Consider the state of Russia’s military and economy following its invasion of Ukraine. The new heavy intercontinental ballistic missile, the RS-28 Sarmat, faced incredible developmental setbacks, including a recent test where the missile exploded in its silo, devastating the ICBM launcher, support infrastructure and the surrounding environment. The missile is designed to replace the aging SS-18 Satan ICBM, a large, liquid fuelled ICBM developed in the 1960s and a cornerstone of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, deploying the highest-yield warheads in Russia’s inventory to target hardened targets, such as enemy silos and underground command and control facilities. The SS-18s were designed and maintained by Pivdenmash in modern-day Ukraine; Russia’s lack of homegrown large ballistic missile expertise is one important consequence of the war they began, and likely part of the reason for ongoing difficulties in the heavy ICBM program.
One of Russia’s new strategic systems, a nuclear-powered, nuclear armed cruise missile not accounted for under the New START Treaty, faced several failures as well. Ukraine further attrited Russian strategic forces with its bold ‘Operation Spiderweb.’ Public reporting suggests that the attack destroyed up to one-third of Russia’s nuclear capable bomber fleet.
The fact that Russia is facing challenges in modernizing its nuclear forces should be no surprise. The coalition of Ukraine-supporters placing export control restrictions and sanctions on Russia intend to starve the military industry of technology and components. Russia faces extreme shortages in technologies necessary for modern nuclear weapons delivery systems, such as microelectronics, space-grade components and propulsion systems for advanced aircraft. While Russian officials offer public statements of year-after-year progress in nuclear force modernization, delivery system replacement timelines continue to grow. And new signs point to a shift in Russian defence industry: away from nuclear modernization to focus instead on medium range conventional capabilities, such as the new Oreshnik, as the meat grinder of the Ukraine conflict is seen as continuing for far longer than Russian leaders anticipated in early 2022.
Russia retains vast advantages over the US in nuclear material stockpiles and the ability to produce warheads. However, without delivery systems, Russia is unable to meaningfully race against the US strategic nuclear weapons limited by New START. The US also could deploy more warheads on these delivery systems – roughly 3,700 to Russia’s 2,800 – and will begin deploying brand new delivery systems by the end of the decade. In short, Russia’s purported advantages in nuclear modernization are overrated, and largely a carryover of analysis before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
What Analysis should Occur in Washington?
US experts and officials have long supported limiting Russia’s nuclear forces. President Trump, after an ill-fated attempt at trilateral nuclear dialogue with Russia and China, pursued a bilateral arms control effort with Russia in 2020. The Biden administration extended the treaty in 2021 and offered, on multiple occasions, negotiations for a follow-on agreement even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
However, administration officials should carefully interrogate the offer on the table. Adhering to New START limits for one more year may disproportionately constrain the US, and free Russia to exhaust money and material on other urgent defence priorities. Putin’s willingness to limit Russian forces, if the US reciprocates, should be considered in the context of his last arms control offer: a moratorium on intermediate-range missiles offered after Russia produced and deployed those same capabilities in violation of the INF Treaty, restricting US missile deployments while Russia continued to expand its arsenal of banned missiles. Putin’s recent history of one-sided arms control offers deserve a sceptical review.