As Europe continues to come to terms with both the Russian threat amid the war in Ukraine as well as the uncertainty surrounding the U.S. commitment to Europe, policymakers across the continent are urgently considering alternative deterrence arrangements. French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly spoken of the “European dimension” to the French nuclear deterrent and his country’s willingness to open a conversation about extending a French nuclear umbrella to Europe’s non-nuclear states. In July 2025, France and the United Kingdom, Europe’s two nuclear powers, announced stronger nuclear coordination in the Northwood Declaration, Lancaster House 2.0, and the U.K.-France Leaders Declaration. While Britain and France have a long history of such cooperation, these announcements undoubtedly take things to a new level.
Yet, assessments of European nuclear deterrence are often inward-looking, focusing on French and British arsenal sizes and escalation options, and on reassuring European allies of French and British credibility. What adversaries think about European deterrence efforts is, however, underappreciated. As defense spending surges, European policymakers should assess whether Russia takes the French and British nuclear deterrents seriously and what capability investments make sense to deter adversaries.
In a recent RAND Europe study, we looked at the Russian military-analytical community’s publications on the French and British deterrents between 2010 and 2024. We discuss the findings of that study here and lay out the options facing European states to further strengthen their conventional and nuclear deterrence against Russia. These options could give Europeans political leverage through potential future arms control efforts. While much work remains to be done in this field, we offer insights that can help identify and address the deterrence gaps of NATO Europe toward Russia.
Russia Sees European Efforts Through a U.S.-Centric Lens But Its Views Are Changing
The key takeaway of our study is that Russia did not take European nuclear deterrents as seriously as the U.S. nuclear deterrent, nor did Russia include the United Kingdom and France in its nuclear planning to a significant degree. First, the research shows that Russian military thinkers have mostly focused on America’s nuclear deterrent when considering NATO’s deterrence posture in the past. Even though France and the United Kingdom have designed their nuclear force postures to cause “unacceptable damage” to Russia — see, for example, the British “Moscow Criterion” — the larger U.S. arsenal in both numbers and delivery systems was the central problem for Russian nuclear thinkers and planners. For instance, an affiliate at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations stated in a 2017 article that the British gaining nuclear weapons in 1952 “did not so much change the overall balance of power as simply increased their ‘credibility’ in the eyes of the [Western] Allies.”
Second, Russian military publications highlight that the British deterrent “guarantees unacceptable damage to any aggressor and there is no doubt that the UK has the requisite capabilities,” despite its low warhead stockpile and limited ability for managed escalation. This suggests that Russia likely considers the British deterrent credible. The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent has also been committed to NATO for decades, unlike France’s deterrent which is not integrated into the NATO structure. On the other hand, however, some Russian authors also mention British reliance on American delivery systems — the Trident D5 submarine-launched missile — as a vulnerability. For instance, Oleg Prikhodko, an academic at the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote in 2021 that the United Kingdom’s “dependence on the supply of critical systems from the United States for nuclear deterrent forces firmly binds Britain to American strategic interests for many years to come.” While the industrial dependence on the United States creates objective difficulties for the long-term independence of the U.K. deterrent, Russian analysts do seem to conflate this with a perceived lack of British autonomy. Yet, the United Kingdom remains operationally independent.
Third, the French strategic deterrent hardly played a role in Russian thinking before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Though Russian sources noted that the French deterrent is characterized as politically and technologically highly independent, and that France does not “depend on anyone else to develop, produce, test and modernize [their] nuclear weapons,” they did not consider the French deterrent to be directed at Russia. There are probably two main reasons for this. For one, Russian scholars have historically tended to perceive France’s political leadership as not as ideologically antagonistic towards Russia as the Americans and the British seem to be, noting that the “host of the Elysee Palace [Macron] is probably the only major European politician who does not treat Russia as a pariah in public.” The other reason derives from an accurate reading of France’s traditional nuclear doctrine, which was an explicit rejection of the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrence guarantees. Unlike the United Kingdom, France is not a member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, and, as some Russian authors put it, “refuses to align with [the] nuclear strategy of its allies.” While French nuclear capabilities were therefore considered a highly credible deterrent, they were not perceived as being threatening to Russia. However, the Russian view of the French nuclear deterrent seems to be shifting as of 2025. Russian observers were caught off-guard by Macron’s statements and outreach to other Europeans. As a result, they likely consider France to have become an important part of the nuclear calculation, with France’s vital national security interests now including the European dimension.
Preliminary Russian responses to the 2025 U.K.-French declarations show a further Russian reassessment of the French and British deterrents — and particularly of France. While further details of the Northwood Declaration have yet to emerge, Moscow is clearly paying attention. In July, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov warned that Russia would factor Franco-British nuclear cooperation into its political and military planning, citing the “aggregate potential” of the two countries’ arsenals. Similarly, Alexandra Ermina, an adjunct professor at the Military University of the Russian Ministry of Defense, argued in a recent Red Star article (Krasnaya Zvezda, the official journal of the Russian Ministry of Defense) that France’s new willingness to extend its nuclear umbrella marks a departure from Charles de Gaulle’s tradition of strategic ambiguity.
Deterrence Beyond Nukes: Building Europe’s Conventional Long-Range Strike Capabilities
While Russia is grappling with the potential capabilities and intentions of the United Kingdom and France, Europeans states should move ahead with other conventional measures to shore up deterrence. Here, too, the strategic decisions should consider Russian assessments. Conventional long-range precision strike systems are central in Russian strategic thinking, particularly in escalation management. Moscow views such systems as strategic threats, a perception evident in key doctrinal texts from the 2015 National Security Strategy to the 2024 Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence. While these concerns are currently also primarily focused on U.S. capabilities, European options exist to strengthen long-range precision strike capabilities to increase their leverage against Russia. These capabilities can project force at great distances, deter aggression, and allow NATO to impose significant costs on high-value targets without crossing the nuclear threshold. By doing so, they reduce the risk of uncontrolled escalation and provide allies with greater flexibility in crisis management. Addressing Europe’s capability gap in advanced conventional weapons will be essential to strengthen its deterrence posture.
European militaries have begun to strengthen their advanced conventional weapons arsenals through development and acquisition, to complement the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom and France. Several major programs are already underway. In July 2024, France, Germany, Italy, and Poland launched the European Long-Range Strike Approach to develop cruise missiles with ranges of 1,000–2,000 kilometers. In May 2025, the United Kingdom announced a joint program with Germany to build a deep-strike capability of similar range, while the 2025 Strategic Defence Review pledged to produce 7,000 long-range weapons. These initiatives, if successfully delivered, will strengthen Europe’s deterrence and help reassure non-nuclear NATO allies, thereby limiting incentives for nuclear proliferation. Non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities also offer deployment flexibility, as they can be mounted on air, land, or maritime platforms. Nevertheless, the development of these capabilities will almost certainly take a long time. Europe has limited expertise and know-how in long-range missile development, except for France, Norway, and Turkey. Shortages of skilled defense talent and lengthy procurement processes will further delay progress. Unless these barriers are overcome, Europe’s deep-strike shortcomings will persist in the near term.
What More Can France and the United Kingdom Do?
France and the United Kingdom are also reinforcing their role in European deterrence in other ways. Alongside these conventional programs, Britain is pursuing measures to bolster its nuclear deterrent. In June 2025, the United Kingdom announced the purchase of 12 F-35As, with deliveries expected by 2030, and its participation in NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. These will allow for greater flexibility in escalation management, though it stops short of reacquiring the sovereign tactical nuclear weapon capability that was cut in the late 1990s. The reintroduction of the air leg of the British nuclear deterrent through the use of American B-61 gravity bombs, while not sovereign, sends a strong signal to NATO allies about the importance that the United Kingdom attaches to deterrence. It might suggest a willingness to use nuclear weapons at lower levels of conflict, even if the operational control remains in U.S. hands. Additionally, it also complicates the Russian calculus by dispersing European-based non-strategic nuclear forces. However, the new fighter jets are unlikely to drastically shift Russian perceptions of the British deterrent as they still indicate British reliance on the United States.
It is therefore particularly important to assert France’s role in NATO’s deterrence, considering the historic ambiguity France has had regarding nuclear use. Our study assessed that Russian military thinkers probably already considered the French deterrent a de facto extended deterrent. An author at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences concluded that French vital interests can be “interpreted extremely broadly, up to the need to ensure the fulfilment of the country’s international obligations.”
The French and British announcements of deeper cooperation through the Northwood Declaration, Lancaster House 2.0, and the U.K.-France Leaders Declaration are therefore meaningful. While the two countries have a long history of nuclear cooperation, the Northwood Declaration in particular reinforces joint threat perceptions and shared interests. The declaration states that “there is no extreme threat to Europe that would not prompt a response by our two nations” in a notable shift from the 1995 Chequers Declaration, which merely recognized the commonalties between the United Kingdom’s and France’s vital interests — instead of all of Europe.
The U.K.-France Leaders Declaration is significant because it established the UK-France Nuclear Steering Group, which goes further than its predecessor, the Joint Nuclear Commission. It suggests unprecedented levels of alignment that could include not only strategic but operational and tactical level collaboration too. While specific details around the cooperation remain limited, it may entail the closer integration of the nuclear-industrial architecture of the two countries, closer technical coordination on warhead development, and the deeper integration of nuclear command-and-control structures.
Finally, the Lancaster House 2.0 declaration reinforces nuclear cooperation between the two countries and introduces even closer defense-industrial ties. This includes the joint Complex Weapons Portfolio Office to facilitate the delivery of joint projects, such as the development of a new deep strike capability, the STRATUS Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapon, among others.
What’s Next?
Europeans are beginning to adapt to the new geopolitical reality shaped by Russia’s aggression and uncertainty over Washington’s long-term commitment. How Russian military thinkers will ultimately interpret these shifts remains uncertain, though initial reactions suggest that these developments can indeed strengthen the European deterrent against Russia. What is clear is that enhanced Franco-British nuclear cooperation, coupled with the gradual development of long-range precision strike capabilities, will be central to both reinforcing Europe’s deterrent against Moscow and reassuring European allies. These efforts should be combined with new arms control measures that address Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons — though not politically feasible in the short term. European countries can build a strong deterrent to effectively deter Russia while using this leverage to pursue meaningful transparency-building and arms control measures with Russia and the United States to improve strategic stability over the long term. In turn, such measures will also limit the risk of nuclear proliferation within Europe.
Building European conventional and nuclear capabilities that can deter Russia will not be easy. Industrial bottlenecks, shortages of skilled defense talent, and the political complexity of sustaining long-term nuclear cooperation all pose significant challenges. Nonetheless, in the current strategic environment, there are few credible alternatives. Strengthening European nuclear and conventional capabilities, through more Franco-British cooperation among other things, is not simply a desirable option. It is becoming an unavoidable necessity.
Zsofia Wolford is an analyst at RAND Europe.
James Black is deputy director at RAND Europe.
Paul van Hooft is research leader at RAND Europe.
Image: Airman 1st Class Albert Morel via Wikimedia Commons