To stop Putin’s war, punish refineries processing Russian oil

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1. For over three and a half years, Vladimir Putin has mortgaged his political and personal survival on the continuation of Russia’s war on Ukraine. As long as the conflict is vital to Putin’s grip on power, he will fight on, disregarding both human and material losses. Current western sanctions, while impactful, have not been surgical enough. Russia’s war effort remains financially resilient not because sanctions have failed outright, but because they have left Russia’s most vital revenue stream largely intact: oil and gas exports.

   Oil and gas sales finance almost a quarter of the Kremlin’s war; in 2024 oil revenues alone surged by over 25 per cent to more than $108bn despite sanctions. Since 2023, China, India and Turkey have become the backbone of Russian oil exports, collectively purchasing approximately $380bn worth of Russian crude. This gives Putin a lifeline to fund the war at a cost of about $1bn per day.

   The G7’s crude oil price cap, introduced at $60 per barrel in late 2022, was meant to limit Moscow’s profits while keeping global supplies stable. But the system has eroded under the weight of non-compliance and weak enforcement. Despite the recent reduction of the price cap by the EU and UK to $47.60, Russia has used a “shadow fleet” of ageing tankers, obscure insurers and shell companies to mask ownership, circumventing sanctions and selling most of its crude above the cap. It is estimated that as much as 75 per cent of Russia’s crude oil now travels outside the G7’s insurance and tracking systems.

   Europe’s continued dependence on Russian liquefied natural gas has become another lifeline for Putin. Since February 2022, the EU has imported over $122bn of Russian LNG, making it one of Russia’s largest fossil fuel customers. This ongoing reliance on Russian energy highlights the urgent need for a more comprehensive and co-ordinated approach to sanctions.

   How can the west sever this lifeline more effectively? The answer lies in threatening the refineries that process the lion’s share of Russian crude, largely concentrated in just eight facilities across China, India and Turkey. Refineries such as Jamnagar and Vadinar in India, Turkey’s Star and Tüpraş plants, and major Chinese refineries manage the majority of redirected Russian flows. Some, like Reliance Industries’ Jamnagar complex, process hundreds of thousands of barrels per day. Others, like the Vadinar facility belonging to Nayara Energy, partly owned by Russia’s Rosneft, are now almost entirely reliant on Russian crude.

   The west should set a clear ultimatum: any refinery processing Russian oil — whether for export or domestic sale — must choose. They can either sever energy ties with Russia or, if they continue buying Russian crude, face comprehensive bans from western shipping, finance and insurance. This is not a call to punish India or Turkey, but to clarify that legitimate participation in global trade cannot coexist with laundering Russia’s war revenues.

   The US, despite its direct sanctions constraining Iran’s oil income, has not halted exports to China, which now buys more than 1.4mn barrels per day of Iranian crude, mostly via opaque intermediaries at steep discounts. This highlights a key lesson: sanctions must not only target the producer but also the major consumers and the networks enabling them. The US and EU should expand secondary sanctions to cover financial institutions and shipping firms that allow illicit Russian energy trade, mirroring the secondary approach used against Iran.

   The EU’s 2025 sanctions are having an impact, prohibiting imports from refineries using Russian feedstock, regardless of where products are blended or relabelled. India’s Nayara Energy, for instance, has been cut off from major Gulf suppliers and is increasing its reliance on discounted Russian barrels, a sign of the initial success of sanctions.

   But it is precisely this outcome — a narrowing of legitimate buyers and shrinking profit margins for the Kremlin — that should be accelerated. With these measures, Russian oil will be forced further to black-market buyers at painful discounts: $20 to $30 per barrel instead of more than $60. This could slash Russia’s oil revenues by three-quarters, providing strategic leverage severe enough to force Putin to the negotiating table.

   Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction costs are projected to be more than half a trillion dollars. Funding that effort requires ensuring that not a single dollar, rupee or yuan continues to fuel the Kremlin’s war machine. Western leaders must summon the courage to see this strategy through. Crude oil, refined products and LNG remain the arteries of Putin’s regime. Cutting them is not just the clearest way to end Russia’s war; it may be the only one.

2. So, a short breakdown: EU peasants will pay more for gas they put in their vehicles.

   I hate Russia, SU or whatever those mongols want to call themselves but it all goes out of our own wallets most of the time.

3. After years of war. Nice. Better late than never.

4. Punish EU members still dealing with Russia.

5. As an additional step, the possibility of decommissioning half of the hydroelectric power plants located in the western part of Russia can be considered.

6. Ukraine has been doing that.

7. And the EU should stop buying Russian oil via proxies, defeats the whole purpose of sanctions!

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