Children sit and look at a poster showing Israeli hostages held inside Gaza while at Hostages Square in Tel Aviv, Israel, on Oct 9, 2025. [David Guttenfelder/The New York Times]
Government officials and diplomats are following the first steps toward a still fragile truce in Gaza with intense interest, trying to gauge what this could mean for Greece and the wider East Mediterranean area.
First of all, they hope that the agreement will prove lasting and will not unravel soon. Second, they hold a positive view of the likelihood of improved diplomatic relations between Israel and Arab states and the revival of the so-called Abraham Accords concluded in 2020. Greece would view the revival of an idea for an India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor very positively, provided it is included in it as a hub.
But officials are also aware of Turkey’s upgraded role: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after strenuous effort, gained a seat at the negotiation table, at least partly, by putting pressure on Hamas to attend, and, perhaps, a chance to shape Gaza’s future.
Hard power, and specifically military power, counts, and, more importantly, is respected by US President Donald Trump. This is certain to be used by Erdogan to ask for favors, from obtaining F-35 aircraft to support for Istanbul’s bid to host the 2036 Summer Olympics. But another interpretation is that, besides a seat at the Gaza negotiating table, Erdogan did not obtain any commitments on other issues. It is true that President Trump personally likes Erdogan, but this is no guarantee that the present good relationship will last beyond this administration.
Likewise, one can say that Turkey’s involvement in Libya and military presence in Syria, in addition to its presence in Gaza, are not signs of geopolitical strength, but of overextension.
And it doesn’t help Erdogan that Arab countries, in general, are repelled by his neo-Ottoman and expansionist rhetoric, and would like to see his ambition curtailed.