitted from training by Pakistani forces over the years. This would mean that the pact signed on 17 September formalises a deep alliance that has historical roots.  

If this was the informal arrangement for decades, what was the provocation at this point of time to accord legitimacy and formalise a relationship that is now subject to various interpretations? The new interpretations are based on the timing as the pact was signed days after Israel’s bombing of Qatar and amid doubts over US security guarantees to the Gulf monarchies. It hints a shifting regional order and the pact been designed to that effect. In the changed security situation when Israel is engaged in war in Gaza and Iran-backed Houthis flexing their military power, coupled with Trump’s inward-looking policies, Saudi Arabia seems to be hedging its bets and building a cosy relationship with Pakistan, which is too happy to be perceived as a security provider in the region.   

As mentioned earlier, the key clause of the pact declaring that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both” is worrying from India’s perspective. In a NATO-like arrangement, the pact commits each side to respond to threats to the other. Both shall now establish permanent coordination mechanisms, including a joint military committee, intelligence-sharing arrangements, and expanded training programmes.

Conversely, Pakistan has too benefitted from Saudi Arabia by way of financial assistance to its nuclear programme. So, this mutually beneficial relationship has remained in place for decades. Irrespective of the fact that Saudi Arabia would be willing to enrich uranium in order to make a nuclear bomb, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (known as MBS) is confident to procure one such arsenal from Pakistan when needed. This demonstrates that while the new agreement does not spell out whether Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities extend to Saudi defence, the remarks made by Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif that Saudi Arabia could access Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities shows that Saudi Arabia remains under Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella. This could also mean that Saudi Arabia would be willing to accord a larger role for Pakistan in the Persian Gulf. 

Here, the agreement and its content need to be assessed in the wake of Israeli’s attack on Qatar, which was clearly a provocation to formalise the ongoing defence cooperation between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This too underscores the changing security environment in the Gulf in recent times. It also needs to be remembered that Qatar is home to the Al-Udeid airbase, the largest US military base in West Asia. MBS could have thought that if such a heavily defended ally came under Israeli attack without consequences, its trust on the US security guarantees could have considerably eroded, which is why he felt formalising a defence pact with the nuclear-armed Pakistan was a preferable option. 

Viewed dispassionately, one might sympathise with MBS why he inked the pact with Pakistan. Saudi Arabia could not have overlooked the fact that the US could not deter Iran’s allies from attacking Saudi oil installations in 2019. Saudi Arabia also possibly was convinced that the US was no longer a reliable ally as the US started losing interest in getting involved in conflicts in West Asia and started shifting its strategic focus to East Asia. The Gaza war and the Houthis were the latest provocations and both developments deepened the insecurity of Gulf kingdoms.

The Saudi Prince was appalled that the Houthis in Yemen had expanded their military capabilities and their missile and drone strikes had disrupted Saudi oil facilities and shipping in the Red Sea. The existing ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis does not still give adequate confidence to the former as the Houthis still remain a force in Yemen and control; almost half of the country, including its capital Sanaa. The Saudi Prince may have therefore seen Pakistan, a Muslim-majority country and a nucleared-armed one, as a better bet to be friend with. The past Pakistani security services to the kingdom and the continuing financial support it needs to stabilise its battered economy were other propelling considerations.

However, Pakistan gambling in getting embroiled in the complex security matrix could cost it dearly. Willy-nilly it has allowed itself to be dragged into Saudi Arabia’s regional rivalries with Iran or into conflict with Yemen. As regards Saudi Arabia, by becoming cosy with Pakistan, its future could get messy if a conflict flares up between India and Pakistan. Saudi could be seen as building castles in the air by inking a security pact with Pakistan as its core vulnerabilities are unlikely to wither away. The possibility of Iranian missile strikes or Houthi drones are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Moreover, while America’s reliability shall remain under doubts, Israel’s role in destabilising the region is unlikely to be altered soon. 

Impact of the Pact on India

India has reason to worry on the Saudi-Pak pact because it has invested heavily in its relations with Riyadh, deepened energy ties, expanded trade, and secured cooperation on counter-terrorism. The future of roughly 2.6 million Indian diaspora working in the kingdom could be impacted, denting the remittances back home. Indian policy makers face the challenge to navigate through the turbulent waters to maintain India in even keel both with Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia could have perceived that India’s pro-Israeli tilt is unlikely to be altered, which is why it probably felt that New Delhi overlooked its concern and thus was driven to enter into a security pact with Pakistan. Given such complexities, India’s stakes are high as it has to secure its energy supplies as well as protect the interests of the diaspora. India shall have no option than to continue engaging with the Gulf countries both economically and politically. 

In the wake of the strategic shift in regional security, India’s dilemma is huge. It has responded cautiously amid shifting regional dynamics and needs to secure that its close ties with Saudi Arabia is not jeopardised because of the security pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. India reacted carefully to the security pact, saying that it was aware of the long-standing arrangement, which has now been formalised. While it studies the pact’s implications on national security and regional stability, India reaffirms its commitment to protecting its interests. 

Saudi Arabia too would be expected to be guarded and ensure that its security pact with Pakistan does not adversely impact its strategic and economic ties with India. Saudi Arabia is India’s fifth-largest trading partner, while India is its second-largest. In fiscal 2023-24, bilateral trade reached $42.98 billion, with Indian exports at $11.56 billion and imports at $31.42 billion. With the King Abdullah’s 2006 visit to India, bilateral ties deepened with the Delhi Declaration. This was followed by the Riyadh Declaration in 2010 that elevated ties to a Strategic Partnership. When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Riyadh in 2016, the kingdom bestowed Modi with Saudi Arabia’s highest civilian honour, the “King Abdulaziz Sash”.

Since then, high-level exchanges have continued. During PM Modi’s April 2025 visit, Saudi Arabia swiftly condemned the Pahalgam terror attack. Saudi Arabia has maintained all along measured positions during India-Pakistan tensions by condemning terror attacks like Pulwama and refrained from criticising India’s Article 370 abrogation or the Balakot strikes. Thus far, Riyadh positioned itself as a mediator by engaging with both neighbours. It is to be hoped that Saudi Arabia shall continue to maintain its balanced policy when it comes to its ties with India and Pakistan so that the interests of neither is imperilled.