Considering its economic future, the European Union should no longer see Ukraine as an external (third) country. With its vast agricultural potential, critical raw materials, industrial base, skilled workforce, and growing digital sector, Ukraine is not a peripheral economy – it is a real strategic economic partner, and the EU stands to gain from closer future integration.
Many European companies have production or sourcing ties in Ukraine (e.g., automotive wire harnesses, agricultural commodities, IT outsourcing). In 8M 2025, Ukrainian exports of goods to the EU reached $14.6 billion and imports from the EU amounted to $23.0 billion. The EU remains Ukraine’s largest trade partner – the share of EU countries in Ukraine’s exports in 8M 2025 stood at 55.3%, and in its imports at 43.7%.
Ukraine’s cooperation with the EU is already far-reaching and multidimensional covering various areas, in particular:
Trade rules and regulatory convergence;
Climate and CBAM issues;
Ukraine’s participation in the European steel supply chains;
Agricultural integration and market access;
Electricity market integration and energy security.
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) has significantly aligned Ukraine’s trade regulation with the EU acquis, reducing technical barriers and harmonizing standards. The «Ukraine 2024 report» from the European Commission confirms that Ukraine’s legislation on standardization is fully aligned with the EU acquis. Furthermore, the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine is a signatory of the European Cooperation for Accreditation Multilateral Agreement, ensuring international recognition of Ukrainian assessment bodies.
Ukraine is also implementing European environmental standards. For example, it has launched an MRV (monitoring, reporting & verification) system for GHG emissions and adopted legislation on integrated prevention and control of industrial pollution. A local ETS is under development. Implementing all requirements of European legislation, Ukraine will have the same regulation field as the EU and will not create any carbon leakage risk in the future.
We are grateful to the EU, which continues to support Ukraine’s integration into its economic space despite the challenges of the war. Notably, the European Commission intends to submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing Ukraine’s situation regarding the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). This report, foreseen by Article 30.7 of the CBAM Regulation, is essential to prepare legislative proposals that could adapt CBAM rules for Ukraine, acknowledging the negative impact of the war.
In the recent proposal about new steel safeguard measures the European Commission also emphasized the need to consider the interests of candidate countries facing exceptional and immediate security situations – specifically Ukraine. This is vital for Ukrainian steelmakers, whose exports to the EU support Ukrainian economy. In H1 2025, the EU accounted for 77.7% of Ukraine’s flat steel exports and 87.3% of long product exports.
Following the June 2025 DCFTA review, the Council adopted decisions in October to reduce or eliminate customs duties for a variety of agri-food products. Ukraine secured unrestricted access to the EU market for many dairy and processed food items, such as fermented milk, processed milk cream, and mushrooms. Quotas for 24 product groups were increased, with wheat rising by 30%, maize by 53.8%, and white sugar by almost 4 times.
For Ukraine, this revision provides more predictable and structured access to the EU market compared to previous emergency Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs). Importantly, market access is now conditioned on alignment with EU production standards and annual progress reporting. In this way, the EU and Ukraine are transitioning from a “third-country” trade relationship to the logic of the EU Single Market. Unlike ATMs, which offered unilateral liberalization, the revised DCFTA includes mutual commitments: Ukraine will also open its market further to EU exports, fostering deeper agricultural integration.
Electricity market integration between ENTSO-E and Ukraine is another strategic alignment. Ukraine now participates in the European electricity market. The EU has supported Ukraine through electricity supply during shortages and is enhancing cross-border capacity, thus strengthening energy security and stability.
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Ukraine’s EU accession would increase the EU’s GDP by around 1% and its population by 9% – comparable to Poland’s accession in 2004. Pre-accession aid and integration tools can support infrastructure, industrial modernization, and human capital development in Ukraine, ultimately generating demand for EU goods and services.
Poland’s example is crucial for Ukraine. Poland used EU membership to support national development while defending key economic sectors. For example, Poland strongly lobbied the EU methane regulation to secure transitional exceptions for its coal industry. It remains the largest recipient of cohesion funds and strategically directs them to energy modernization. The Polish model emphasizes broad domestic coalition-building from businesses, municipalities, and trade unions, and assertive negotiation in Brussels.
Ukraine can emulate this approach: pursue transitional periods, negotiate tailored conditions, and align with regional allies to defend shared industrial and energy interests. Cooperation with Poland is vital for our country – not only because Poland is Ukraine’s top EU trade partner (22.6% of exports in 8M 2025) but also because both countries are reducing coal dependency, modernizing electricity grids and adapting policies to ensure smooth “green” transition.
Deeper cooperation with Poland will strengthen Ukraine’s position in the EU and accelerate its integration into the Union’s economic and political architecture. In general, countries like Ukraine and Poland bring fresh momentum in the EU development helping to ensure the bloc remains strategically flexible and resilient.