Donald Trump’s declaration that Pakistan is continuing nuclear tests clandestinely, combined with Islamabad’s ongoing proliferation activities, represents a serious and destabilising development. Reports of recent seismic events in Pakistan – some matching magnitudes observed during the 1998 Chagai nuclear tests – reinforce suspicions that Pakistan could be conducting low-yield detonations inside underground tunnels.
Given Trump’s personal rapport with Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir, these revelations cannot be dismissed. Islamabad’s denials carry little weight in view of its long record of illicit nuclear activity. India’s Ministry of External Affairs has rightly recalled Pakistan’s history of smuggling, export-control violations, covert partnerships, and the globally notorious A.Q. Khan network. India has “taken note” of Trump’s remarks – a calibrated but significant response.
Notwithstanding that no international agency has confirmed a new Pakistani nuclear test, the very possibility of covert activity has sharpened geopolitical anxieties and brought renewed focus to Pakistan’s longstanding history of opaque nuclear development and proliferation networks. India’s measured but firm reaction reflects a deeper truth: the concern is not just about a single tremor but about an entire trajectory of Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour, one marked by opacity, external patronage, and a troubling history of proliferation.
Pakistan’s nuclear programme has long been associated with clandestine proliferation activities. The A.Q. Khan network is still active, despite Islamabad’s claims that it has been deactivated. In fact, Pakistan’s nuclear programme has never operated in isolation. It was midwifed by China, augmented by technology exchanges with North Korea, and infamously marketed to third parties through the A.Q. Khan proliferation network.
Beijing remains Pakistan’s most significant nuclear and missile partner, providing political cover, technological inputs, and military synergies designed to tie down India on two fronts. The deepening strategic partnership leaves little room for optimism about Pakistan’s future restraint. Credible reports of Pakistan and China sharing nuclear test data in the past exist. Pyongyang retains longstanding linkages with Pakistan’s missile-nuclear ecosystem. Its incentives to barter technology remain high. An emerging dimension is intensified defence and technological cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey. Ankara’s flirtation with nuclear ambitions and its appetite for advanced military technologies indicate possible Pak-Turkey clandestine nuclear cooperation with Beijing’s connivance.
Past interdictions highlight the continuity of Pakistan’s proliferation network. During the Kargil conflict, the North Korean ship Ku Wol San was seized at the Kangla port. This ship was carrying missile components, metal casings, and Scud missile manuals to Pakistan, which were declared as water purifying equipment. In 2020, a ship (Da Cui Yun) at the Kangla port bearing a Hong Kong flag and bound for Port Qasim in Karachi for wrongly declaring an autoclave as an industrial dryer was detained. An autoclave is critical for producing silica sheets under controlled pressure for the solid fuel to be used in ballistic missiles. Not only was the item wrongly declared, but more importantly, the ship belonged to a Chinese company, COSCO, which was earlier sanctioned by the US. Significantly, the destination of the ship was Port Qasim in Karachi, where the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), responsible for Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme, is based. This pattern of deception is not incidental; it is structural.
More worrying is Pakistan’s shift in its nuclear doctrine. The Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) is a nuclear strategy designed to counter India’s conventional military advantage by providing deterrence across all levels of conflict – tactical, operational, and strategic. It aims to “plug the gaps” in a deterrence capability, integrating both conventional and nuclear forces, and is characterised by its own blend of ambiguity, a rejection of a “no first use” policy, and the development of varied delivery systems like tactical and sea-based nuclear weapons. In 2023, Lt. Gen. Kidwai stressed Pakistan’s lowering of the threshold of the use of nuclear weapons against India. Earlier, he had spelt four thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons: military, economic, space, and domestic destabilisation. This concept demands more tests to validate the design of weapons and calibrate them to the new generation of tactical devices and miniaturised warheads. A covert test, even if low-yield, would help Pakistan refine new warhead designs, miniaturise payloads, or experiment with tactical nuclear devices.
The real strategic risk lies not only in Pakistan’s expanding nuclear arsenal but in how poorly it is safeguarded. Pakistan’s TNWs imply decentralised command-and-control – a frightening prospect in a country with growing internal radicalisation. The episode of the Zulfiqar ship, which was almost captured by four rogue Pakistani naval officers in May 2014, is still fresh. They planned to attack US Navy Patrols in the Indian Ocean. There were several such incidents, including attacks on nuclear facilities near Dera Ghazi Khan in 2003 and 2006 and a string of attacks on the air force bases at Sargodha and Kamra between 2007 and 2012. These indicate the depth of extremist penetration.
The Pak Army Chief Munir’s approach adds another dimension to India’s security. He is deeply committed to “jihad”, as stated by Lt Gen Ahmad Sharif, Pakistan Army’s spokesperson. He supports the “two-nation theory” and has strong anti-Hindu sentiments. His links with terrorist organisations like LeT, JeM, etc, were visible during Op Sindoor. The recent 27th Amendment would bestow more powers on him while ensuring his extension. Given Munir’s radical views and close alignment with terrorist objectives, irresponsible acts cannot be ruled out. Besides, a combination of geopolitical circumstances, like the support to Munir by some countries and Bangladesh’s efforts to revive strategic ties with Pakistan, could also embolden him to execute his nefarious designs against India.
Thus, whether Pakistan has recently conducted a covert nuclear test or not, the combination of seismic ambiguity, doctrinal drift, clandestine infrastructure expansion, and enduring proliferation networks creates a dangerous strategic environment. Hence, India must keep all options open to strengthen its deterrence. Rajnath Singh’s statement that India is prepared for every eventuality sends the right signal. Pakistan’s proliferation activities need to be exposed more forcefully in international fora to attract punitive global action. The world has overlooked Pakistan’s nuclear irresponsibility for too long.
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
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