By Dr Claudia Bădulescu, Government of Ireland Postdoctoral Fellow, Maynooth University & Dr Barry Colfer, IIEA Director of Research
Romania’s most recent presidential election marked the most severe electoral disruption in the country’s post-communist history. The crisis, caused by large-scale foreign interference, AI-driven disinformation, and deep domestic polarisation, culminated in the annulment of the November 2024 first-round vote and the organisation of a new election in May 2025. The eventual victory of Nicușor Dan, a pro-European independent reformer, restored a measure of democratic legitimacy but also exposed enduring vulnerabilities in Romania’s political system.
1. Who is the Romanian President and how was he elected?
Romania’s current president is Nicușor Dan, a 55-year-old mathematician and former mayor of Bucharest who built his career as an anti-corruption activist and founder of the Save Romania Union (USR) political party. He was sworn in on 26 May 2025 after a dramatic two-round rerun of the presidential election. Dan entered the race as an independent, positioning himself above the traditional parties and presenting a technocratic, integrity-based alternative to both the established PSD–PNL bloc and the ascendant far-right movements. His calm, moderate public profile proved an asset for his candidacy in a highly polarised environment.
In the first round of the rerun election (4 May 2025), Dan came second with roughly 21% of the vote, behind ultranationalist candidate George Simion, who led with about 41%. In the 18 May runoff, Dan overturned this deficit and won with approximately 53.6%, following an intense campaign that framed the contest as a choice between a pro-European Romania and an anti-Western, illiberal alternative. After briefly contesting the results, Simion conceded, and Dan assumed office in late May.
2. What was unusual about the 2024 election, why the first round was annulled, and who annulled it?
The November 2024 presidential election became the epicentre of a foreign interference scandal. Its first round was won by Călin Georgescu, a fringe ultranationalist, anti-EU, pro-Moscow independent candidate who came in first place with approximately23% despite polling under 5% only days earlier. His campaign was almost entirely digital, driven by massive viral activity – including around 150 million TikTok views in two months.
Investigations by the Romanian state security council uncovered extensive cyberattacks, including over 85,000 such attacks against electoral IT infrastructure, as well as coordinated amplification of Georgescu’s messaging through AI-generated content, bot networks, troll farms, Telegram channels, and other algorithm-manipulation techniques. Stolen election-server credentials were found on Russian forums, and intelligence assessments linked the interference directly to Russian hybrid operations. These activities significantly distorted the information environment, creating artificially inflated support for Georgescu.
On 6 December 2024, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the first-round results – an unprecedented act – citing overwhelming evidence that the election’s integrity had been compromised. The court’s decision was final and binding. It determined that the scale and sophistication of manipulation – including unreported digital campaigning and foreign-sponsored disinformation – made it impossible to validate the vote. A lower court briefly attempted to challenge the ruling but was swiftly overruled due to lack of jurisdiction.
The annulment triggered mass protests across the country from both pro-democracy activists who supported the annulment and far-right groups who claimed a ‘coup’ had taken place. Nonetheless, institutions held firm, and Romania committed to rerunning the election in 2025.
3. Presidential Priorities: Europe, Foreign Policy, and Strategic Alignment
President Dan is firmly aligned with European Union (EU) and NATO priorities, consistently articulating Romania’s place in the Euro-Atlantic community. He has vowed to keep Romania ‘within the European mainstream’, to strengthen ties with Brussels and Washington, and to maintain unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. His foreign policy reflects not only ideological commitment but a conviction that Romania’s national security depends on resisting Russian influence and maintaining NATO unity.
EU leaders – particularly France’s Emmanuel Macron and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen – hailed his election as a reaffirmation of democratic values and a rejection of electoral manipulation. The President of neighbouring Ukraine, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, also congratulated Dan, noting that it was “important to have Romania as a reliable partner” that supports Kyiv. These reactions illustrate the geopolitical significance of Romania remaining anchored in the West at a time of democratic backsliding across parts of Central and Eastern Europe.
4. What does the annulment reveal about Romanian politics and regional trends?
The annulment exposed two contradictory realities. On the one hand, it showcased Romania’s democratic resilience. Key institutions, such as the intelligence services, the courts, and the electoral authority, acted decisively to prevent a foreign-manipulated candidate from capturing the presidency. Analysts described the episode as a “near-miss in the heart of NATO”, highlighting the seriousness of the threat but also the success of institutional safeguards. Romania may now serve as a regional precedent for addressing digital-era election interference.
Second, the crisis revealed deep societal and political fractures. The fact that a fringe extremist could top the first round, and that George Simion later captured 41% in the rerun’s first round, underscores the depth of popular discontent in the country, rooted in corruption fatigue, inflation, and widespread distrust of elites. The surge of far-right populism mirrors broader trends across Central and Eastern Europe, where nationalist, Eurosceptic forces have gained ground, often reinforced by external disinformation. Romania’s crisis thus fits within the regional pattern of democratic turbulence, contested sovereignties, and increasing vulnerability to Russian hybrid strategies.
The annulment also raises complex normative questions. While justified, voiding an election is an extreme measure which risks creating anxieties about democratic norms and the fine balance between protecting elections and honouring popular sovereignty. These tensions will continue to shape Romanian – and regional – debates on democratic governance.
5. What does the future hold for the Presidency and the Republic?
President Dan entered office amid high expectations but daunting challenges. Romania remains deeply polarised. His first major task has been the formation of a pro-European government under Prime Minister Ilie Bolojan, which prioritises economic stabilisation, fiscal consolidation, and the restoration of trust in the state’s institutions. Romania’s severe budget deficit (with a general government deficit of 9.3% of GDP in 2024) and risk-laden economic outlook complicate these efforts. If austerity measures erode living standards, populist forces could rebound.
Long-term stability will depend on whether Dan can deliver credible anti-corruption reforms, strengthen the country’s public administration, and enhance Romania’s resilience to hybrid threats. The country must urgently modernise its digital governance, tighten electoral oversight, and safeguard against misinformation to avoid future crises.
6. What are the implications for the EU and for Ireland?
For the EU, Romania is a front-line democracy, an anchor state for the bloc in an increasingly contested region. Its ability to remain stable, reform-oriented, and outward-looking will influence not only its own trajectory but also regional security dynamics. Whether the 2025 reset becomes a turning point or merely a pause in the rise of populist nationalism will depend on President Dan’s ability to govern, deliver economic improvements, and rebuild trust in the country’s democratic institutions.
The case of the Romanian 2024-2025 presidential elections presents a case study for the impact that malign external interference can have on European democracy. Its near neighbour Moldova, an aspiring EU member, endured a similar experience of Russian interference in its parliamentary election in September 2025. In both instances the forces of democracy won out, but only barely, in the face of sustained, well-resourced, and sophisticated meddling by external actors. To put these developments in their wider context, one of US President Trump’s first acts upon his re-election to the White House in 2024 was to freeze US support that traditionally played a central role in defending democracy and supporting the activities of civil society organisations across Central and Eastern Europe. In the absence of this support and amid increasing Russian interference, EU leaders have an increasingly urgent responsibility to support and defend democracy and the rule of law – including free, transparent, and fair elections – both within and beyond its borders.
The EU’s Democracy Shield and the EU Strategy for Civil Society, published in 2025, seeks to ‘pave the way for stronger and more resilient democracies’ and presents a welcome development. These initiatives bluntly acknowledge the very high risks that are posed to social cohesion, security, and EU values by malign interference with democratic processes and institutions. The nexus between electoral interference and the debates around security and defence in Europe is clear too. Such interference often seeks to undermine faith in democratic institutions and democratic governments and in the state’s ability to respond adequately to the needs and expectations of the citizenry. Ireland is at the centre of this debate, as a mature democracy with strong institutions. Equally, Irish critical infrastructure, including subsea cables and data centres, plays a vital role in the EU’s communications infrastructure, and are potentially vulnerable to interruption from external interference. The role of well-funded public media and independent academic and other research is also essential to a vibrant and informed public realm which is enjoyed in places like Ireland. Working across each of these plains, Ireland and its leaders must work to promote democratic values and must continue to strengthen its defences against malign external interference, with the Romanian case presenting a sobering and urgent example of how this can play out. The forthcoming Irish Presidency of the EU Council of Ministers in the second half of 2026 provides a unique opportunity for Ireland to do so, and to robustly defend democratic values on a global scale.