Colonial Legacies and Military Hardware in the India-Pakistan War of 1965

Chandigarh: As India marks the diamond jubilee of its 1965 war with Pakistan, it is worth recalling that much of the conflict was fought with its matériel and military mindset inherited from the British Raj.

India’s armed forces, for their part, entered the campaign with a predominantly British-origin arsenal – Centurions, Shermans, Hunters, Vampires, Lee-Enfields and 25-pounders – supported by doctrines and training systems still rooted in their colonial inheritance. Together, this hardware and inherited operational culture shaped their conduct of the 17-day war from September 5-23, 1965, defining both what could be attempted on the battlefield and how effectively it was executed.

Pakistan, by contrast, had already pivoted sharply towards U.S. military equipment, through its alliances in the fifties with Washington, fielding Pattons, Chaffees, F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters and M-series artillery, among other weaponry. For it, British-origin gear survived mostly in supplementary or back-up roles.

Yet, much like India, its warfighting doctrines, staff procedures and command culture, according to online research and open source documentation, were firmly rooted in British military tradition, from which both the armed forces had sprung, 18 years earlier.

Thus, at one fundamental level, the 1965 war can be evaluated as a study in contrasts and continuities: while one side went to battle largely on British-origin platforms and the other leaned on American military hardware, both militaries remained united in their doctrines, structures and approaches  – still deeply shaped by their common colonial legacy.

Veteran panellists and discussion groups at the recently concluded 9th Military Literature Festival at Chandigarh examined the strategies, sacrifices and operational strains that shaped the 1965 war, widely regarded by analysts and historians as a hard-fought draw, in which both sides demonstrated their strengths and limitations, while continuing to make competing claims of having decisively bested the other.

The three-day festival, which concluded on November 9, offered a lens to revisit the extensive use of British-origin matériel in the 1965 conflict and underscored how intrinsically the colonial mindset continued to shape both armed forces.

In many ways, the genesis of the Indian and Pakistani armed forces was unprecedented and unique: two fully formed, professional militaries carved overnight from a single, sprawling imperial army, representing one of the most audaciously ambitious and arrogant decolonisation experiments.

Created under pressure, executed in haste and never replicated anywhere else before or since, it split its soldiery and officer corps, command hierarchies, equipment and doctrinal systems simultaneously. This unprecedented division left both militaries largely mirroring each other in strategy, organisation and operational habits – long after they had begun to arm themselves in entirely different ways.

Also read: Looking Back at the 1965 War, With a More Objective Eye

Created under pressure, executed in haste and never replicated anywhere else before or since, it split its soldiery and officer corps, command hierarchies, equipment and doctrinal systems simultaneously. This unprecedented rupture cast a long shadow and nearly two decades later, when the two militaries confronted each other in 1965, both forces continued to mirror each other in strategy, organisation and operational habits – long after they had begun to arm themselves in entirely different ways.

India, having received the bulk – over 80% – of UK-sourced defence equipment and platforms following the division of military assets at Partition, fielded a formidable mix of British air, armoured, artillery and infantry systems, alongside naval assets in the 1965 war fought across Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat and, earlier, in the Rann of Kutch in the run up to full-blown hostilities. According to speakers at the festival, much of this military kit, together with some systems developed thereafter, was instrumental in sustaining operational momentum and tactical flexibility, decisively shaping outcomes in key engagements.

By contrast, Pakistan employed British-origin matériel largely in auxiliary roles, reflecting the meagre 17% share of military assets it received at Partition from the Joint Defence Council – chaired by Indian Army Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, tasked with dividing the Imperial Army between the two new states.

This sparse colonial inheritance was soon overtaken by a surge of U.S.-supplied combat aircraft, main battle tanks, artillery and other key systems that began arriving in the mid-1950s, after Pakistan entered American-backed, anti-Soviet alliances. These alliances led to around $2 billion in U.S. military aid being funnelled to Pakistan via the Mutual Defence Assistance Program and the Military Assistance Program, which evolved in 1968 into the Foreign Military Sales system that endures today.

The Indian Army, on the other hand, fielded substantial numbers of 47-tonne British-origin Centurion MBTs, 32-tonne U.S.-origin, but U.K.-retrofitted M4A2/4 Sherman medium tanks, QF 25-pounder field guns, BL 5.5-inch medium guns and 105mm and 3.7-inch mountain howitzers, all supported by ML3 and 4.2-inch mortars. Infantry small arms like Lee-Enfield rifles, Bren guns and Sten submachine guns, completed the Indian Army’s inventory.

And while all this British kit performed reliably in the 1965 conflict, it was the Mk 5/7/9 Centurions and the Shermans that proved decisive, in one of the fiercest tank battles fought since World War II at Asal Uttar, near the border township of Khem Karan in Punjab.

This epic clash – featuring some 200 to 250 tanks, by some accounts nearly 300 – proved a turning point in the 1965 war, becoming one of modern India’s most vividly remembered and talked about battles.

The Pakistan Army’s formidable assault was led by its 1st Armoured Division, fielding mainly 45-tonne Pattons, nimble 19-tonne US-made M24 Chaffee light tanks, a handful of Shermans and elements of the 11th Infantry Division, supported by American M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers.

At the time, Pattons were the most formidable MBTs in the region, noted for their powerful 90 mm M36 guns that fired heavier, longer-range rounds than the Indian Army’s 75 mm and 84 mm tank guns. Their thick armour and superior mobility also outclassed the Indian Army’s British-origin tanks.

Also read: An Authentic Account of a Forgotten India-Pakistan War

Faced with this potentially deadly onslaught, Major General Gurbaksh Singh of 4th Mountain Division and Brigadier Thomas K. Theogaraj of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, employed simple yet ingenious counter-defensive tactics. They adopted a horseshoe-shaped disposition around Asal Uttar, lining the arc with Centurions and Shermans and flooded the surrounding sugarcane fields overnight, transforming the entire area into a treacherous quagmire.

At first light on September 10, the Pakistani Patton, Chaffee and Stuart columns pushed forward with confidence – only to instantly sink helplessly into the waterlogged fields, their tracks churning defencelessly in the sludge, leaving them horribly exposed, vulnerable like rabbits transfixed in headlights.

Immobilised and clustered in the open, they were sitting targets for India’s encircling Centurions and supporting Shermans, whose fire tore through the stalled Pakistani formations, giving them no quarter, humiliating the famed Pattons and leaving the enemy no chance to either manoeuvre or retreat.

By mid-morning, Pakistan had lost 90-100 tanks, including 70-75 Pattons, many abandoned intact, while Indian losses stood at 15-20 tanks – mostly Shermans – though some accounts place this figure marginally higher. Soon after, a makeshift memorial to the destroyed, damaged and captured Pakistani tanks was created at Bhikiwind, about 40 km from Khem Karan and christened “Patton Nagar”.

Many Patton MBTs were also displayed across the country, both as a testament to Pakistan’s 1965 losses and as a tribute to the resilience of British-designed armour and the Indian Army’s tactical ingenuity – its battlefield jugaad – which had transformed unequal odds into a globally studied example of improvisation in tank warfare.

As for the Indian Air Force, it operated highly manoeuvrable Folland Gnat lightweight fighters – which, at the time, were being licence-built in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited – and were nicknamed ‘Sabre Slayers’ for their success in dogfights against the Pakistan Air Force’s more advanced F-86 Sabres. The IAF also deployed Hawker Hunter Mk. 56 fighter-bombers, English Electric Canberra bombers and De Havilland Vampire twin-boom fighters.

Air combat in the 1965 war was sharp, brief and often tactically decisive. The Pakistan Air Force is believed to have lost 20-25 aircraft – including Sabres, F-104 Starfighters and B-57 Canberras – through air-to-air combat, ground fire, accidents and successful Indian Air Force raids.

The Indian Air Force, in turn, lost 35-40 aircraft, including Gnats, Hunters, Vampires and a few Canberras under analogous operational conditions, though both sets of figures remain contested.

However, both air forces showed skill and resilience, inflicting losses and achieving tactical successes. Yet Pakistan’s faster, more modern U.S. combat aircraft gave it an edge in key engagements, even as the Indian side’s nimble, HAL-built Gnats repeatedly asserted their dominance over the advanced Sabres.

And lastly, the Indian Navy of 1965 was predominantly British in equipment, operational concepts and tradition, but remained largely on the sidelines during the conflict, its role confined to blockading and patrolling India’s western coastline. Emerging from the Royal Indian Navy, founded in 1934, the Indian Navy’s focus was defensive and littoral, aimed at protecting coastlines and shipping lanes rather than projecting power.

Also read: Commemorating the 1965 War Is a Good Idea, the Proposed ‘Victory Carnival’ Isn’t

The Bombay-based Western Fleet – regarded the Indian Navy’s sword arm, then as now – comprised Royal Navy Hunt, R and Battle-class destroyers; Whitby, Leopard and Black Swan-class frigates; and various anti-submarine trawlers and minesweepers. All were on high alert during the 1965 operations, but saw no major action, as India’s political leadership sought to avoid maritime conflict escalation. Ironically, INS Vikrant (ex-HMS Hercules), the second-hand 16,000-tonne Majestic-class aircraft carrier acquired by the Indian Navy in 1961, along with its embarked Hawker Sea Hawk fighters, sat out the war as it was undergoing a refit at the Naval Dockyard in Bombay (now Mumbai).

Nevertheless, the Indian Navy’s experience of restraint in 1965 left a lasting imprint on its doctrine, highlighting the need for an independent maritime strategy and greater offensive capability. This shift manifested itself six years later in the 1971 war, when the Indian Navy blockaded Karachi and launched decisive strikes on other ports, crippling Pakistan’s war-fighting capacity by cutting off critical fuel supplies.

Conversely, by 1965, Pakistan had developed a markedly different strategic balance, shaped largely by its matériel. By then, the majority of its fighters, armoured units, heavy artillery and other defence equipment had been supplied by the U.S., after Islamabad joined the American-led Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organisation a year later. Both agreements were aimed at containing the spread of communism in Asia and the Middle East.

Hence, it fielded a technologically modernised military on paper, one employing mainly U.S. military equipment atop its residual British-era arsenal. But intrinsically, it was still anchored in British war-fighting structures, training and command practices, reflecting its colonial heritage even as it absorbed American hardware.

Accordingly, the Pakistan Army retained a handful of older Sherman tanks in secondary roles while the backbone of its armoured forces comprised M47/48 Patton MBTs and 19-tonne M24 Chaffee light tanks, both of which spearheaded offensive operations like those at Khem Karan.

Its artillery was a hybrid assemblage – American M114 155 mm, M101 105 mm and M3 75 mm howitzers paired with British QF 25-pounders, 3.7-inch mountain guns, BL 5.5-inch mediums and a spread of 3-inch, 4.2-inch and ML-3 mortars. Its infantry, however, still fought with the familiar trio of Lee-Enfield rifles, Bren guns and Sten submachine guns, much like their Indian counterparts.

By the mid-Sixties, the Pakistan Air Force too had transitioned almost entirely to U.S. combat platforms – F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters and British B-57 Canberras – retrofitted and license-built in the U.S. A smattering of British military aircraft like Tempest IIs, Harvards and Tiger Moths – transferred to it at Partition – were relegated to training and secondary roles.

Alongside, the Pakistan Navy – a small but strategically focused coastal force – comprised mainly British-built sloops, frigates and minesweepers, reflecting its Royal Navy antecedents. A few ex-Royal Navy destroyers acquired in the 1950s modestly enhanced its surface capability but, like the Indian Navy, it too undertook no major strikes during the 1965 war, limiting itself to patrols and mine-clearing operations around key domestic ports and nearby shipping lanes.

In retrospect, the 1965 war was quintessentially a land-based conflict, defined by manoeuvre and attrition, tank and infantry battles and conventional artillery duels – all of which rigorously tested human grit. This was amply epitomised by the Asal Uttar clashes, where shrewd use of terrain and tactical acumen determined the outcome.

“Looking back, purely in hardware terms, it was as if the empire still guided our formations via its tanks, fighters, guns and rifles,” said Major General A.P. Singh (retired), one of Chandigarh’s Military Literature Festival organisers. Yet, he said, every manoeuvre-advance, flank and counter-carried the thrust of a new nation, turning borrowed colonial hardware into instruments of Indian resolve on the battlefield.

This article went live on November seventeenth, two thousand twenty five, at thirty minutes past nine in the morning.

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