Executive Summary
This report evaluates the likelihood and drivers of a possible renewed Israeli strike against Iran. It examines Tel Aviv’s strategic objectives, Tehran’s vulnerabilities and deterrence efforts, the evolving political environment, and the interplay between military procurement and information warfare.
The analysis highlights that Israel may consider a further attack imminent, driven by strategic necessity and a closing political window, while Iran seeks to strengthen deterrence through military modernisation and information operations.
Key Takeaways The short-term likelihood of an Israeli strike on Iran remains elevated, moderated by escalation risks, Iran’s air-defence enhancements, and US political timing. Tel Aviv enjoys superior logistics and allied support, while Tehran gradually modernises its forces with foreign-supplied aircraft and SAM systems amid renewed arms embargoes. Iran’s selective release of Israeli and IAEA-related documents demonstrates a strategic use of information warfare to reinforce deterrence. Information background
In late September and early October 2025, the US Air Force started a substantial deployment of aerial refuelling aircraft to the Middle East. Approximately 30 KC-135 Stratotanker and KC-46 Pegasus aircraft were observed departing from the United States and arriving at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, a key hub for US Central Command operations. The deployment of these tankers is seen as a strategic move to enhance the operational range and endurance of US and allied aircraft in the region, particularly in light of escalating tensions with Iran. Concurrently, unconfirmed reports underline that the RAF has increased its reconnaissance capabilities.
The recent activation of the JCPOA “snapback” mechanism by the E3 (France, Germany, UK) has hardened the diplomatic environment and removed a degree of immediate restraint on Western policy toward Iran by restoring sanctions and an arms-embargo framework (besides the Maximum Pressure policy re-imposed by the Trump US administration on February 4, 2025). This development supports the Israeli strategic narrative of portraying Iran as a regional threat, creating favourable conditions for a new offensive.
Israel’s June 2025 attack against Iran pursued three main objectives:
To draw the United States into a full-scale war with Iran, a long-term Israeli ambition. While Israel sought total US commitment, President Trump instead opted for a limited intervention that prevented escalation Israel could not sustain over time. To decapitate Iranian political and military leadership, as well as scientists linked to the nuclear programme, many of whom were assassinated along with their families. To weaken Iran structurally and reduce it to the status of Lebanon or Syria, thereby consolidating Israeli regional dominance by neutralising any actor capable of contesting its military supremacy.
Unlike the campaigns against Lebanon, Syria or Yemen, operations against Iran are more complex. The Islamic Republic has the capacity to retaliate militarily, as demonstrated by its June missile counter-offensive, which inflicted significant damage on Israeli cities, including Tel Aviv. This exceeded Israeli expectations and revealed vulnerabilities in Tel Aviv’s multi-layered air-defence when faced with very high launch volumes and adaptive Iranian tactics, and in the country’s capacity to sustain prolonged conflict. From Tehran’s perspective, however, the June conflict exposed two major weaknesses: extensive internal infiltration by Israeli intelligence and the inadequacy of its air-defence systems.
Geopolitical Scenario Military and Arms Flows Defensive Systems and Resupply. Israel is incentivised to strike before Iran replenishes its missile arsenal and acquires advanced air-defence platforms. Conversely, Tel Aviv itself needs to consolidate its own defences. During the June clashes, the United States fired between 92 and 150 THAAD interceptors, estimated to represent between 14% and 25% of its total stockpile. Given slow production rates, replenishment will require years (according to military analysts, between 4 and 8 years). Israeli defensive systems such as Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2/3, Patriot and THAAD performed well but were stressed under high launch volumes. Some Iranian missiles penetrated defences, particularly through saturation tactics and improved manoeuvring technologies.
Analysts noted that Iran doubled its strike effectiveness (from 8% to 16%) by refining tactics. This evolution suggests Tehran’s capacity to adapt quickly. The immediate implication is twofold: US support materially raises Israel’s near-term survivability against Iranian ballistic attacks, and the depletion of US interceptor stocks reduces the margin for prolonged mutual attrition without a substantial US replenishment programme. Israel is working on Iron Beam, a laser-based interception system promising far lower operating costs than existing defences, though it is not yet operational. By contrast, interception costs for existing systems range from $50,000 (Iron Dome) to $2 million per missile.
Some reports and satellite imagery published by an Iranian X channel suggest the expansion of US THAAD sites in Israel, these claims have not been officially confirmed by the US Department of Defence and might be part of the ongoing information warfare. Israeli offensive calculus. Tel Aviv’s motivation to strike again is driven by a narrowing political window in which it expects Washington to be most supportive (midterm election campaigning will soon begin, and incumbent presidents commonly prefer to avoid initiating or expanding military actions that risk uncontrolled escalation during politically sensitive periods; however, limited strikes or actions judged to offer strategic advantage or domestic political benefit remain possible); Israeli planners prefer to act while US political cover and European hostility to Iran’s nuclear activities align to reduce international pushback.
A further incentive is the tactical logic of “strike before remediation”: Israeli strategists reportedly calculate that striking before Iran replenishes missile stocks and fields more capable air-defence fighters/systems preserves the best chance of degrading Tehran’s strategic deterrent at acceptable cost to Israel and its allies. Iranian re-armament and air-defence modernisation. Tehran has actively sought and—per Iranian official statements—begun to receive modern combat aircraft and advanced SAMs from external suppliers. Abolfazl Zohrevand, a member of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, has confirmed the arrival of Russian-made MiG-29 fighter jets in Iran and are currently stationed in Shiraz as part of a short-term defensive measure. He further stated that advanced Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets will be delivered gradually under a long-term strategy aimed at strengthening Iran’s air defence capabilities. In addition, two strategic air defence systems—the Chinese HQ-9 and the Russian S-400—are expected to be integrated into Iran’s arsenal in phases. Comparative logistics: Israel’s advantage in allies and procurement. Tel Aviv’s capacity to rebuild or upgrade defensive and offensive inventories is supported by a wider range of external sources (notably the United States, Europe and long-term procurement channels). By contrast, Tehran’s replenishment of advanced interceptors and some high-end platforms is contingent on constrained production lines, on the political willingness of external suppliers to transfer platform-level capabilities into an active crisis and on renewed sanctions and arms embargo. The differential access to rapid, high-end supply thus favours Israel and its US partner in the short term, even where Iran is moving to reduce specific vulnerabilities. Information Warfare
The June conflict was also fought in the information domain. Iran announced it had penetrated Israeli intelligence networks and gained access to sensitive documents, including data on Israeli nuclear sites, military bases, and evidence of espionage against Western officials. In the days when the E3 threatened snapback activation, Tehran strategically released selected documents, including images of Israeli nuclear sites and personal photographs of IAEA Director Rafael Grossi. This was intended to achieve three goals:
To demonstrate that Iran knows the location of sensitive Israeli facilities and can target them if attacked again. To expose double standards, given that Israel never signed the NPT and has not been subject to inspections. To accuse the IAEA Director of collusion with Israeli intelligence, suggesting that he may have been blackmailed to provide information facilitating Israel’s June strikes.
The release underscores Iran’s strategy to counter Israeli narratives and increase deterrence by signalling intelligence penetration of Israel’s most sensitive assets. According to third-party verification, the released footage appears to be publicly available rather than exclusive. The Western response, emphasising that the documents were not exclusive, may itself be interpreted as a calculated element within the broader information warfare campaign, shaping perceptions and countering Tehran’s narrative.
Indicators to Monitor Clear additional deployments of US high-end air-defence assets or large munitions transfers to Israel (movement of THAAD batteries, resupply manifests). Credible independent confirmation of Russian/Chinese platform deliveries into Iran (arrival photos, third-party logistics tracking, corroboration beyond Iranian official statements). Further Iranian publication of alleged Israeli targeting files or operational intelligence (timing of releases correlated with diplomatic events). Political signals from Washington (public statements committing forces or refusing to back escalation), and electoral/timing pressures that may shorten or extend Israel’s perceived window for action. Conclusion
The likelihood of another Israeli attack on Iran is elevated but conditioned. The confluence of factors—Israeli strategic intent (to prevent Iranian recovery and to preserve regional military primacy), the perceived narrowing of the political window for US support, European political pressure on Tehran (the E3 snapback) and the partial depletion of US and allied interceptor stocks—means the risk of a further Israeli strike against Iran is elevated in the near term.
The June conflict revealed both Israeli and Iranian vulnerabilities: Israel’s missile defence can be overwhelmed, while Iran’s counter-intelligence and air-defence remain weak. Both sides are racing to address these deficiencies.
Iran’s efforts to modernise its arsenal and strengthen its deterrence could soon close the opportunity window for Israel. Meanwhile, Western sanctions and arms embargoes are designed to prevent Tehran from achieving such progress and provide Tel Aviv with theoretical backing. The information warfare dimension further complicates the confrontation, as Tehran leverages intelligence to delegitimise Israeli actions and international oversight mechanisms.
However, the decision calculus in Tel Aviv and Washington is conditional on at least three constraints that could prevent action: (i) the risk of uncontrolled escalation (including the possibility of a protracted war that would exceed Israeli endurance and US political tolerance); (ii) Iran’s ongoing procurement of longer-range fighters and advanced SAMs (and the effect of any such systems on Israel’s freedom of action); and (iii) domestic US political considerations (the US President’s tolerance for direct involvement in an expanded war and electoral timing). In conclusion, the combination of Israeli strategic doctrine, political timing, and Iran’s rearmament trajectory makes the prospect of a renewed Israeli strike in the near term plausible.
SpecialEurasia Co-Founder & Managing Director. She is an International affairs specialist, business consultant and political analyst who has supported private and public institutions in decision-making by providing reports, risk assessments, and consultancy. Due to her work and reporting activities, she has travelled in Europe, the Middle East, South-East Asia and the post-Soviet space assessing the domestic dynamic and situations and creating a network of local contacts. She is also the Director of the Energy & Engineering Department of CeSEM – Centro Studi Eurasia Mediterraneo and the Project Manager of Persian Files. Previously, she worked as an Associate Director at ASRIE Analytica. She speaks Italian, English, German, Russian and Arabic. She co-authored the book Conflitto in Ucraina: rischio geopolitico, propaganda jihadista e minaccia per l’Europa (Enigma Edizioni 2022).