On November 20, Axios published the draft text of the Trump administration’s latest plan to end the Russian–Ukrainian war. One of the most detailed sections of the document is point 14, which outlines how the White House intends to use Russia’s frozen assets. Here’s what the draft agreement says:
14) Frozen funds will be used as follows:
$100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine;
The U.S. will receive 50 percent of the profits from this venture. Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen. The remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate U.S.–Russian investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas. This fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.
It’s hard to overlook that much of this part of the plan centers on the prospective gains the agreement could deliver for the United States. This aligns with Trump’s approach to the war in Ukraine since returning to the White House: he has repeatedly emphasized that Washington must stop spending money on supporting Kyiv and begin recovering the investments already made through arms shipments and other aid. That same logic underpinned both the now largely forgotten “rare-earth” agreement with Ukraine and the restructuring of the weapons-supply system, in which NATO began paying for transfers from U.S. stockpiles to Ukraine. The scale of these purchases is unclear, but President Trump insists that the United States is now earning a profit on these deliveries.
Judging by the White House’s proposal, frozen Russian assets are supposed to become yet another source of compensation — and ultimately profit — for Washington. To understand the risks embedded in this idea, let’s review what these frozen assets are.
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The frozen Russian assets
To protect against inflation and exchange-rate risks, Russia’s Central Bank, like other national regulators, invests its money in dependable assets. Most often, these are foreign securities such as top-rated government bonds.
According to various estimates, Western jurisdictions have frozen between $280 billion and $330 billion in Russian assets. At least two-thirds of that sum — more than $200 billion — is kept in the European Union. The largest custodian of these frozen reserves is the Belgium-based depository Euroclear, which holds nearly $160 billion in Russian sovereign assets.
As of early 2022, Russia kept no more than 6 percent of its reserves in the United States. The amount frozen there is estimated at only about $5 billion. That prompts a key question for Trump’s proposal: without European backing, how would Washington manage hundreds of billions in Russian assets? And is there any realistic scenario in which the Kremlin surrenders its reserves to stop the war?
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U.S. control and Russia’s willingness to forfeit its reserves
Securing the Kremlin’s approval to transfer some $200 billion to Ukraine’s reconstruction would be extremely difficult for Washington. On the Russian side, responsibility for the draft peace plan lies with Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s envoy for economic cooperation, who lacks the diplomatic authority to set the Kremlin’s official position. Neither the Foreign Ministry nor the government has made any statement suggesting Russia might surrender its reserves. “Before Trump’s offer was made public, I had not heard that Russian authorities were willing to take such a step and thereby indirectly recognize the need to compensate Ukraine for damages,” anti-corruption expert Ilya Shumanov told Meduza. By contrast, just over a week ago, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described the confiscation scenario as “bandit behavior” and threatened the West with a reciprocal response.
In February 2025, however, Reuters sources familiar with the negotiations said that, behind closed doors, Russian officials were not ruling out unfreezing part of their reserves for Ukraine — provided that at least a third of the money went to rebuilding areas occupied by Russian troops after February 24, 2022. There has been no sign of progress on the asset issue since, and Russian advances at the front do not bring Ukraine closer to a victory scenario that would allow Kyiv to seek reparations from Moscow.
At the same time, Europe has taken no decisive action to seize Russia’s assets on Ukraine’s behalf. E.U. governments remain deadlocked over the legal and financial risks of any expropriation. In 2024, European officials agreed to transfer the interest income from Russia’s frozen reserves, which gave Kyiv several billion dollars last year and more than $10 billion this year. That support is insufficient for Ukraine’s wartime needs, however, prompting the E.U. to propose its so-called “reparations loan.” Under this plan, Ukraine would receive an interest-free loan from Brussels backed by Russian assets and repay it only if Moscow pays reparations after the war. Though this would not formally confiscate Russian money, Belgium has opposed the scheme. As Euroclear’s home state, it would face the main financial and legal liabilities under any quasi-expropriation mechanism. Supporters — including German Chancellor Friedrich Merz — have so far been unable to find a compromise with the Belgian authorities.
Moscow’s voluntary agreement to put its reserves toward rebuilding Ukraine — apparently envisioned in Trump’s plan — would likely serve as a lifeline for Europe. Yet it would also be an unprecedented step. Yes, the economy has been drained by the war, casualties have surpassed 200,000 troops, and most Russians say they favor ending the “special military operation.” Even so, history is not exactly littered with wars where the winning side suddenly sued for peace and agreed to bankroll its adversary’s recovery. The U.S., for example, poured tens — maybe hundreds — of billions of dollars into Iraq and Afghanistan, but those funds were distributed by Washington-aligned governments, not by the regimes the U.S. was fighting.
This element of Trump’s peace plan appears to rely on the Kremlin’s goodwill. That gambit is plausible only if Russia’s wartime costs are higher than the Kremlin says and steep enough to make continued fighting untenable.
There’s also a more pragmatic explanation for why the Russian authorities might consent to Trump’s arrangement. In 2023, the G7 countries decided that Russia’s reserves would remain frozen under any circumstances until Ukraine receives compensation for the damage inflicted on it. Even Russia’s triumph on the battlefield wouldn’t change the status of the frozen assets. With this in mind, Washington’s plan might be the best compromise available to Moscow, Alexander Kolyandr, a research fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, told Meduza. “It’s better than what they’ve got now,” he said, explaining that the Kremlin has no path to recovering all of its assets, and Trump’s proposal would at least make it possible to recoup some of the money.