Ahead of the elections to be held in Iraq in November 2025, Iran’s strategic position represents a critical turning point in terms of both regional power balances and Tehran’s proxy power strategy. Diplomatic contacts in recent months, security developments on the ground and the maneuvers of regional actors reveal Iran’s efforts to reposition its influence in Iraq.

In particular, the visits of Ali Larijani, secretary general of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), to Iraq and Lebanon, and the visit of Ammar al-Hakim, leader of Iraq’s National Wisdom Movement, to Tehran stand out as concrete indicators of this strategic orientation. The timing of the visits coincides with the Israeli attacks in June 2025 and the increased sensitivity of proxy elements in the region. This situation indicates that Iran is reshaping its security and influence strategies through diplomacy and institutional mechanisms, limiting its use of hard power.

Laricani and al-Hakim’s visits

Laricani’s visits demonstrate that the SNSC has begun to take on a more central role in security and foreign policy matters. From Tehran’s perspective, this situation represents not only an institutional repositioning but also an institutional reflex against Israel’s increasing military pressure and U.S. regional moves.

Laricani’s talks and engagements have been shaped primarily around the evacuation of anti-Iranian armed groups based in northern Iraq and the reinforcement of existing security agreements. In addition, the visit is underpinned by strategic calculations regarding the November elections; Iran aims to ensure that the militias it supports maintain their political positions and gain a more institutional place within the system. The U.S.’ demands for disarmament and sanctions against these groups are perceived by Tehran not only as a security risk but also as a narrowing of its regional sphere of influence.

Ammar al-Hakim’s visit to Tehran, on the other hand, signals a new strategic direction in Iraq-Iran relations. Al-Hakim’s meetings were not merely diplomatic ritual but consisted of concrete steps toward cooperation in areas ranging from security to justice, and from economics to cultural ties. Al-Hakim’s emphasis on a “mutually beneficial approach,” rather than solely advancing Iran’s agenda, highlights Tehran’s acceptance and effort to build relations based on a pragmatic and results-oriented framework. Furthermore, this approach demonstrates that Iraq’s relations with Iran go beyond symbolic rapprochement and reflect a desire to develop a strategic partnership through institutions and mechanisms. Thus, the visit signals the beginning of a new era in Iraq-Iran relations.

Security cooperation is a particularly prominent aspect of this process. With elections approaching in Iraq, maintaining stability in the country has become a priority. Al-Hakim’s meetings with Iranian officials emphasized the need to implement security agreements and revealed a shared sensitivity regarding stability during the election process. Laricani’s visits to Baghdad are also a concrete manifestation of this security-focused cooperation. The visits by both leaders aim to secure Iran’s strategy of controlling its proxy forces, preventing their radicalization and lowering their profile against U.S.-Israeli attacks.

Iran’s changing strategy

The Lebanese front represents another critical axis in Iran’s regional strategy. Increasing pressure to disarm Hezbollah and U.S.-backed initiatives to collect weapons under state monopoly pose a serious threat to Iran and Hezbollah. Laricani’s visits not only confirm diplomatic and political support for Hezbollah but also aim to prevent the organisation from becoming completely marginalized. Preserving the organization’s political weight serves as a strategic lever for Iran, enabling it to maintain a status quo role in Lebanon. In this context, Larijani’s statements and contacts underscore Iran’s orientation toward limiting direct intervention in proxy forces and supporting their capacity for independent action.

Iran’s strategic repositioning is being pursued through diplomacy and institutional mechanisms rather than direct military intervention. Israel’s attacks and the increased threat perception of proxy forces in the 2024-2025 period have pushed Tehran to seek a new balance. The SNSC, lowering the profile of proxy forces and prioritizing national security, form the basis of Iran’s regional strategic calculations. This approach is directly linked to Tehran’s strategy of both limiting tensions with Washington and Tel Aviv and maintaining allied elements in a controlled manner.

Another significance of al-Hakim’s visit relates to Iraq’s internal political consolidation and the consolidation of state authority over armed groups. Hekim emphasized that groups allied with Iran should not participate in regional conflicts, stating that political consensus had been reached in this regard. This stance is consistent with the demands for reform of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and can be seen as a critical step toward strengthening state authority in Iraq. In this context, Iraq’s election security and the consolidation of state capacity are emerging as a reflection of Iran’s regional influence strategy in domestic politics.

In summary, Iran’s strategic position ahead of the Iraqi elections is shaped around three main axes. The first is the strengthening of the SNSC and the prioritization of institutional decision-making mechanisms. The second is a strategy of reducing the profile of proxy forces and directing them to act more independently and moderately. The third is prioritizing national security over regional influence. The visits by Larijani and Hekim demonstrate that Tehran is prioritizing its ability to maneuver through diplomacy, institutional mechanisms and proxy forces rather than its hard power capabilities.

Consequently, Iran’s strategic position in Iraq is built upon regional stability and the effective management of proxy forces. This approach both reduces the risk of direct intervention by the U.S. and Israel and ensures the preservation of internal stability during Iraq’s electoral process. Laricani and Hekim’s diplomatic engagement reveals Tehran’s quiet but profound strategic shift and signals a new era in Iran’s power projection in the Middle East. The stability Iraq achieves in the political and security spheres will serve as a tool to strengthen Iran’s regional position, with the November elections emerging as the testing ground for this new strategy.

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