The EU needs to seek formulas for integration with countries of the southern Mediterranean

At one point in our conversation, this time without microphones, I asked Stefano Sannino whether Ursula von der Leyen really believed in the Pact for the Mediterranean. “Yes, absolutely,” he replied without hesitation. He added that the creation of a new commissioner dedicated specifically to the region is “a very clear indication of the orientation of the President of the Commission.” That tone of conviction ran through our entire conversation: Sannino insists that the EU is undergoing profound geopolitical change, and that it can’t afford to ignore “a region so close, not just geographically but also economically and socially.”

Throughout the interview, he argued that the Commission’s major shift came from viewing the Mediterranean not merely as a source of risk: “We’ve never really regarded the region as a potential contributor,” he told me, also listing some items related to his view of a shared future agenda – training, the blue economy, energy, innovation, shared production chains. The key word, he maintains, is ‘integration’.

Sannino explained that the Pact for the Mediterranean is articulated across three pillars – people, economy and security, and resilience and migration – with the hope of arriving at a “shared vision of the threats” existing between the two shores. He also underlined the role of Spain and Italy; in his opinion, “every time they act together, the impact is strong.”

From educational projects along the lines of a “Euro-Mediterranean Erasmus” to the medium term potential for an economic area of deep integration, Sannino offers a view that blends geopolitical realism with strategic ambition: “The future of this region is also the future of the European Union.” The following conversation sought to explore that remark and what it might imply for European foreign policy.
 

What is the Commission’s current policy regarding the Mediterranean? One fundamental challenge of Spain’s foreign policy lies in its relationship with North Africa.

The creation of a portfolio for the Mediterranean region, with a commissioner responsible for relations and a dedicated general directorate, is a very clear indication of the orientation of both the President of the Commission and a large group of Member States, all pushing in the same direction. All of this is happening at a time when the European Union has had its eyes on the distant East, thanks to Ukraine and the security implications for the EU, given the Russian threat.

The idea of having two different structures or portfolios dealing with these two regions seems to me a proper approach, because it also conveys the European Union’s commitment to the Mediterranean.

The second issue is that the global geopolitical framework has changed a lot in recent times; indeed, the European Union can’t afford to not consider every region of the world, but especially a region that’s so close, not only geographically, but also economically and socially, and with very strong implications. Countries with joint production chains, societies in evolution whose development has an impact on the political situation in our own countries.

I don’t necessarily want to talk about migration or mobility, or terrorism – all of which have an impact. But the future of this region is also the future of the European Union. 

“The global geopolitical framework has changed a lot in recent times; the European Union can’t afford to not consider every region of the world”The third point is that the Commission is trying to look at the Mediterranean not only as a problem, but also as an opportunity. Until now – and I say this with respect for what’s been accomplished so far – we’ve never really considered the region as a potential contributor in terms of training, universities, culture, economics, energy, innovative startups, or the maritime economy. That’s what the Pact for the Mediterranean means: looking at all these dimensions so the southern shores of the Mediterranean can contribute and, above all, integrate. For me, that’s the fundamental word: the integration of a common Mediterranean space.

Might we be looking at a single market with North Africa in the medium term?

That’s one of the ideas behind the pact. We’re talking about proximity in regulation and standards, integration of production chains, all of which feed that possibility. 

The interesting part is that the countries of the region are voicing the same idea, reflecting on mechanisms similar to those at work in the European Economic Area: forms of integration that would imply a significant effort from both parties, the European Union and the countries along the southern shore.

A few months ago, I interviewed former president Romano Prodi, who told me about his project to associate European universities with those of the North African countries. What future do you see for that project, which could help train the region’s future elites?

I hope it has a great future, because the Commissioner is very interested in that particular project. In fact, if you look at the Pact for the Mediterranean, that’s the first action we want to develop, and we’re already working on it.

The idea is to create mechanisms for conducting joint classes. We have yet to define the best way to do so. Universities have changed a lot in recent years, especially after Covid-19. But there’s one key point: facilitating student exchange. Training is essential, but so is fostering personal connections. Spending time in another country – as happens with Erasmus in Europe – creates strong bonds.

Some balance needs to be found between converting universities into associated physical centers and using existing structures for shared programs and degrees. That presents significant challenges: the recognition of degrees, student mobility, visas, researcher exchanges. Those are issues we’ll have to face in the coming months.
 

What can Italy and Spain do together, to champion this Mediterranean policy? Is there room for collaboration?

I’m a great advocate for cooperation between Spain and Italy. There’s a closeness between our societies, cultures, economies, and languages. Every time Spain and Italy act together, the impact is strong: we’re the third and fourth largest economies in the Eurozone, and each has considerable political weight.

“I’m a great advocate for cooperation between Spain and Italy. There’s a closeness between our societies, cultures, economies, and languages”I believe that, in the decision to create this Mediterranean portfolio, the political drive of those two countries and others was very influential. If we can build a cooperation that channels ideas, suggestions, and proposals, that will prove crucial. Spain and Italy are probably among the countries that reflect most on the Mediterranean question, since both already experience a dimension of permanent integration.

I count on them not only for support but to provide substance and concrete proposals.

You’ve also served as secretary general of the European External Service. The Financial Times mentioned von der Leyen’s willingness to create an intelligence cell within the Commission. What role do intelligence and security play in the Pact for the Mediterranean?

We need to draw a distinction. In security, the role is important: one of the three pillars of the pact is security, resilience, and migration. The idea is to bring the two shores of the Mediterranean as close as possible, to achieve a shared vision of the threats and work together.

The topics range from protection of increasingly sensitive underwater cables to disinformation, data manipulation, hybrid threats, and the instrumentalization of diverse policies.

It would be very promising to forge security and defense partnerships with countries in the region. We’ve already started with some, and others are pending. This can draw together very closely our future security architectures. 

Including NATO? As you know, Javier Colomina is involved in that work.

We’re working with NATO and with Javier in particular. We’ve set up a small EU-NATO group for the Southern Neighborhood. Two days ago, I was at the North Atlantic Council to brief the allies on the pact and on Mediterranean policy.
The exchange is useful, and fruitful; the two institutions are very complementary. Security has become much more complex and encompasses a lot more than military security.

NATO, for example, has opened a center in Jordan. That kind of cooperation is both intelligent and constructive.
The issue of intelligence is more delicate, because it’s still in the hands of the Member States. Cooperation depends on what they’re willing to share. There’s already a structure in the Foreign Service – the EU INTCEN – that cooperates with the intelligence services of the Member States.

But it’s true that certain elements of intelligence are related to trade, energy, or other policies typically dealt with by the EU. Here there’s a need to integrate such information so the EU has the capacity to respond and even anticipate.

We’re looking eastward at Russia and China, but China is also part of the Global South. How do we cooperate with those countries to foster democracies that don’t look to China?

It’s another delicate issue. I don’t think we should compare Russia and China: they are two different things. Russia acts as a spoiler and persists in creating problems, conflicts, destabilization. 

China is different. It has its vision of the world, instruments to apply and capabilities that we might like more or less, but that we need to respect. It doesn’t promote revolutions; on the contrary, it’s interested in stability, because its global influence derives from its economic capacity. 

The EU defines China as a partner, a competitor, and a strategic rival. We have different visions of the world but also areas in which we can cooperate. On the matter of the environment, for example, China can be an important ally: the ecological transformation that China has been undertaking is real.

We’re also competitors in the free market, but a free market requires common rules. When a country uses dumping, economic coercion, or bribery, that’s another matter.

Each one of us has to find a way, and that’s our challenge, to put an offer on the table that’s sufficiently attractive for the Mediterranean countries. We have all the means to do so, because we’re very integrated geographically, culturally, and economically. 

There’s a very present debate on immigration in Spain: the distinction between Latin American immigration and Muslim immigration, the latter being supposedly less adaptable. How do we deal with this debate in Europe, knowing that many countries in the region are Muslim?

That’s a debate about differences. I think there can be different societies, with different cultures. The issue is how you help integration while respecting both diversity and the cultures of the receiving countries. For me, these matters are fully compatible.

What I fear is that, in recent years, polarization has brought about discourses claiming that the differences aren’t compatible, and that it’s therefore better to simply keep people out. It’s necessary to pursue active integration policies that also avoid excessive concentrations that can put pressure on public services like health, education, or security.

“If we remove the polarization and examine the issue rationally, we see that our societies need immigration, because they need labor”If we remove the polarization and examine the issue rationally, we see that our societies need immigration, because they need labor. We have regular flows between Europe and third countries. We need to develop more of those regular channels, which prevent despair and permit a positive welcome. We can’t welcome everyone, but neither can we close off completely. You have to manage it. Migration isn’t solved by any single measure – it requires many policies at once.

The EU works a lot on economic development, opportunities, circular migration. One classic example are the Moroccan seasonal strawberry workers in Andalusia: they come, then go home, then return the following year. If we can move out of the polarized framework, there’s plenty of scope for constructive and positive management of migration and mobility.

Thank you very much.