With 2025 declared as the ‘Year of Reforms’ by India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD), the formation of Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions is part of an effort to consolidate organisational restructuring within the Indian Army (IA). These efforts, along with other technological cum organisational changes, are aimed at developing the doctrinal and response options against the changing character of warfare and the threat posed by India’s structural rivals—China and Pakistan. Nonetheless, the restructuring of the Indian Army faces implementation constraints due to both existing and potential escalatory risks.
China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has become increasingly assertive in territorial disputes over the past decade, especially via the threat or use of force.
‘No-war, No-Peace’ Environment as Logic for Change
Both China and Pakistan have undertaken efforts to consolidate their positions vis-à-vis New Delhi—especially along the Line of Control (LoC) and Line of Actual Control (LAC)—in the past decade. As a result of India’s consolidation of its territorial claims through a constitutional reorganisation of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, both Pakistan and China have deepened their collusive front against India. China, under the leadership of Xi Jinping, has become increasingly assertive in territorial disputes over the past decade, especially via the threat or use of force. In fact, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has created multiple hotspots in the past decade with new areas for contestation along the LAC. The PLA has engaged in face-offs with the Indian Army in a series of territorial intrusions in the past, including 2013 in Depsang, 2014 in Chumar, 2015 in Burtse, 2017 in Doklam, 2020 in Galwan and Naku La, and the latest in 2022 at Yangtse ridge during the bilateral border negotiations. Collectively, these actions were part of the PLA’s ‘salami slicing’ to present a fait accompli to India’s civilian and military leadership. However, the Indian Army and political leadership signalled resolve by responding firmly through troop deployments to ensure operational readiness along the LAC. However, these repeated attempts by the PLA to pressure the Indian Army have produced lessons and inspired doctrinal thinking to find effective solutions to the issue. Similarly, Pakistan has demonstrated higher risk-taking as part of a grand strategy executed through Islamic terror proxies to challenge India’s denial strategy. In operational terms, the behaviour of Pakistan’s army and the PLA thus aims to coerce and constrain the Indian Army. Against this backdrop, the need for a recalibration in operational thinking and strategy became a necessity for India’s military leadership.
Doctrinal Innovation with Caution
The Indian military, specifically the Indian Army, has been undergoing a transition in its military strategy vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan. More specifically, the contours of the shift aim to develop capabilities for offensive options against the PLA, thereby imposing a deterrence by punishment regime in action. The latest change in orientation was evident in the Op Kailash Ranges in 2020, when the Indian Army captured the two major tactical heights—Rezang La and Rechin La on the Southern bank of Pangong Tso Lake. It consolidates tactical advantage vis-à-vis the PLA to secure an upper hand in the border negotiations with the IA overlooking the Moldo garrison on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso lake. Such a tactical gain also helped create a consensus and momentum to develop military-led options.
The creation of the Bhairav and Rudra brigades is a part of ongoing efforts within the Indian military transformation debate to establish a more robust deterrence posture against its two major adversaries.
The creation of the Bhairav and Rudra brigades is a part of ongoing efforts within the Indian military transformation debate to establish a more robust deterrence posture against its two major adversaries. The initiative aimed to foster innovative doctrines for addressing increasing challenges posed by the PLA’s fait accompli strategies. Conceptualised as swift and lean forces, these battalions are a variant of the original idea of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), first conceptualised by the late Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Bipin Rawat, marking a shift in orientation from Pakistan towards the China challenge. The Rudra battalions are a step beyond the existing Ghatak platoons, developing a lean, agile, and simultaneously more cost-inflicting option against Pakistan. These brigade-sized formations, by choice and design, are aimed at conducting offensive operations in enemy territory and deterring any serious adventure along India’s border territories. Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions are structured for combined arms manoeuvre to secure limited objectives against the adversaries. To counter the Pakistan Army’s asymmetric nuclear strategy, which involves Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in battlefield scenarios, these two formations will provide a more measured alternative compared to deploying a corps-sized unit for offensive operations. For the China challenge along the LAC, apart from the existing Mountain Strike Corps (MSC) for massive conventional responses, the Bhairav battalions aim to provide a less-escalatory, flexible option to address the problem of military coercion and meet the requirements of tactical escalation. The question related to potential escalation and the requirement for necessary reinforcement against the adversary’s move needs to be addressed and integrated well into the Army’s doctrinal thinking and operational planning.
The restructuring of the Indian Army to create Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions aims to sharpen the coercive edge of its military capabilities.
Conclusion
As India moves forward by undertaking innovation in force planning and shifting its operational posture in response to a no-war, no-peace environment, a major precaution is necessary. The restructuring of the Indian Army to create Rudra brigades and Bhairav battalions aims to sharpen the coercive edge of its military capabilities. Against both China and Pakistan, they aim to forge both a deterrent and compelling effect. Conceptually, both deterrence and compellence are two sides of the same coin – coercion. In other words, this reorganisation is aimed at signalling political resolve as well as risk-taking on the part of the military leadership against perennial threats. These changes are geared to tackling vertical and horizontal escalation through the calibrated use of force.
Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
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