The package, presented in Brussels on Wednesday, is designed to anticipate measures such as export curbs on critical materials and strategic investments in infrastructure, rather than respond after disruptions have occurred.
The doctrine builds on the 2023 European Economic Security Strategy and the first economic security package unveiled in January 2024, which concentrated on tighter screening of foreign direct investment, closer coordination on export controls and an initial exploration of outbound investment screening in sensitive technologies.
New measures include faster and more assertive use of trade defence tools, including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties. The Commission also proposes stricter controls on inward investment and access to public tenders in sectors such as semiconductors, batteries, defence, space and advanced digital technologies, alongside support for companies that diversify away from high-risk suppliers.
China is not mentioned explicitly in the legal texts, which remain formally country-agnostic, but Commission papers and recent speeches highlight Chinese export controls on rare earths and other critical inputs, as well as industrial overcapacity in areas such as electric vehicles and solar equipment. Trade commissioner Maroš Šefčovič has presented the doctrine as a move towards systematic identification and management of security risks in supply chains before crises emerge.
Business reaction has been cautious. BusinessEurope, which represents national industry federations, has welcomed greater clarity on how the Commission intends to implement its economic security strategy, but insists that controls must be targeted, predictable and compatible with the EU’s commitment to open markets and WTO rules. Large manufacturers remain heavily exposed to the Chinese market, both as a sales destination and as a source of components.
Surveys suggest that European firms operating in China are already adjusting to a more constrained environment created by Beijing’s own measures. A flash poll by the EU Chamber of Commerce in China found that roughly a third of surveyed companies plan to build capacity outside the country, as they grapple with delays in export licences and uncertainty over Chinese export controls on key inputs. Chinese investors and subsidiaries in Europe, meanwhile, have warned that what they see as an “over-emphasis” on security risks could deter investment and fragment supply chains.
The doctrine lands in a Union that formally endorses “de-risking, not decoupling” in its China policy. An analysis for the European Parliament this year characterised de-risking as a balance between economic losses from restructuring supply chains and perceived security gains, rather than a push to sever ties entirely. In practice, member states differ in how far they are prepared to go.
Germany, France and Italy illustrate these variations. Germany has adopted a national China strategy built around de-risking in critical sectors and stricter investment screening, while large industrial groups continue to localise production “in China, for China”. France has promoted a more assertive economic security agenda under the banner of “strategic autonomy”, including tighter safeguards on critical technologies and infrastructure. Italy, having withdrawn from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, has strengthened screening of Chinese acquisitions but is seeking a “soft reset” that protects exports while aligning more closely with EU and US security concerns.
The interplay between the new doctrine and the EU’s WTO commitments is likely to be closely scrutinised. Officials in the Commission’s trade directorate stress that measures will be risk-based, proportionate and open to challenge, and that the Union remains committed to multilateral trade rules even as it equips itself with more muscular instruments. Some legal experts point to the risk that local-content requirements and preferential treatment for EU-based suppliers in public tenders could trigger disputes at the WTO or retaliatory action from affected partners, including China.
For the Commission, the doctrine is presented as the next step in an economic security agenda that has accelerated since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a series of Chinese export restrictions. Its impact will depend on how the 27 member states translate common principles into national screening regimes and how far businesses judge the new controls to be manageable. The balance Brussels is seeking – reducing exposure to coercive leverage without closing the door on global trade – will now be tested in its relationship with China.
Post Views: 1,250