The Albanian Federation Between Civilizational Metaphor And Political Reality – OpEd – Eurasia Review

1. Introduction

The war in Ukraine, the rise of China, and the polarization between Western democracies and Eurasian authoritarianisms have fundamentally changed European geopolitics. The Balkans, due to its geostrategic position, remains an area of ​​collision and projection of great powers, where new global rivalries are reflected.

Serbia, which oscillates between orientation towards the European Union and the traditional alliance with Russia, has become a node where different interests of great powers intersect. In this context, Germany sees Serbia as an important supplier of lithium, a critical mineral for the energy transition; while France hopes to consolidate its influence through the sale of Rafale fighter jets. These geoeconomic interests, while legitimate from a national perspective, often conflict with the strategic interests of the West as a bloc, which aims to neutralize Russian and Chinese influence in the region.

2. Geopolitical realignments and the Balkans

At the center of the rivalry, in broad strokes, two parties remain: the West and Russia.

While NATO and the EU aim to maintain stability in the Balkans, accelerate European integration and contain Russian influence. Russia, isolated from the West after the invasion of Ukraine, uses Serbia as its main point of influence. Through media propaganda, cultural ties and support for the Kosova issue, Moscow aims to maintain an open source of tension in the region. This rivalry translates into a hybrid war: political destabilization, influence on elections, instrumentalization of the issue of minorities.

But this rivalry also extends within the EU and European powers.

• Germany focuses on political stability and energy/mineral interests (lithium in Serbia).

• France seeks to consolidate military and economic influence (e.g. the sale of Rafales to Serbia).

• These approaches are often not harmonized with common EU policies, creating spaces that Serbia uses to maneuver.

In the age of the new world order and changing geopolitical realignments, Serbia had claimed for more than a decade, since the Russian occupation of Crimea [2014], to review its strategic doctrine in line with the expansionist policies it has applied since its founding as a modern state [1878].

Meanwhile, after the resumption of Russian aggression for the complete occupation of Ukraine [February 2022] and the escalation of rivalry between the West and the Russian-Chinese axis, world geopolitics has entered a phase of new realignment. Middle powers and countries on the periphery of large strategic spaces are using the policy of balancing to maintain opportunities for maneuver. In this context, the Balkans has claims to be treated as a buffer zone between the EU/NATO and Russia, where Serbia would play the role of a key actor seeking to benefit from the tensions.

But Serbia cannot wear the costume of Turkey or that of Great Britain in this game. Serbia throughout this period judged that its flirtation with Germany [giving lithium] and France [purchasing Rafael] would “soften” the EU’s engine to accept the occupation of northern Kosova and the annexation of the Republika Srpska on the one hand, but also the extension of influence and taking control of Montenegro and North Macedonia, and this calculation was partially correct: Europe calculated that in this way it would succeed in separating Serbia from the sphere of Russian influence. But, as time is showing, this positioning in Serbia’s favor, packed with benefits on the geo-economic and strategic levels, is unlikely to end in a win-win for Berlin and Paris, on the one hand, and Belgrade, on the other.

Serbia has chosen a strategy of self-proclaimed active neutrality: On the one hand, it is a candidate for EU membership and receives billions of euros in development aid from Brussels. On the other, it maintains close political, military, and cultural ties with Russia, which is seen as the traditional defender of Serbian interests in Kosova. Meanwhile, China has become a strategic partner for investment and technology, transforming Serbia into the “Chinese hub” of the Balkans through the Belt and Road initiative.

This triple positioning allows Belgrade temporary maneuvering, but at the same time exposes it to great pressure from all three sides.

2.1 Geopolitical realignments and Serbia

In the context of global realignments, Serbia is placed in a triangle of tension in relation to the three axes of geopolitics.

• Western Axis (EU/NATO): seeks stabilization, harmonization of security policies and resolution of the conflict with Kosova. For the EU, Serbia is the “key to the Balkans”.

• Eastern Axis (Russia): uses Serbia as a fulcrum for propaganda, energy influence and destabilization in the region. The Kosova Charter remains Moscow’s strongest weapon to keep Belgrade tied down.

• Asian Axis (China): through investments in infrastructure, technology and green energy, Beijing is turning Serbia into a platform for expansion into Central Europe.

In this context, Serbia is trying to avoid a clear, final choice, following a zigzag policy that resembles the model of the Non-Aligned Movement countries, but updated for the multipolar reality.

This strategy, however, faces several limitations: The war in Ukraine and especially its protracted nature have reduced the space for neutrality. EU and US pressure is increasing; Serbia is being asked to clarify sanctions against Russia.

Serbia is increasingly dependent on Chinese capital, Russian energy and European subsidies – a contradictory and uncertain position, which in geostrategy would translate as multiple dependence.

This multiple dependence has produced the tectonic movement that has been shaking Serbia for almost a year. Mass protests continue everywhere and the possibility of a slide into civil war remains a very possible scenario. However, nationalism and rhetoric about the “Serbian world” keep society tied to a Russian orientation, making rapprochement with the West more difficult.

2.2. Germany and Serbian lithium

The “Jadar” project in Serbia, originally developed by the Rio Tinto company, represents one of the largest lithium reserves in Europe. This mineral is essential for battery production and for the German strategy of transition to electromobility. Germany, with its automotive industry (Volkswagen, BMW, Mercedes), seeks to diversify its sources of supply to avoid dependence on China and distant markets. As a result, Serbia is seen as a strategically important economic partner.

However, such a policy creates a paradox: by investing in Serbia without clear political conditions, Berlin risks strengthening a regime that remains authoritarian and with close ties to Moscow.

2.3 France and the Rafale sale

France has embarked on a new economic and geopolitical offensive in the Balkans. The possible contract for the sale of Dassault Rafale fighter jets to Serbia represents not only a commercial interest, but also an attempt to re-establish Paris as a key player in European security.

On the one hand, the sale of the Rafale gives Serbia a new military status, bringing it closer to the countries that have already chosen this platform (Greece, Croatia). On the other hand, this creates new military asymmetries in the region and raises questions about the true intentions of Serbia, which refuses to align itself with the EU’s common security policy.

3. Strategic interests of the West as a bloc

The goal of NATO and the EU in the Balkans is clear: stabilizing the region, weakening Russian influence, and gradually bringing Serbia closer to Euro-Atlantic structures. However, the special approach of Berlin and Paris often sabotages this common objective.

• Serbian lithium could become an instrument of pressure for Belgrade, similar to Russia’s use of gas against the EU.

• Arming Serbia with Rafale creates security dilemmas for its neighbors, especially Kosova, and weakens trust in “Euro-Atlantic guarantees.”

Thus, short-term economic interest conflicts with long-term strategic interest: ensuring a stable and integrated region.

But when the geo-economic interests of individual states within the EU and NATO often do not fully coincide with the strategic interests of the West as a bloc, the calculations can easily be overturned.

4. Losers of the game

In this context, three main “losers” can be identified:

• Belgrade, because the more it relies on bilateral agreements, the more it loses its clear strategic orientation and risks becoming a hostage to international contradictions.

• Paris, because an armed but not integrated Serbia will remain a source of instability, damaging France’s credibility as a promoter of European security.

• Berlin, because investments in lithium could turn into a political boomerang, creating new dependencies and undermining its vision for a united EU.

The only short-term winner is Aleksandar Vučić, who manages to play on several fronts: he benefits from Germany, France, Russia and China simultaneously. But this does not strengthen Serbia as a state, on the contrary, it plunges it into a position of multiple dependence.

5. Possible scenarios for Serbia

• Euro-Atlantic scenario: Serbia is forced by international dynamics to move towards the EU, limiting Russian influence and accepting an agreement that ends Serbian expansionist policies to the detriment of Albanians, thus paving the way for the real normalization of relations with Kosova.

• Eurasian scenario: Belgrade moves closer to Moscow and Beijing, becoming their “eastern gateway” to the Balkans. This scenario risks isolation from the EU and new regional tensions. This is the most likely scenario. In this case, Skopje, as in the era of Peter Bogdan, becomes the extreme border of the Front.

• Prolonged equilibrium scenario: Serbia continues its current policy of  maneuvering, taking advantage of everyone without fully engaging with any bloc. This model is sustainable only as long as the great powers do not force Belgrade to choose.

5.1 The Eurasian Scenario and the Restoration of Historical Borders

If Serbia moves further towards Moscow and Beijing, embracing the Eurasian axis, the Balkans risks experiencing a new division of civilizations. This new Serbia, strongly linked to Russia and China, will act as their “eastern gateway” to the continent, dividing the region and placing it in a permanent buffer zone. In this case, North Macedonia would disappear from the political map of Europe.

In this scenario, the political and cultural borders of Europe will shift. Just as in the 17th century, when Peter Bogdan and the Albanian intellectual elites perceived Skopje as the border of the Western world in the face of Ottoman pressure, Skopje would find itself in a similar position today. The capital of North Macedonia would become the first line of defense of the West, a border zone where Euro-Atlantic influence would directly clash with the Eurasian project.

This scenario could begin to materialize relatively quickly. It is also related to the position that the US embassies will take in the context of the reviews that the State Department is conducting with the appointments of resident ambassadors in Europe and with an emphasis on the Balkans.

A Serbia placed in the eastern camp would bring major and irreversible consequences:

• For the EU: strategic loss of a key country in the heart of the Balkans, forcing Brussels to agree to the division of North Macedonia between Bulgaria and Albania and accelerating the creation of the Albanian Federation, where the weight of Pristina would be meritorious on its southeastern flank.

• For NATO: increased tensions and militarization of the region, as Serbia would be seen as an instrument of Moscow and Beijing to challenge the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

• For the Albanian Federation: a revival of the historical clash between a Western world that defends its values ​​and an Eastern world that seeks to expand its influence through nationalism and authoritarianism.

6. The Albanian Federation between civilizational metaphor and political reality

The new geopolitical realignments in Europe, caused by the war in Ukraine and the clash between the West and the Russian-Chinese axis, have brought attention back to the Balkans as a fragile space exposed to external influences. In this context, Serbia is increasingly seen as the “eastern gate” of Moscow and Beijing in the region. For some analysts, this situation resembles a revival of the historical clash between the West and the East, where the Albanian Federation would once again be placed in the role of “border guard” taking us back to the era of Gjergj Kastrioti. But is this picture real, or more of a metaphor for the past?

6.1 The metaphor of the civilizational clash

The history of the region often reminds us that the Balkans has been the border of the clash between empires and civilizations. In the 17th century, Peter Bogdan conceived of Skopje as the extreme border of the West in the face of Ottoman pressure. In the same way, today it can be argued that a Serbia strongly linked to Moscow and Beijing would restore this symbolic border, with Skopje, Pristina and Tirana as the first line of defense of the West.

In this metaphorical reading, the Albanian Federation would once again be a “defensive wall” of Europe, a dividing line between Western democratic values ​​and Eastern authoritarianism supported by instrumentalized nationalisms. This approach creates a dramatic narrative at first glance, but based on the theory of political realism: Albanians as a factor of stability in the region and the first shield of the West on the southern flank of the continent, as the Baltic countries are currently for the western part of the continent.

6.2 Political reality: the clash of governance models

However, this picture is more of a historical metaphor than a deep analysis of current developments. In fact:

• The unofficial “Albanian Federation” [Republic of Albania and Republic of Kosova] is already part of Euro-Atlantic structures. Albania and North Macedonia are members of NATO, Kosova is protected by KFOR and enjoys strong American support.

• There is no border of civilizations, but a division between models of governance: on the one hand the West with functional democracy and integration; on the other hand the Eurasian model that promotes authoritarianism and economic dependence.

• Serbia does not have the imperial potential of the past. It remains a limited regional power, dependent on Chinese capital, Russian energy and European subsidies. Therefore, it cannot really become the “pillar of the East” in Europe, even though it rhetorically appears as such.
Consequently, the main danger for Albanians today is not a civilizational clash, as some Western centers allied with Serbia assume, but a slide into authoritarianism and state capture – a phenomenon that could weaken its Euro-Atlantic affiliation from within.

6.3 Balancing metaphor and reality

These two approaches are not necessarily opposite, but complementary:

• The civilizational metaphor helps to understand the historical perception and symbolic role of Albanians as an inseparable part of the West. This metaphor also helps the process of accelerating the creation of the Albanian Federation.

• The realistic analysis poses the concrete challenge: parallel to the move towards national integration and the creation of the Albanian Federation, the two existing republics must work on strengthening institutions, integrating into the EU, consolidating democracy and building and integrating a sustainable economy.

Only by facing this internal challenge will Albanians avoid the risk of being reduced to a “permanent border” and become an organic part of the West where they already belong. This confrontation will be successful from the Albanian side when, mRelations with our Western partners – especially with the United States of America, Great Britain, Germany and Croatia – We base not only on common values, but above all on strategic interests.

These interests position the Republic of Kosova and the Albanian space as a whole as a factor of particular importance in this period of transition: from the decline of the world order established after the Second World War (1945) towards the gradual shaping of a new international order, which is being accompanied by significant geopolitical regroupings.

In this sense, our right alignment on the side of the Western powers takes on historical weight and can be compared to the strategic choice made by Gjergj Kastrioti in his era.

7. Conclusion

Geopolitical rivalries in Europe are not limited to Ukraine, but extend deep into the Balkans. This region is a contender for the future of the European order: if the Balkans manage to integrate, it will be a sign of the West’s power; if it remains hostage to Serbian-Russian-Chinese maneuvers, it will show the EU’s weaknesses and its fragmentation.

Ultimately, the Balkans are not only an object of geopolitics – but also a subject, because the choices of its elites and societies will determine which camp they will belong to in the future.

The narrow geoeconomic interests of Germany and France in Serbia seem attractive in the short term, but in the strategic perspective they are counterproductive. They undermine Euro-Atlantic unity, strengthen a regime that remains unstable and tied to Moscow, and send the signal that the West does not have a coherent approach to the Balkans.

In this game, Belgrade, Paris and Berlin risk losing together – while the only winner is the short-term opportunism of an authoritarian leader. To avoid this, the West must harmonize its policies and combine economic interests with clear political conditions, linking Serbia to reforms and real European integration.

The Eurasian scenario, where Serbia moves closer to Moscow and Beijing, is possible and dangerous for regional stability. But for Albanians, this does not necessarily mean a return to the Bogdanian-type clash of civilizations. The reality is more complex: the battle is not between the West and the East as cultural worlds, but between democracy and authoritarianism as models of governance.

Therefore, the main challenge for the Albanian Balkans is not to protect the borders of Europe, but to build a functional Europe within its own borders.

Orientation references

European Council on Foreign Relations (2023). Europe’s Strategic Dependence on Critical Raw Materials.

Pjetër Bogdani [1990] Çeta e profetëve, Prishtinë. 

Theo Sommer [2019] China FIRST – Die Welt auf dem Weg ins chinesische Jahrhundert, Hamburg/Muenchen. 

Brookings Institution (2022). Europe’s energy transition and the geopolitics of critical minerals.

Carnegie Europe (2023). France’s Strategic Interests in the Balkans.

German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) (2021). The Geopolitics of Lithium: European Perspectives.

International Crisis Group (2023). Serbia’s Balancing Act: Between Russia, China, and the EU.