When China unveiled the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) more than a decade ago, many in Moscow and Beijing believed it would open a new era for the Russian Far East (RFE). Stretching from Lake Baikal to the Pacific, the region sits on vast reserves of timber, fish, and minerals — and shares a long border with China. On paper, it looked like a perfect fit for the BRI’s promise of cross-border connectivity.

But ten years later, the results tell a different story. Despite the political symbolism of the “pivot to the East,” the RFE remains at the edges of China’s grand infrastructure map. While the BRI has transformed Central Asia and parts of Southeast Asia with roads, railways, and industrial parks (Belt and Road Portal), the Russian Far East has seen far fewer visible gains.

Plenty of Plans, Little on the Ground

Moscow has long framed the RFE as its bridge to Asia. Since the early 2000s, the region has been a testbed for federal programs promising new infrastructure, population growth, and investment. The creation of the Ministry for the Development of the Far East and Arctic (Minvr.gov.ru) and the launch of the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok in 2015 were meant to send a clear message: Russia was open for business.

China has been the most visible guest at those forums, signing a stream of memoranda on energy, logistics, and agriculture. Yet, behind the photo-ops, the numbers remain underwhelming. Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) accounts for less than 2 per cent of total FDI in the region (Carnegie Endowment). Many projects exist only on paper, constrained by bureaucracy, slow customs procedures, and the lingering fear of Western sanctions.

The success stories — like the Power of Siberia gas pipeline and the Heihe–Blagoveshchensk bridge — are exceptions. Both serve energy exports rather than regional diversification, and both highlight the asymmetry in Sino-Russian cooperation: Chinese capital and consumption meet Russian raw materials and geography.

Why the RFE Struggles to Join the BRI

Three structural reasons explain why the RFE has not found its place in the Belt and Road network.

First, Russia’s desire for strategic control often complicates cooperation. The Kremlin prefers to brand projects under its own initiatives, such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) (Eurasian Economic Commission), rather than as part of a Chinese-led framework. That instinct for sovereignty limits Beijing’s ability to act as a long-term investor.
Second, geography and logistics remain a drag. Transport costs from Vladivostok to western Russia are among the highest in Eurasia. Ports are outdated, railways congested, and digital infrastructure thin. For Chinese planners, it is easier — and cheaper — to channel investments through Central Asia or the China–Pakistan corridor (Belt and Road Initiative Map).
Third, the financial landscape has worsened since 2022. Western sanctions have pushed many Chinese banks to scale back their exposure to Russian projects. While trade between the two countries reached a record US$240 billion in 2023, most of that was in oil, gas, and coal, not infrastructure or high-tech manufacturing (Reuters).

Turning North: The Arctic Alternative

Interestingly, while the Far East has been left waiting, the Arctic has become the new focus of Chinese interest. The Polar Silk Road, outlined in Beijing’s 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper (China’s Arctic Policy White Paper), ties into Russia’s push to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and its liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects.

Companies like CNPC, CNOOC, and Novatek have found common ground in Arctic ventures such as Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2. These partnerships reflect a pragmatic shift: China gets stable access to energy and a potential shipping shortcut to Europe, while Russia secures investment that helps sustain its sanctions-strained economy.

But this cooperation largely bypasses the RFE. It underscores how China’s northern engagement has split into two paths — one Arctic, one marginal — leaving the Russian Far East somewhere in between.

Can the RFE Catch Up?

There’s still space for cautious optimism. If Moscow streamlines local governance, improves transport links, and guarantees fairer investment conditions, Chinese and Korean investors could yet return. Renewable energy, digital logistics, and tourism are areas where even modest projects can yield visible results.

For China, engagement in the RFE could diversify its BRI geography and strengthen Northeast Asian supply routes, especially as Arctic navigation becomes more viable. But Beijing will not invest heavily without reassurance that projects are commercially sound and politically stable.

A Frontier Still Waiting

The story of the RFE’s limited role in the Belt and Road is not just about geopolitics; it’s about institutional inertia and competing priorities. For now, the region remains a symbol of untapped potential — rich in resources, strategically placed, but structurally isolated.

Until Moscow and Beijing find a way to balance sovereignty with partnership, the Belt and Road’s northern frontier will remain exactly that: a frontier — full of promise, but still on the sidelines.

[Photo by Sung Shin on Unsplash]

Dr. Shamuratov Shovkat is a researcher in international trade and economics at Jiangxi Fenglin College of Economy and Trade in Nanchang, China. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.