On October 16, the Jacques Delors Friends of Europe Foundation held a conference under the motto “Europe matters: now or never,” underscoring both the EU’s relevance and the urgency of the moment. 

Just a month earlier, the current President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, had called for Europe’s “Independence moment,” warning: “Battle lines for a new world order based on power are being drawn right now.” Yet when the EU looks squarely into the geopolitical mirror it so often avoids, what does it see? How does it measure up against the great powers shaping the twenty-first century, the United States, China, Russia and India?

In the year marking the centenary of visionary European architect Jacques Delors, the answer is stark. The numbers are unambiguous, and what they reveal is sobering: Europe’s share of global power has long been in decline, and it continues to shrink rapidly. 

Europe’s decline relative to China, Russia and India

When Delors became President of the European Commission in 1985, the combined Gross National Product of the European Community was around ten times larger than China’s. Today, the two economies are roughly equal in size, and within the next 25 years, Europe’s economy is projected to be only half the size of China’s. 

This is not merely the story of an “old economy” losing ground; it reflects profound transformations in regulatory agility, innovations, digital sovereignty and the very architecture of the global order. Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore’s veteran diplomat, scholar and member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, calls it an unprecedented structural shift, something the world has not witnessed in 2,000 years.

Russia tells a different but equally revealing story. Its economy cannot be compared to the European economy as a whole; it is roughly equivalent to a single major European economy, such as Italy. Yet long-term dynamics are not promising for the EU either. 

In 2000, Italy’s nominal GDP was four times larger than Russia’s. Today, they are neck and neck. Even more concerning is that European defense capabilities are falling behind those of Russia. Russian military expenditure is rising so rapidly that, when measured in purchasing power parity terms, it now exceeds the combined defense spending of all European countries, despite their efforts to boost budgets and rearm.

The troubling dynamics of the EU’s relative decline are equally apparent with India. In 2000, France’s economy ($1.36 trillion) was three times larger than India’s ($468 billion). Today, it is smaller. The economy of the United Kingdom, then still a member of the EU, was nearly four times larger than India’s, but it has now fallen behind. 

In just a quarter-century, India has overtaken both France and the UK — a worrying trend for two permanent members of the UN Security Council. This raises an increasingly pressing question: as their relative power declines, how much longer can France and the United Kingdom retain their privileged status in the UN?

Across Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc of ten countries has set itself up to become the world’s fourth-largest economy, driven by integration, demographics and trade agility. In 2000, Germany’s economy was three times larger than ASEAN’s; today, they are roughly the same size, and by 2050, Germany is expected to be only half as large. 

The projected growth for ASEAN in 2024 is 4.6%, significantly outpacing the EU’s growth rate. If the current trends continue, their economies could be on par within the next 40 years. Ironically, Europe, once the model of regional integration, is now watching others perfect its own idea.

In America’s shadow

The story of the EU–US relationship is one of symbols and numbers, of political dependence and growing economic imbalance. They enjoy a special political and security relationship, yet they remain economic competitors. In that competition, the EU once held the upper hand: in 2008, its economy was nearly $2 trillion larger than the US’s. Today, the EU’s economy has shrunk to roughly two-thirds the size of America’s, with the US now boasting a nominal GDP around $10 trillion higher. 

On a per capita basis, Europeans now produce roughly half as much as Americans ($46,000 versus $89,000). Europe’s defense industry, too, depends heavily on American technology and equipment. Nearly 80% of European military procurement goes to foreign suppliers, with EU countries still relying on the US for software, strategic enablers and major platforms.

The imbalance is not only material but symbolic. In what many described as an embarrassing display of subservience, European leaders, including British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, French President Emmanuel Macron, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Mark Rutte, sat around US President Donald Trump in the White House “like schoolchildren.” 

Even Arab and Muslim states reportedly avoided such optics during Gaza truce negotiations. The Independent called it an image of “unruly schoolchildren,” while American commentator Benny Johnson dubbed it “the single most powerful image of 2025.” To cap it all, NATO’s Secretary-General reportedly referred to Trump as “daddy.”

And now, “daddy” has imposed a new transactional strategy for Europe and Ukraine — no more aid, only arms sales. European allies are now expected to buy arms from the US to sustain Ukraine’s defense. From Berlin to Tallinn, capitals are pledging purchases. Cynics could argue that Washington’s strategy risks not only fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian, but also draining Europe to the last euro.

Searching for a new Delors

Three decades after Jacques Delors defined Europe’s purpose, that purpose is faltering. The United States sets its security agenda. China and India define the scale of global growth. Russia dictates the pace of rearmament and challenges the European security order. ASEAN demonstrates what dynamic regionalism can achieve.

In the current digital realm, China commands WeChat, TikTok and a market of over three billion users in Asia, while the United States leverages Silicon Valley, Elon Musk and unmatched global reach. Overregulated Europe, by contrast, has little digital sovereignty and struggles to turn regulation into global innovation.

Reversing this decline will require greater European sovereignty, stronger leadership and a rediscovery of Europe’s soul. Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and former President of the European Central Bank, warns in his report that the EU must increase annual investments by €800 billion ($930.9 billion), reduce bureaucracy and curb its digital dependence. 

Delors guided, strengthened and united Europe as the world shifted from a bipolar to a unipolar order. But who, today, in Europe, can navigate the rougher seas of an emerging multipolar world?

[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.