In the introduction to his book Capitalism and Freedom, noted neoliberal economist and statistician Milton Friedman stated, “Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change.” In this respect, Milton emphasised the necessity for decision-makers to have a heightened level of preparedness to develop alternative courses of action, responding to those conditions where “the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable.”
Until recently, the idea that Russia would initiate an attack against a NATO state constituted an example of the “politically impossible.” While the threat posed by Russia has been a consistent theme of strategic policy discussions within Europe for some time, there had been minimal consideration given to the possibility that Russia would actually make good on the numerous threats it has issued against the alliance.
Many of these more analytical discussions collapsed when Russia initiated what constitutes its first military operation against a member of the alliance, Poland. Late at night on 9 September, between 19 and 23 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) entered Polish airspace, triggering the NATO Quick Reaction Alert, and were intercepted by the Polish Air Force with assistance from Dutch, Italian and Belgian air support. The operational command of the Polish Armed Forces labelled the attack an act of aggression which had posed a genuine threat to its citizens, with the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, invoking Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty to formally initiate a military response to Russia’s actions.
Consequently, the politically impossible had become the politically inevitable as, to quote Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, Putin had “been at war with us, but we didn’t acknowledge it because it seemed too preposterous and too strange.”
FPV drone bodies (Roman Mykhalchuk/Getty Images Plus)
The initial outcome of the Article 4 meeting was the launch of Operation Eastern Sentry to enhance NATO’s military presence within those states bordering Russia and improve the ability of Allies to effectively respond to any further destabilising actions in the region. One of the key proposals arising from the strategy is the development of a “drone wall” to protect the eastern flank of the alliance.
Further incidents in the weeks following the attack on Poland, including subsequent drone incursions in Denmark and Germany, as well as Russian fighter jets violating Estonian airspace, created an early consensus across all European leaders on the need to protect themselves against such threats.
However, broad agreement does not necessarily translate easily into tangible outputs. In the first instance, there is a burgeoning debate over ownership of the scheme. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently stated that while NATO was providing military capabilities, the European Union’s contribution was the “soft power of the internal market and making sure the money was there.”
The EU, however, over the past few years has indicated it wants to assume a greater role in enhancing Europe’s defence capabilities. This desire has been illustrated by the creation of a dedicated European Commissioner for Defence and Space in 2024 and release of the “Readiness 2030” white paper outlining the EU’s commitment to massively increase defence investments. The recent Russian incursions have provided the EU with a renewed opportunity for such efforts.
Regardless of which organisation ultimately assumes control over the scheme, a more immediate concern is determining Europe’s capacity to actually establish an effective defence system.
The EU has already proposed extending the preliminary plans for the drone wall to a broader scheme to protect the entire continent and is now being called the “European Drone Defence Initiative,” so as to alleviate the concerns of those EU member states that were not initially covered by the scheme. The “wall” will consist of a layered network of detection and interception systems, which will extend the current anti-drone capabilities of European states, and is intended to be fully operational by 2027.
Fulfilling the expectations of such an initiative, in particular one where so many parties have a vested interest in ensuring that it is successfully implemented, will be a challenge. Disputes have emerged over sovereignty and control; Germany and France have resisted moves by the European Commission assuming the role of lead coordinator for the initiative. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz have already expressed their preference for national control over the initiative, or, to reflect the recently extended nature of the scheme, appoint NATO as the lead coordinating body to meet the demands of a scheme which is, as Macron observed, “more sophisticated” and “more complex” than originally envisaged.
Regardless of which organisation ultimately assumes control over the scheme, a more immediate concern is determining Europe’s capacity to actually establish an effective defence system. German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius has expressed scepticism about a drone wall although he acknowledged there is a need to “manage expectations”. Not only would Europe struggle to meet the projected timeline for establishing the initiative but, more significantly, European states needed to focus their attention on building broader defence capabilities as a drone wall would not be sufficient to ward off Russian attacks on Europe.
Instead, recent events should function as a catalyst for Europe to collectively focus on reconstituting its conventional defence infrastructure in addition to more innovative systems such as anti-drone technology. In this respect, drones should not become a distraction from the more substantive threats posed to Europe by a state such as Russia. On this basis, the only effective system will be one which compels restraint rather than one which inspires adversaries to test these capabilities.