Could Trump’s Gaza Plan Resolve Conflict in Cyprus and Kurdistan?: Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Turkey may take part in a task force “to monitor the implementation of the agreement on the ground.” Given Turkey’s backing for Hamas and Erdoğan’s refusal to acknowledge Hamas terrorism, that should be a non-starter.
Still, an international force to police Gaza now seems inevitable as Israel pulls back and Hamas releases the remaining hostages it holds.
Still, Erdoğan’s endorsement of the ceasefire is crucial because it sets a precedent that could resolve two persistent conflicts for which Turkey is at the center, or at least strip away the international legitimacy that Turks claim.
A Look to History
The first is Cyprus. More than half a century after Turkey invaded Cyprus, the Turkish army continues to occupy one-third of the island. Turks justify the occupation in a desire to protect the Cypriot Muslim population. Chronology, however, belies Turkey’s claims. The Turkish invasion came in two waves. The first, motivated by Turkey’s desire to prevent a union between Greece and Cyprus, established a beachhead. Shortly after, the Greek junta collapsed and, with it, any threat Greece posed to the Cypriot Muslim minority. The major Turkish invasion came as negotiations were underway in Geneva; what transpired was a land grab, blessed for cynical reasons by Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, followed by Turkey’s ethnic cleansing of its new zone. In the decades since, Turkey has poured settlers into the region, drowning out the voice of the Cypriot Muslims that the Turkish occupation was meant to protect. Today, the chief threat to the livelihood and culture of Cypriot Muslims comes not from democratic Greece or democratic Cyprus, but from Turkey’s own autocracy.
If a solution to Gaza involves a phased Israeli withdrawal, then why should the solution to Cyprus not involve a phased Turkish withdrawal? By endorsing the Trump plan for Gaza, Erdoğan tacitly acknowledges its applicability for Cyprus or, at least, exposes Turkey’s hypocrisy and the illegitimacy of its diplomatic position.
As Israel withdraws and to prevent the reconstitution of Hamas, Trump’s peace plan will see the deployment of international monitors, again an element that Erdoğan endorses by volunteering Turks.
While Turks, as Hamas supporters, and the former pre-World War I colonial power are not appropriate for Gaza, Erdoğan’s embrace of monitoring is valid and opens the door to pushing forward the Cyprus peace.
Simply put, as Turkey’s army withdraws and Turkish settlers depart, international monitors in northern Cyprus could assuage any legitimate concerns Turks have regarding the human rights of the remaining Cypriot Muslims. A consortium of regional states—Abraham Accords countries and European Union members—could credibly report and protect civilians as the legitimate Cypriot government re-establishes its authority. The same monitors might also facilitate the departure into exile to Turkey or Qatar of Ersin Tatar, Mehmet Ali Talat, Derviş Eroğlu, and others who acted as illegitimate leaders in the occupation zone.
In Cyprus, the Trump model might also resolve the ongoing hostage crisis. While they have not received attention on college campuses or in the Western press, over recent months, Turkish and occupation forces have taken and held ordinary Greek Cypriots as hostages after they visited the north to inspect property in the occupied zone whose titles they owned.
If Trump can demand Hamas release its Israeli and American hostages, and if Erdoğan can join Hamas in demanding the release of legitimate security prisoners with blood on their hands, then certainly both Trump and Erdoğan can agree that Cypriot hostages must come home.
Trump desires a Nobel Peace Prize, but his previous efforts at peace—with the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, and with Armenia and Azerbaijan—have not survived even the first months after signing ceremonies; it is unclear if the Israel-Hamas ceasefire will fare better.
A Plan that Ports to Other Regions?
Still, Trump could be a dark horse if his efforts at Israel-Palestinian peacemaking trap Turkey into resolving another seemingly intractable problem: Kurdistan.
Kurdish nationalism runs longer historically than its Palestinian counterpart; after all, until the creation of the State of Israel, most Palestinians, many also recent immigrants to the land, considered themselves Syrian. Kurds are also the largest people without a nation.
Most Kurds live in Turkey, but they tend to adopt a more moderate religious outlook and a more pluralistic, tolerant political culture. Historically, Turkish violence toward Kurds exceeds the casualty figures Hamas claims regarding Gaza. The Turkey-Kurdistan Workers Party fight, Turks claim, killed more than 40,000 people, mostly Kurdish; that does not include Turkish suppression of Kurdish revolts in the 1920s and 1930s.
In recent years, the Turkish army has flattened parts of Diyarbakir, Mardin, and Cizre; photos of the destruction are reminiscent of Gaza, with the significant difference that the cities were largely peaceful and not hubs of any group as lethal as Hamas.
The Gaza model could also apply to Kurdistan, which has as much of a claim to statehood as Palestine.
The Turkish army should withdraw beyond Kurdistan’s borders to allow a multinational force to monitor human rights in the region. Turkey’s Kurdish hostages—including PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan and imprisoned parliamentarian Selahattin Demirtaş should go free.
Trump may not yet be deserving of the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts toward peace. Still, he could become a real contender if he not only achieves a lasting peace between Israel and Gaza, but also persuades Erdoğan to apply the same construct that the Turkish leader already endorses to Cyprus and Kurdistan.
At the very least, Trump’s Gaza deal provides a roadmap for the United Nations to resolve the Cyprus conflict this year, and a new basis upon which to begin negotiating for Kurdish freedom.
About the Author: Dr. Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum. The opinions and views expressed are his own. A former Pentagon official, Dr. Rubin has lived in post-revolution Iran, Yemen, and both pre- and postwar Iraq. He also spent time with the Taliban before 9/11. For more than a decade, he taught classes at sea about the Horn of Africa and Middle East conflicts, culture, and terrorism, to deployed US Navy and Marine units. The views expressed are the author’s own.
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