How to defeat Putin and build a better Ukraine – Op-ed by Valerii Zaluzhnyi

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1. **How to stop Putin, and build a better Ukraine**

   Valerii Zaluzhnyi

   5–6 minutes

   Knowing the political goal of a war makes it possible to understand what the enemy is doing, and how to respond.

   The conflict in Ukraine has been going on for 12 years, beginning with the 2014 invasion of Crimea. There is no doubt over Russia’s political goal: the abolition of Ukraine as an independent state. Understanding this has to form the basis for building a strategy that will preserve our statehood.

   We are in an extremely difficult situation, where a rushed peace will only lead to a devastating defeat and loss of independence.

   I became commander-in-chief of the armed forces of Ukraine in August 2021. Although the military was undergoing a transformation and gaining combat experience, it still had many problems. The Russian army was rapidly increasing its forces and supplies. The Kremlin increased the military budget year after year, invested resources in the defence-industrial complex and purchased more weapons and equipment.

   Meanwhile the opposite was happening in Ukraine In 2021, the army was allocated even less money than in the previous year. As a result, our military met a full-scale invasion the following year with a huge shortage of everything, from people to weapons.

   At the beginning of 2022, the general staff made calculations that showed the total needed to repel aggression – including for the restoration and replenishment of missile and ammunition stocks – was estimated at tens of billions of pounds, which we did not have. And then Russian tanks rolled over the border.

   According to the Russian military theorist Alexander Svechin, there are two types of strategy to achieve a political goal: defeat and attrition. The Russian strategy for defeat envisaged clear military actions: a quick strike on the Ukrainian capital and attacks in other directions.

   However, this did not go according to plan. The heroism of Ukrainian citizens was the key to a victory that, although cost us the lives of our best and part of our territory, preserved the state and gave us that most important thing – a chance to fight and make peace on our own terms.

   From that moment, the enemy’s strategy changed to one of attrition. Russia in 2023 tried to focus on creating a strong defensive lines, which on the one hand was logical, serving to repel our offensive, and on the other hand, distracted our attention from the main goal.

   As Ukraine was pushing back, Russia was implementing a war economy, launching propaganda, changing legislation and building strategic reserves, all while dragging us into a new attritional phase of the conflict for which, just like in 2022, we were not ready.

   The events of 2024 and 2025, despite minor achievements at the front, indicate the absolute effectiveness of such a strategy for Russia in its efforts to achieve its political goal.

   However, a war of attrition is also being waged on the political front and the economic front. Military actions play an important role in achieving political goals, but are not the final phase.

   For example, let’s imagine that Russia completely occupied the Donetsk region. The war would not end, because it would not achieve the political goal. Russia seeks to create conditions to achieve the collapse of Ukraine on the military, economic and political fronts simultaneously.

   In the absence of a unified vision of a new security architecture on the European continent, without security guarantees and real financial programmes, the war with Russia risks turning into a broader war with over the capture of Eastern Europe.

   War does not always end with the victory of one side and the defeat of the other. We Ukrainians strive for complete victory, but we cannot reject the option of a long-term end to the war.

   Peace, even in anticipation of the next war, provides a chance for political change, for deep reforms, for full recovery, economic growth and the return of citizens.

   It is even possible to speak about the beginning of the formation of a safe, protected state through innovation and technology; of strengthening the foundations of justice through the fight against corruption and the creation of an honest court system; and of economic development, including on the basis of international economic recovery programmes.

   But all this is impossible without effective security guarantees.

   Such security guarantees could include: Ukraine’s accession to Nato, the deployment of nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory or the deployment of a large allied military contingent capable of confronting Russia.

   However, there is no talk about this today and, therefore, the war will probably continue. Not only militarily, but also on the political and economic fronts. Russia may change the tools and forms of its aggression, but they will all serve the same purpose.

   Valerii Zaluzhnyi is the Ukrainian ambassador to Britain and former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces

2. Proposals like this which call for more help from allies are pointless… The reality is that no one is willing to provide the kinds of security guarantees or support Ukraine needs to either be victorious or deter Russia from future attacks. So, in the absence of the support or security guarantees Ukraine needs, what can Ukraine do to defeat Putin?

3. This was a good Op-ed by Zaluzhnyi and I still think Zelenskyy removing him for Syriskyi is one of his biggest mistakes. He did a great job applying critiques to all parties involved while reminding all of us that the absolute fault falls on Russia. Ukraine has made some missteps that are hurting their war effort, there’s so many people listing them out, it’s just getting the leadership to listen

4. Our man talked about 2022, then immediately jumped to 2024 and 2025, glossing over 2023. Oh, right, the Great Summer Strategic Offensive of 2023.

   There are a lot of excuses but the fundamental reason, for me, is fact that the Ukrainian brigades couldn’t coordinate with one another for shit. It was a few lines in the RUSI report but apparently, the Ukrainian brigade slated for conducting the breach was shot at by the static brigade holding the zero line as the attacking brigade was conducting a forward passage of line through the static brigade to actually get to the line of departure and start the breach. That delayed the breach from night to day, and they were shot up.

   That’s a very basic but vital problem. Passages of line are not easy, but forward is easier than rearward and Ukraine screwed that up. As much as we like to make fun of the Russian Army, they did several RPOL without fucking those up.

5. This guy seems to understand that even a bad peace is a better outcome than continued fighting right now. If fighting could actually result in Ukraine taking land back it would make sense to continue. In the current situation it doesn’t making it somewhat futile. The US should be pushing Russia to accept current lines for peace and using every carrot and stick possible to achieve that.

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