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The last known headquarters of the WPK Propaganda and Agitation Department on Ch’angkwang Street
According to Daily NK, the documentary video about Kim Jong Un’s (KJU; Kim Cho’ng-u’n) visit to China was deemed a dud and the requisite personnel discipline has been implemented:
Officials who edited documentary footage of Kim’s China visit faced criticism for producing content deemed “lacking in enthusiasm and sincerity.” The edited scenes showing Kim’s arrival at Beijing station and his reception by senior Chinese officials, including Cai Qi, secretary of the communist party of China central secretariat, and Wang Yi, director of the party’s central foreign affairs commission, appeared “meager and shabby” compared to Chinese media coverage.
Documentary editors also drew fire for including footage of Kim waiting in line with other world leaders during China’s 80th anniversary victory day celebrations. While Kim received second-to-last reception from Chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan — directly before Russian President Vladimir Putin — indicating China’s highest-level treatment, showing Kim waiting in line was deemed damaging to the supreme leader’s image.
“Kim scolded them, saying ‘When I was making diplomatic efforts for the people under the scorching sun in Tiananmen square, you comrades were not fulfilling your duties. Even in capturing the propaganda canvas, you failed to carefully reveal each ideological will of our party,’” the source said.
As a result, many workers in the korean central television video editing department and party propaganda and agitation department received job suspensions or ‘revolutionization’
The WPK Propaganda and Agitation Department [PAD] and its affiliates in DPRK culture and media like KCTV are highly difficult places to work. Media, culture, arts and press reporting are existential concerns in DPRK political culture. PAD cadres and their counterparts in culture and media are subject to rigorous Party Life assessments (more frequent unit meetings, more self critique). The PAD HQ building** on Ch’angkwang Street has (or had) a jail in its basement.
Screen grab of a KCTV documentary showing an image of former KPA Navy Commander Kim Myong Sik removed (Photo: KCTV-Yonhap).
The documentary’s middling production quality is about the third time in which there has been a disconnect between PAD, DPRK press and television personnel and KJU’s public events. In June, footage of former Navy Commander Admiral Kim Myong Sik was disappeared from a KCTV video after a North Korean warship capsized. However, Admiral Kim’s image from other past events remained available through others DPRK media resources and his image in the KCTV video was later restored.
Pak Jong Chon and his nephew in Namp’o in April 2025 (Photo: KCTV)
WPK Secretary Ri Hi Yong watches his grandchildren playing in April 2025 (Photo: KCTV).
In May, according to Sand Times, a conflict broke out between Central Committee elites and PAD events managers. Central Committee personnel were given a special invitation to bring two family members (spouse, child, grandchild) to attend the April launch ceremony of the Ch’oe Hyon destroyer. Some core elite family members did bring their families to the event, but many more saw their invitations rescinded at the last minute. When these family members protested, saying Kim Yo Jong (Kim Yo’-cho’ng) brought her daughter and son, PAD cadres circulated guidance materials to the elites’ families and subjected them to relatively mild Party Life sanctions.
A disconnect in the management and state media coverage of KJU events might indicate a disagreement, conflict, even a power struggle, among PAD and DPRK media managers. North Korean media products have to pass through up to three reviews (via the home department to PAD to the Publication Guidance Bureau) before they’re released. In two of these three incidents (the KJU documentary and the admiral’s airbrushed photos), there was a problem in the handoff and review process.
Kim Pyong Ho (annotated) with KJU in September 2025 (Photo: KCNA).
One final note; KCNA President Kim Pyong Ho (Kim Pyo’ng-ho) has been an infrequent member of KJU’s entourage at his public during the last year.
Kim is a PAD veteran and a top figure in North Korean news. Kim is probably not in a conflict with current PAD Director Ju Chang Il (Chu Ch’ang-il)—the discord in PAD and its affiliates most likely exists at the middle manager level, not between top leadership Moreover, Ju Chang Il is still somewhat FNG as a core elite so it’s improbable he’d be in a turfwar. And yet, it seems based on Daily NK reporting that only KCTV and PAD personnel were disciplined, not Kim Pyong Ho’s people from KCNA.
**the last known PAD HQ building as the regime may have constructed a new one on So’so’ng Street**