Investing in the youth in terms of exchanges, joint programs and peace education could produce a constancy for accommodation that does not exist at present
Introduction
October 7, 2023, was a historical day in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel was attacked by Hamas and other Palestinian militants, who caused the deaths of 1,195 Israelis and foreigners – including 815 civilians – and captured a further 251 hostages. Israel’s reply was swift and lethal. More than 68,000 Palestinians in Gaza have been killed by the Israeli offensive on the strip, half of them are women and children, and more than 170,000 wounded. The deaths and the destruction are unprecedented: For every ten buildings in Gaza, eight have been damaged or destroyed, while for every ten houses, nine were razed.
This tragic escalation is taking place against the backdrop of a century long conflict rooted in competition over national movements, colonialism and disputed issues of sovereignty, security and rights to justice. The Gaza War is a part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which started with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War during which over 750,000 Palestinians fled or were expelled and the State of Israel was created. Israel and Hamas have fought several wars since 2007, but the current campaign eclipses all previous confrontations in its scale of death and destruction.
The main question that this essay will tackle is if long-term peace between Israelis and Palestinians is still possible following the destruction of October 7th and thereafter! This question requires reflection from a number of angles: the historical development, the immediate dynamics released October 7, critically-placed actors, international responses, structural challenges and roads to resolution. The essay argues that, although peace is not technically impossible, the psychological effects and political radicalization in both societies, the structural obstacles that perpetuate conflict, and what is called the two-state solution’s “physical and political irreversibility” can create hurdles too tall for even the most vigorous diplomacy to climb without a generational transformation of hearts.
Background: The Long March to October 7
1.1. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Foundational Dynamics
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the outcome of two competing national projects in one land, throughout the 20th century: The Jewish national project (Zionism), aspired for a national state in Israel and was willing to share it with its Arab population; and Palestinian Arab nationalism which refused the displacement they were compelled into while asserting their indigenous rights. The British Mandate (1920-1948) created the conditions for long-term conflict, which was generated by conflicting pledges and refusal to reconcile competing demands made by both communities (Khalidi, 1997; Shlaim, 2000).
The 1948 war led to the creation of Israel and the uprooting of around 750,000 Palestinians, an event that is commemorated by Palestinians as the Nakba (catastrophe) and involves migration matter a crisis which has continued until today (Morris, 2004; Pappe, 2007). The 1967 Six-Day War created the boundaries of the conflict, with Israel controlling the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the whole Sinai Peninsula. “Land for Peace”: The framework of Resolution 242 – and in subsequent years the call of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories and peace, has been filled with various implementations that have led from time to time to controversy (Quandt, 2005).
The Oslo Accords 1993-1995) were the most serious attempt at peace-making, it set up the Palestinian Authority granting the Palestinian people an era of limited self-rule and laid out a structure for final status negotiations on borders, refugees, settlements, security and Jerusalem (Shlaim, 2000; Ross, 2005). But the Oslo process disintegrated in the violence of the Second Intifada (2000-2003), accusations and counteraccusations, and more settlements building. Later peace initiatives (namely the Camp David Summit [2000], Taba talks [2001], Roadmap to Peace [2003], Annapolis Conference [2007] and Kerry initiative [2013–2014]) consistently stalled as well (Pressman, 2003; Thrall, 2017).
1.2. Gaza: From Occupation to Blockade
Israel seized control of Gaza in the 1967 Mideast war, and when it withdrew from the territory in 2005, Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on Gaza after the militant group Hamas took over in 2007. The blockade, justified by Israel on security grounds, has been described by human rights groups as collective punishment. By 2023, UNRWA stated that 81% were poverty-striken, and 63% food insecure and reliant on international aid.
Israel and Hamas have fought multiple conflicts since 2007, including three wars in 2008–9, 2012 and 2014 as well one earlier on 2021, which together killed some for some estimates up to 6,400 Palestinians and around 300 Israelis. The violence, as the conflict’s previous rounds of fighting had done, took on a familiar rhythm: Hamas fired rockets into Israel; Israel responded with airstrikes and sometimes ground incursions; Palestinians suffered heavy civilian casualties while Israeli deaths were few; a truce was brokered by Egypt, which led to inevitably renewed hostilities. So this circular violence made them feel that the situation was hopeless and to accept managing rather than resolving conflicts.
1.3. The Road to October 7
There were many reasons why October 7 happened. The Hamas officials said it was in response to the Israeli occupation, blockade of the Gaza Strip, desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque, settler violence against Palestinians as well as movement freeze and detention of thousands of Palestinians. The lack of a political horizon for Palestinian statehood, coupled with declining conditions in Gaza and the perception that they have been abandoned by Arab states moving toward normalization with Israel, helped set the stage for unrest.
At the time of attack, Israel and Saudi Arabia were negotiating to normalize relations and Hamas leaders claimed they had aimed “to stop the normalization train as this would have a knock-on effect from one calm agreement followed by another at the expense of our cause.” For Hamas, the attack was designed to put the Palestinian issue back on the international agenda and show that peace with Israel will remain a fantasy so long as Palestinian rights are not realised.
The policies of the Netanyahu government also created a combustible situation. Critics observed that Netanyahu’s overall approach of handling the conflict, rather than solving it, making it easier for Hamas to obtain money from Qatar and aiming for relative calm in Gaza even as settlement expansion was continued on the West Bank could have fostered conditions for Hamas to exploit (Thrall, 2017).
2. October 7 and Its Consequences: Transformative Disaster
2.1. The Attack and Immediate Consequences
During Jewish holidays of Simchat Torah, on the morning of October 7, 2023, Hamas officially declared “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood” and within a time frame of 20 minutes fired between 3,000-5,000 rockets at Israel; around this time period there was also an infiltration by about 3,000 Hamas militants into Israel via trucks, motorcycles (motorbikes), bulldozers, speedboats, and paragliders. The attackers struck at military bases, kibbutzim, and the Nova music festival with acts of terror such as murder, sexual molestation and hostage-taking that rocked Israeli society (Kershner, 2023).
The scope and ferocity of the attack splintered Israeli security presumptions. Israel’s renowned intelligence and military establishment abysmally dropped the ball in preventing or quickly responding to the attack, prompting existential questions about the competence of the state on whose creation so many hopes for Jewish revival have been pinned. The attack was the worst day for the Jew since the Holocaust and scarred—or traumatized—Israeli society deep in its soul.
The Israelis responded with such speed and strength. On October 27, Israel began to bomb and invade Gaza with the goal of defeating Hamas and releasing the hostages. The crushing cost of the Israeli campaign: It has killed more than 67,000 Palestinians and wounded close to 170,000 — over 40,000 suffering injuries that will affect them for life. Forces have razed entire neighborhoods, bulldozed new roads through the landscape and constructed new military posts.
2.2. Crisis of humanity and issues of international law
The humanitarian situation in Gaza exploded into catastrophe. One in 10 have been killed or injured by an Israeli strike, nine are displaced and at least three have gone without food for days. Israeli bombing and demolitions between May and October 2025 wiped towns off the map, and in August the world’s leading authority on food crises announced that Gaza City had plunged into famine.
Bombardment has buried Gaza under 12 times the rubble of the Great Pyramid of Giza, and at least 102,067 buildings lie destroyed, from grade schools to universities and medical clinics to mosques greenhouses and family homes. The level of destruction prompted serious questions regarding proportionality and compliance with international humanitarian law. The International Court of Justice (2024, January 26 & 2024, May 24) ruled that Israel had to stop genocidal acts and cease its military action in Rafah.
In May 2024, International Criminal Court Prosecutor Karim Khan sought arrest warrants for top Israeli and Hamas leaders including Prime Minister Netanyahu on war crimes charges. These legal challenges, however contested, represented international disquiet concerning the way in which hostilities were being conducted by both parties.
2.3. Regional Escalation and Spillover
The war in Gaza set off regional escalation. Hezbollah in Lebanon opened another front, trading fire with Israel along the northern border and forcing tens of thousands to flee on each side. Yemen’s Houthi movement attacked shipping on the Red Sea in what it called solidarity with Palestinians. Iran and its proxies executed small‐scale direct strikes against Israel, involving missile and drone attacks; sparking concerns that wider regional conflagration might ensue (International Crisis Group, 2024, 29 February).
Since 7 October 2023, Israel has escalated violence in the occupied West Bank leaving over a thousand Palestinians dead. Israel has bombarded refugee camps in Jenin, Tulkarem, Nur Shams, Far’a and Nablus – causing large-scale displacement and employing the same methods used in Gaza. Between Oct. 7, 2023, and Dec. 16, 2024 there were about 1,800 settler attacks across the West Bank. This upsurge of violence in the West Bank aggravated prospects for peace, indicating an Israeli overall plan for territorial consolidation rather than conflict resolution.
3. Eroding the Two-State Solution
3.1. Physical Viability Under Threat
The two-state solution — an independent Palestinian state running alongside Israel along the 1967 borders, with mutually agreed land swaps — has been the international consensus for peace for decades (Chtatou, 2024, October 24). But its physical and political feasibility has rapidly deteriorated. Settlement proliferation has been relentless: over 700,000 Israelis now reside in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, making it almost impossible to imagine how territorial continuity for a Palestinian state could ever be achieved on the ground (Peace Now, 2024; B’Tselem, 2021).
On 18 July 2024 the Israeli assembly voted against the creation of a Palestinian state by 68 votes to nine. Netanyahu’s coalition with the far right groups co-sponsored the resolution, stating “Between the sea and the Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty”. This straightforward repudiation by Israel’s leadership of the two-state framework is a serious stumbling block to any peace process based on that resolution (Chtatou, 2025, January 14).
In 2024 Israel has stolen more Palestinian land in the West Bank that in the last 20 years combined, and Finance minister Bezalel Smotrich is pounding for control since taking over the new “Settlements Administration”. These steps indicate a clear policy of making full realization of a Palestinian state impossible, resulting in an irreversible one-state reality with at least two-tiered systems of laws for Palestinians and Israelis.
3.2. Political Will and Public Opinion
In polling done from June through August 2025, only 27% of Israelis supported a two-state solution and 63% were against it, compared with the West Bank and East Jerusalem, where the numbers were 33 percent in favor and 55 percent opposed. These numbers stand in stark contrast to 2012, when 61% of Israelis and 66% of Palestinians supported the concept. The drop in public support reflects a hardening of both sides’ pessimism and radicalization.
Just 21 percent of Israelis and 23 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem believe that permanent peace will ever come. It is this pernicious pessimism that becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy: with no faith in the possibility of peace, political leaders do not feel pushed by their publics to conclude the necessary compromises, and their constituencies are driven to embrace ever harder positions. And this is not to mention the psychological effect that October 7 has had on the Israeli public (Chtatou, 2024, April 29). The attack broke the spell of relative calm that disengaging from Gaza and building the separation barrier had created. Numerous Israelis came to believe that making territorial concessions in the context of the Palestinian conflict equals the imposition of existential dangers, and therefore could not but erode support for a two-state solution (Fiore, 2020, November). On the other hand, with Gazans suffering and the West Bank’s settlements growing, Palestinians increasingly suspect that Israel will never agree to real Palestinian sovereignty.
3.3. Alternative Frameworks and Their Challenges
In view of the practicality concerns over the two-state solution, alternative design plans have been discussed but none gained a wide acceptance. There are many considerable obstacles to the one-state solution, whether binational or as Israel- hegemony. A binational state would ask Israelis to give up their exclusive sovereignty and Palestinians to renounce the desire for self-determination in a separate state—psycho-socially and politically unappetizing to most (Lustick, 2019 ; Tilley, 2010).
The de facto one-state situation is of course a reality —namely, effective Israeli controls over the Palestinian territories deeply enmeshed with inequity. A solution based on one state with mega-populations of Palestinians with no real hope for freedom and rights or dignity would be impossible, the secretary-general António Guterres stressed. That reality has been described by human rights organizations such as B’Tselem, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International as apartheid – a description that Israel vigorously denies (Human Rights Watch, 2021 ; B’Tselem, 202 1; Amnesty International, 2022).
Track II efforts have begun to explore confederation models, which envision two sovereign states with open borders and common institutions, but encounter deep trust deficits and security fears (Morris, 2009). A “three-state solution” where Egypt in Gaza and Jordan in the West Bank took responsibility have been proposed, but were shot down by all involved. None of these options has in fact remotely gained the traction required to replace the two-state framework, which remains as elusive now as it ever was.
4. International Diplomacy: Shifts and Continuities
4.1. Renewed International Engagement
The Gaza war led to new international diplomatic activity to promote the two-state solution. Special session On September 26, 2024, a meeting co-chaired in New York by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud and Norway’s Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide was held involving representatives from some 90 countries in order to introduce the global alliance towards appetite for a two-state solution. A High-level International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement of the Question of Palestine was held from 28 to 30 July 2025, in France and Saudi Arabia.
In September 2025 the UK, Canada, Australia and Portugal all recognised a Palestinian State with France stating it would also do so. Though largely symbolic with no real Palestinian sovereignty in place, these conclusions reflected international frustration over the deadlock and goal to keep alive hopes of a two-state solution. French President Macron said “recognising the rights of the Palestinian people in no way undermines Israel’s rights”. Macron stressed the need for a two-state solution where Israel and Palestine can coexist peacefully and securely.
In December 2023, the G7 Leaders indeed wrote in their joint statement that they are “committed to a Palestinian State as part of a two-state solution that allows both Israelis and Palestinians to live in just, lasting and secure peace.” The European Union, Arab League and many states reconfirmed their support for the two-state solution, with some requesting time-bound and international guarantees on its realisation (Arab League, 2024).
4.2. The United States: In Support ?
It is a tough balancing act for the United States, Israel’s closest ally and its supplier of billions in annual military aid. President Biden said he supported a two-state solution and was “working with the Israelis and the Palestinians” on planning for a political transition to a government in Gaza. But Biden also gave Israel rock-solid military and diplomatic support during the Gaza war, including shipping weapons to Israel and deploying US Security Council vetoes to prevent ceasefire resolutions.
American officials have said they would welcome a return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza following reforms, whereas Prime Minister Netanyahu has insisted on full security control for Israel over all territory to the west of the Jordan River. This basic disagreement over how Gaza will be governed in the future is illustrative of the divide between American hopes for peace and Israeli practices.
As of September 2024, the US has pledged over $1 billion to emergency assistance in the region since October 2023. But the juxtaposition of humanitarian aid and ongoing arms supply illustrate American policy contradictions. Detractors maintain that, without conditionality of military assistance as a gesture to press for Israeli policy changes in settlements and occupation, American peace rhetoric has an empty ring (Khalidi 2020).
4.3. Regional Dynamics: Saudi Arabia and Normalization
The possibility that Saudi Arabia could be drawn into a formal normalization with Israel is still a key in any potential diplomatic deck. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said in September 2024: “The Kingdom will continue to exert strenuous efforts towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, under United Nations resolutions and international law and would not normalize relations with Israel without that.
This connection between normalization and the Palestinian state provides leverage for peace. Only a deal encompassing Saudi-Israeli normalization, U.S. security assurances to Saudi Arabia, some movement toward the Palestinian state and Palestinian administrative developments would outline the future. But whether such an approach is credible depends on a real desire among Israelis to accept Palestinian sovereignty, which current Israeli leadership categorically opposes.
The Abraham Accords (Chtatou, 2025, July 9), which normalized ties between Israel and UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco, have shown that Arab-Israeli peace can happen without Palestinian agreement — but it also showed its limits. And the Gaza fight tested those relationships, showing that marginalizing the Palestinian cause does not make it irrelevant as an engine of regional instability (Fiore, M. 2020, November).
5. Structural Obstacles to Lasting Peace
5.1. Political Leadership and Domestic Constraints
The current political leaderships on both sides are obstructionist in principle. Prime Minister Netanyahu heads the most right-wing coalition in Israel’s history that includes parties that openly oppose settlement growth and a Palestinian State. Netanyahu demands Israel “retain overriding security control of the entire area west of the River Jordan” and maintains that, not just for now but in the indefinite future. Coalition is all, for his political survival outside the prison cells and bloody streets of Nablus depends on keeping up coalition unity and giving Palestinians nothing.
Netanyahu is indicted for corruption and has extended the Gaza war, which was perceived by many as a personal political interest in avoiding accountability. Israel’s opposition (Verter, 2025, October 18), which has been quick to criticize Netanyahu for alleged leadership failure, largely agrees with him on the importance of security control and yearns to stave off Palestinian statehood in the near future, curtailing any room for policy revamp despite leadership change.
Palestinian leadership is equally problematic. The Palestinian Authority, ruled by the octogenarian Mahmoud Abbas since 2005, is afflicted with legitimacy deficits as its leaders have repeatedly postponed elections and grown more authoritarian. It rules only parts of the West Bank and does not have a foothold in Gaza (Tayara & Sayigh, 2025, October 2). Hamas, which has been declared a terrorist organization by the US, EU and others is the de facto ruler of Gaza (even though Israel has repeatedly bombed them into submission), and refuses to recognize Israel.
This leadership void has produced a representational crisis: who can negotiate for the Palestinians — and with what legitimacy ? The lack of a single, credible Palestinian partner responsible for reaching and enforcing such agreements is a basic obstacle to peace.
5.2. Security Dilemmas and Trust Deficits
Security is the critical concern on both sides, and irreconcilable dilemmas emerge out of it. Israelis say October 7 proved their point about the dangers of territorial withdrawals. The disengagement of Gaza has taught Israelis the lesson that not peace – but rather, Hamas rule (and rockets aimed at as many Israeli civilians as possible ) is likely to flow from the formerly beautiful land of sand dunes that Israel emptied of its settlers (Klein Halevi ; al-Nuaimi ; Stroul & Ross, 2025, October 7).
The Israelis insist on airtight assurances, with Israeli presence in what would be any future Palestinian state; control of airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum; limitations to Palestinian weapons capabilities; and Israeli veto over Palestinian security decisions. Palestinians regard such conditions as inconsistent with real independence and similar to continued occupation in another form (Khalidi, 2020).
Palestinians, however, though are dealing with a security matter of an entirely different magnitude: protection from Israeli military incursions, settler violence, arbitrary arrests and house demolitions. There have been 1,800 settler assaults all over the West Bank since October 7th, 2023. Terror reigns in the Palestinian communities. The lack of a functioning Palestinian security apparatus, to attend even slightly to civilians or maintain order, means anarchy.
Mutual trust for security arrangements to work properly has diminished precipitously. Either side views the other’s security interests as pretexts for aggression or continued control. It will take confidence-building measures, security guarantees at an international level to bring about the unwinding of this process – which seems virtually impossible in a period of mutual distrust.
5.3. The Settlement Plan and Territorial Facts
The settlement project, perhaps the most tangible obstacle to peace. More than 700,000 settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are enmeshed into Israeli society with infrastructure, subsidies, and political representation. Any peace accords involving more than limited evacuation of settlements would generate strong domestic opposition and perhaps civil disorder (Zertal, 2007).
Leaders of the settlement movement and their political allies consider the West Bank (which they prefer to call by its biblical names, Judea and Samaria) an inseparable part of the biblical Land of Israel, turning territorial compromise into a religious and ideological red line. Settlement blocs reinforced into Israel through the separation barrier and infrastructural development generate irreversible facts on the ground (Weizman 2007).
The settlement regime shatters Palestinian territorial contiguity, so that it is difficult to imagine a contiguous and viable future Palestinian state : roads only Israelis can use, harassing checkpoints, closures to whole towns and villages.
6. Possible Pathways Forward
6.1. Prerequisites for Progress
Even if the hurdles are high, seeking recipes for a step forward on peace is still important. There needs to be a political metamorphosis in Israel itself: A shift in leadership towards those genuinely desiring a negotiated two-state settlement and prepared to incur the necessary domestic political costs associated with peacemaking. This demands of Israeli society a coming to terms with October 7 in ways that lead toward accommodation rather than greater separation.
Second, there must be political unification and reform among the Palestinians. A credible Palestinian leadership needs to assert itself that can negotiate on behalf of all Palestinians, and whose decisions will have the support of the people. It may take fresh elections and generational change, alongside healing the split between Fatah and Hamas moderates or marginalizing the latter if it remains rejectionist.
Third, it requires sustained and intensive international engagement with leverage and guarantees. This would include: American willingness to link aid to Israel with the necessary policy changes; European, Arab and wider international backing with not only financial incentives but also security guarantees; implementation of mechanisms for monitoring compliance and dispute resolution; and possible international forces in place to provide security during transitions (Makdisi 2010).
Forth, to tackle the fundamental problems we need to be creative and flexible. On refugees, recognizing the symbolic right of return while pursuing practical solutions (compensation, resettlement, limited family reunification) might bridge the gap. On Jerusalem, any creative sovereignty formula enabling two capitals in the city might be feasible. On borders, you have the Clinton Parameters and Geneva Initiative to provide models of compromise. On security, the use of international forces and a graduated approach could alleviate concerns (Malley & Agha, 2001).
6.2. Interim Steps and Confidence-Building
Even short of full peace, interim steps might diminish violence and save the viability of two states. If the settlement is frozen, especially beyond main blocs, there would be no more physical erosion for the solution. Reducing the number of West Bank checkpoints and respecting Palestinians’ freedom of movement would improve daily life. Expanding Palestinian Authority control in the West Bank would improve Palestinian governance (Thrall, 2017).
Reconstruction in Gaza, with a role for the Palestinian Authority and international monitoring, could kick-start reunification of the West Bank and Gaza and alleviate humanitarian suffering. Economic development zones could be set up to provide jobs and commerce between Palestinians and Israelis, building up interdependence and constituencies for peace. Some trust could be revived by increased Israeli-Palestinian security and civil cooperation.
Long-term investments in education and cultural programs promoting recognition of both sides and human rights would be primordial (ROPES does a wonderful job in this area). By challenging dehumanization and incitement, or fostering compassion and knowledge of the other’s history in both societies are foundations for next generations’ coexistence (Bar-Tal, 2013).
6.3. Regional and International Frameworks
A regional framework that connects Israeli-Palestinian peace to wider Arab-Israeli normalization could offer both incentives and assurances to solidify a deal. The Arab Peace Initiative’s principles: full normalization with all the Arab states in return for an Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders and a just resolution of the refugee issue, are still relevant and may be reactivated with amendments (Arab League, 2002).
Conference systems which gather all participants and have binding commitments, not just bilateral negotiations, could serve to surpass negotiation problems. If the latter defines the needs for security of Israel on a separate footing, and institutionalize ‘’NATO-like’’ security guarantees to both (Chtatou, 2022, September 14), or if that is not politically possible replace it with a UNSC resolution under Chapter VII which mandates and guarantees an agreed peace.
There will also be mighty incentive for the development of economic integration frameworks—e.g., Middle East Marshall Plans that offer huge investments in return for the successful implementation of peace processes. “Water and energy cooperation agreements involving regional countries on common challenges may develop a sense of mutual trust and inter-dependence “ (Zawahri, 2008).
6.4. The Generational Challenge
At the end of the day, lasting peace may not be achieved until a change in generation. Postcolonial generations that have been traumatised by violence, displacement and conflict no longer enjoy the mental health to be able to reconcile with one another so they can coexist in reality. Investing in the youth in terms of exchanges, joint programs and peace education could produce a constancy for accommodation that does not exist at present (See ROPES programs and activities).
This is a generational model that recognizes comprehensive peace around the corner may not be possible at this time but aims at stabilizing and preventing further downward spiral as well as laying bricks for future breakthroughs. It takes disciplined international engagement, that you stay engaged and keep developing recipe books and incentives even when nothing appears to be happening.
Conclusion
Is peace between Israelis and Palestinians possible beyond October 7th ? The sobriety-inducing answer is that peace seems further away than it has been in decades. The trauma of 7 October on Israeli society, the devastating humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, the explicit repudiation by Israeli leaders of a two-state solution (in both word and deed), degradation of the physical viability for that solution through settlement expansion, mutual public opinion meltdown around peace on both sides, dysfunctional leaderships representing their electorate inadequately or not at all, security dilemmas that are virtually insurmountable combined with trust chasms and regional instabilities. These form an environment whose bleakness surpasses expectations.
The renewed attention from the international community on the two-state solution, be it in terms of new state recognitions or high-level conferences, is evidence that support for this framework as the only one is still there. Secretary-General Guterres (2025, September 22) :
‘’ Nothing can also excuse developments in the West Bank that pose an existential threat to a Two-State solution.
The relentless expansion of settlements.
The creeping threat of annexation.
The intensification of settler violence.
All of it must stop.
The situation is morally, legally and politically intolerable.
We must recommit ourselves to the Two-State solution before it is too late.
A solution in which two independent, contiguous, democratic, viable and sovereign States are mutually recognized and fully integrated into the international community.’’
But, such global statements having no material leverage and special institutions to ensure are unable to have it for the people on ground.
The fundamental problem is that the prevailing conditions reward prolongation of conflict — not peace. Israeli political leadership has an interest in managing conflict and not solving it, as the latter would necessitate concessions that could bring down fragile ruling coalitions. Hamas’ political-military project is based on armed struggle and the negative assertion of rejecting Israel’s existence. The PA is weak, corrupt and incapable of negotiating with Israel and of enforcing any agreement. International actors, especially the United States, offer rhetoric of peace but execute policies in service of war.
Breaking this deadlock will take simultaneous shifts: Israeli politics towards leadership genuinely in support of a two-state solution; Palestinian politics to reunify politically around legitimate, reform-oriented leadership; American willingness to utilize their leverage by tying aid to policy changes on the ground; sustained, intensive international engagement with both guarantees and incentives; creative solutions around core issues; long-term investments into societal change programs that will foster coexistence.
These tensions are exacerbated by the Oct. 7 attacks and the Gaza war making that already Herculean task even more daunting. With only 21% of Israelis, and 23% of Palestinians who believe that everlasting peace can be attained, the psychological pillars for peacemaking have collapsed. Reconstruction will take decades of sustained effort, courage in leadership and international commitment in the unlikeliest times for resolution.
History tells us that drawn out conflicts can be resolved: Northern Ireland, South Africa and the Balkans have all emerged from apparently insurmountable levels of violence to achieve at least a fragile peace. These cases imply that peace depends on joint fatigue, transformation of leadership, international pressure and assistance, imaginative institutional design and generational commitment to reconciliation. It is as yet unclear whether the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will mirror these patterns.
What is clear at any rate is that the present situation is untenable and inherently unjust. With nine-in-ten in Gaza displaced, one-in-ten killed or injured and homes and infrastructure being destroyed systematically, the human cost of conflict sustained remains devastating. The alternative to a just peace is not stability, but rather cycles of violence; a humanitarian disaster with regional implications; and moral deterioration of the parties to the hostile conflict.
The issue is not that peace is easy or imminent — it’s plainly neither. The question is whether the international community, regional actors and at some point Israelis and Palestinians themselves will make the hard choices that are needed to break such cycles of violence and develop frameworks for coexistence, or whether we are arriving conclusively at an end to the two-state solution and in its place a one-state reality underpinned by permanent conflict – or unending occupation encapsulating permanent inequality. The response will determine the future not just for Israelis and Palestinians, but for the wider Middle East and the ability of the international order to resolve chronic conflicts through negotiation rather than simply by force.
In 50 years, historians will look back on this moment: On Oct. 7, the day that killed hopes for peace forever — or, more unlikely yet conceivably possible, finally pushed forward the transformative changes required in order to achieve a resolution. That future depends on decisions that leaders, societies and the world have yet to make. The road to achieving lasting peace it still seems attainable, albeit barely, but its route can only be traveled by couragous and far-sighted people with sustained commitment we don’t have. Until they do, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will slouch its tragic way ahead, devouring lives and resources and hopes in what could turn out to be one of the twenty-first century’s most depressing moral and political sinkholes.
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Appendix A: Key Statistics
October 7, 2023 Attack
Israeli and foreign civilians killed: 1,195 (including 815 civilian)
Hostages taken: 251
Hostages released/rescued: About 150 (as of October 2024)
Israeli security forces killed: 373
Gaza War (7 October 2023 – October 2025)
Palestinians killed: Over 68,000
Palestinians injured: More than 170,000 (40,000+ with permanent disabilities)
Buildings destroyed or damaged: 80 percent of all buildings
Homes with major damage or destroyed: 90% of all homes
Population displaced: 90% (about 2 million people)
Rubble produced: Volume of 12x the Great Pyramid of Giza
Population struggling with food insecurity: At least 3 out of every ten people have not eaten for days
West Bank Conflict (7 October 2023 – December 2024)
Palestinians killed: Over 1,000
Settler attacks: Approximately 1,800 incidents
Israeli security activities: Operations intensify in Jenin, Tulkarem, Nablus and refugee camps.
Settlement Expansion
Settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem: More Than 700,000
Area of West Bank under full Israeli control (Area C): 60%
Land in the West Bank confiscated by Israel in 2024: More than combined previous twenty years
Two-State Solution Public Opinion (2025)
Support by Israelis: 27% (compared with 61 percent in 2012)
Palestinian support (West Bank/East Jerusalem): 33% (66% in 2012)
Israelis who think there will never be permanent peace: 21%
Palestinians who think there will be lifelong peace: 23%
Appendix B: Chronology of Key Events
Pre-October 7, 2023
1948: Israeli independence and the Palestinian Nakba; some 75,000 Palestinians displaced
1967: Six-Day War; Israel takes control of West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights, Sinai
1993-1995: The Oslo Accords create the Palestinian Authority and set out process for peace
2000-2005 Second Intifada, breakdown of peace process
2005: Israeli disengagement from Gaza
2007: Hamas seizes control of Gaza and Israel, together with Egypt, imposes a blockade
2008-2021: Four Israel-Hamas wars in Gaza
2020: Abraham Accords normalize Israeli relations with UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco
October 7, 2023 and Aftermath
October 7, 2023: Israel’s borders attacked by Hamas, trains bombed, UN and IDF buildings destroyed; 1,195 dead, 251 taken hostage
October 8th, 2023 Israel declares war and initiates bombardment of Gaza
27 October 2023: Israeli ground assault on Gaza commences
November 2023: Temporary truce and hostage releases_GRE_COAST_KEEP_FALL.Truscgin2 Seven peacekeepers and two civilians were released after more than five days in the hands of rebels whom they had been sent to disarm by force, during a fragile ceasefire signed with their captors.
December 2023: G7 leaders renew two-state solution pledge
26th January 2024: ICJ imposes provisional measures to stop genocide by Israel
May 2024: ICC Prosecutor requests arrest warrants against Israeli and Hamas leaders
24 May, 2024: ICJ directs Israel to stop military operations in Rafah
18 July 2024: Israel\’s Knesset votes to reject a Palestinian state
August 2024: Famine declaration by UN in some areas of Gaza
September 2024: Saudi Arabia, Norway to co-chair meeting of 90 nations backing two-state solution
September 2024: British Empire, Canada, Australia and Portugal recognize Palestine; France indicates it will follow suit
November, 2024: War continues and the tally of Palestinian deaths is reported to have exceeded 45,000.
July 2025: International High-Level Conference for Peace in Palestine, in Paris
68,000+: October 2025Death toll surpasses 68,000 Palestinians90% of Gaza’s population uprooted
Appendix C Key Issues in Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians
Borders and Territory
Israeli position: Annexation of large settlement blocs; security zones; maintaining the Jordan Valley
Palestinian position: 1967 borders with minor land swaps; territorial contiguity, link between West Bank and Gaza
International consensus: 1967 lines with mutually agreed upon land swaps (around 3-5% of the West Bank)
Jerusalem
Israeli stance: Unified Jerusalem as the state of Israel’s “eternal and indivisible” capital.
Palestinians: East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state
International consensus: Creative sovereignty set-ups with both capitals in the city; Old City under special regime
Refugees
Israeli position: No right of return to Israel; re-settlement and compensation in Palestinian state/third countries
Palestinian demands: UN Resolution 194 Right of return Great March of Return.
Ice at the South Pole Here is what Cold Virus has gathered about international consensus: Right of return in principle; actually through compensation, re-settlement in Palestine or third countries, limited family reunification
Security
Israeli position: Palestinian state, but demilitarized; Israeli security presence; control of air space and radio frequencies as well as borders; international security guarantees
Palestinian stand: Real sovereignty with security forces; Light international presence; Israeli pullout in stages
International opinion: Incremental approach by means of international security forces; demilitarization, except in the case of internal security; incremental transfer of responsibility
Settlements
Israeli position Annexation of the largest settlement blocs, home to most settlers
Palestinians: All settlements must be removed or remain under Palestinian jurisdiction
International consensus: Major settlement blocs annexed to Israel with comparable land swaps; isolated settlements removed or ceded to Palestinian control
Water Resources
Israeli position: It is vital for Israel’s regional water security to continue using West Bank aquifers
Palestinian position: Sovereignty over water resources on the Palestinian land
World consensus: Sharing of water resources; fair apportioning; regional solutions sharing desalination and water infrastructure
Appendix D – Worldwide positions regarding Two-State Solution
United States
Official position: In favor of a two-state solution with negotiations between the parties
Real world: Steadfast military and diplomatic support for Israel; no strings (or pressure to freeze settlements) attached when it comes to U.S. aid, even as settlements keep growing; December 2020 recognition of Israeli sovereignty over Golan Heights
Biden Affirms Two States, but Arms During Gaza war current level of trade in goods and services — This level takes the ratio of the most recent four quarters to 2019, adjusted for inflation.
European Union
Official position: Strong support for two-state solution based on 1967 borders with land swaps
Actions: Many Member States (Ireland, Spain, Norway, Slovenia) recognized Palestinian state in 2024 -25.
Obstacles: CJEU judgements rule out application of trade deals to settlements; little practical leverage
United Nations
General Assembly: Strong backing for two states and Palestine sovereignty
Security Council: A number of resolutions affirming two-state solution; U.S. vetoes prevent implementation
Secretary-General: António Guterres underscores two-state solution as only option; cautions against one-state type scenarios
Arab League
Arab Peace Initiative (2002): Full normalization with Israel as part of a peace agreement, and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Recent evolution: Some states normalized without Palestinian agreement (Abraham Accords); some continue linkage
Current state of play: Saudi Arabia ties normalization to path to Palestinian state
Russia
Official position: Two-state solution, backed by international law
Practical function: Limited; it has relations with all actors
China
Position: Supporter of two-state solution, Palestinian rights
Activities: Hosted Palestinian reconciliation negotiations; Gives humanitarian aid
Functional role: More economic and diplomatic, less mediation
Appendix E: Alternative Frameworks Discussed
One-State Solution (Binational)
Option: Single democratic state with equal rights for Israelis and Palestinians.
Supporters: Some scholars, activists on each side
Obstacles: Israeli refusal to concede Jewish minority; Palestinian fears of power ratios; political backing from no mainstream leaders
One-State Reality (Israeli Sovereignty)
Idea: De facto annexation of West Bank with Palestinian autonomy restricted
Status: Current path with settlement expansion and rejection of a Palestinian state.
International view: Human rights organizations say it is apartheid; unsustainable and unjust
Confederation
Concept: Two states that will live side by side in open borders with shared institutions and a joint rule of Jerusalem.
Proponents: Track II Initiatives; Israeli-Palestinian Confederation Proposals
Challenges: Requires great trust; security risks; felt as not time due to hostilities.
Three-State Solution
Concept: Egypt takes over Gaza; Jordan in the West Bank
Status: Rejected by everyone; Egypt, Jordan unwilling; Palestinians against splits
Managed Conflict
Concept: Just Because you Cant Resolve Something doesnt Mean it cant Be Managed with Some Degree of Dignity.
Status: De facto Israeli policy in the Netanyahu era
Critique: October 7 is a proof that this attempt has failed; tools of injustice and instability