The existing state of the Alawites holds significance in this assessment, followed by an examination of the Iran-United States confrontation. In general, the United States’ Middle East policy in recent decades, in many cases, has been heavily influenced by Israel’s situation. Hence, not only the overall rupture of relations between Iran and the United States since the 1979 revolution, but also their face-off during the Syrian crisis and the Arab Spring, and even considerations of changing conditions and regimes, are largely shaped by the Israel factor. Thus, I opine that unraveling the intricacies of the Iran-United States confrontation in present-day Syria, and to a certain extent, the Alawites, largely hinges on Israel. As such, a portion of my analysis delves into the nature of Israel’s approach, indirectly shedding light on the confrontation between Iran and the United States in relation to the Alawite issue.

 The Alawites

ISIS and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), under the leadership of the temporary Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, have previously denounced Alawites as apostates. During the March demonstrations, the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria (MCLSS), commanded by Brigadier General Ghiath Suleiman Dala, declared its establishment. Additionally, in the widespread protests in March, approximately 1,700 innocent Alawite civilians lost their lives. Many of the victims have fled to Lebanon in fear for their safety. Furthermore, forced displacement of hundreds of Alawite families from Damascus was documented in late April, as part of an effort to alter the demographic makeup of the capital city. Statistics indicate that almost half a million Alawites have migrated from Damascus, Aleppo, and Homs to the western coastline. Moreover, in the last month alone, 30,000 Syrian Alawites have sought refuge in Lebanon. Even some of the victims even had a past of enduring imprisonment under the Assad regime. Therefore, the nature of the conflict has shifted towards a psychological and ideological confrontation.

The New Elites

From the onset of the Arab Spring, Syria’s central government has been embroiled in a grave crisis, one that persists even with the regime change. Today, Syria is governed by Ahmed al-Sharaa and his fellow Salafi cohorts, whose scant ideologies offer no solutions for the existing turmoil, nor any strategies or plans for managing the heightened tensions.  A majority of the prominent positions and responsibilities within the government have been filled by ex-members of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, hailing from a Salafi background and roots. Conversely, numerous meritorious individuals have been disregarded, with ideological affiliation being the primary criterion for assigning responsibilities. For instance, the Minister of Justice holds a degree in Sharia law, signaling the supremacy of ideology over governance and efficacy. Moreover, a significant number of the supporters of Ahmad al-Sharaa are non-Syrians, serving through their ideological allegiances to the caliphate and Islamic state.

Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s team and minorities

Numerous apprehensions persist regarding the mindset of Ahmed al-Sharaa and his associates towards minority groups in Israel. These fears stem from the practices and history of their group, under the larger umbrella of al-Qaeda and Salafi groups. While Ahmed al-Sharaa may have a way with words, his government’s inability to manage and control extremists was evident in the massacre of Alawites. This has only strengthened Israel’s apprehensions about Ahmed al-Sharaa and his Islamist ideology potentially taking over. Moreover, the past decade has seen a significant loss of educated individuals and intellectuals, with little opposition or efforts to reduce sectarian violence. As soon as the Syrian regime changed, Israel wasted no time in announcing its plan to create a buffer zone, considering the security implications. In light of this, the Druze, who previously had a more favorable view towards Israel, have received their support, even during the Assad era.

Iran and the Alawites

Enigmatic complexity and linguistic dynamism overshadow Iran’s declared and practical policy, which hinges on inactivity and withholding support for the Alawites. Speculatively, there exists no substantiation of Iran’s involvement in the Alawite protests. Perhaps this is because Iran is cognizant of the potential for such action to serve as a pretext for the Syrian central government to escalate pressure and violence against the Alawites. Yet, despite the divergent and fierce clashes of interests among the primary foreign players in Syria, namely Türkiye and Israel, they share one common goal – to prevent the resurgence of Iranian influence. Hence, Iran’s relatively passive approach towards the Alawites in recent months is not a deliberate choice in their foreign policy, but rather a reflection of the exigencies and practical realities imposed upon Iranian policy. It is therefore understandable why Iran takes a diplomatic stance in supporting the lifting of international sanctions on Syria and also advocating for the reconstruction of its economy. This balancing act has been met with opposition from some leaders and influential figures within the Alawite community, who reject seeking assistance from Iran as a means of avoiding providing the central government and foreign powers with a pretext. For example, even Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, has refrained from mentioning Iran while requesting aid from Russia to establish a defense force to safeguard the Syrian coast and its inhabitants. While, the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has vehemently denounced the atrocities committed against the Alawites.

Iran, the United States and the Israel Factor

Iran’s perspective also confirms the immense difficulties in regaining influence in Syria, given Israel and Türkiye’s constant vigilance and the new regime’s opposition. This makes the idea of a return highly unrealistic, considering the current situation on the ground. Even many Arab countries that are not allies of Syria have provided financial aid, support, and cooperation in order to lift sanctions against the country, a condition for preventing Iran from returning. Additionally, Iran’s potential ally in the region, the Kurds, have had close ties with the United States, making them a preferred choice for cooperation over the Alawites and against Israel. However, this possibility remains minimal.

Israel’s ultimate aim does not involve a centralized and united Syria, particularly given its Islamist ideology. Consequently, their plan aims at fracturing, or the very least, rendering this Islamist Syria of Ahmed al-Sharaa vulnerable and feeble. This overall objective forms the basis for the proposition of reviving the long-standing “Alliance of Minorities” strategy by some factions within Israel. Its purpose is to hinder the coalescence and solidarity of Islamist and Arab forces against Israel’s national security and existence. The mastermind behind this strategy was the founding father of Mossad, Reuven Shiloah, who believed that the Arabs were besieged from two opposing directions. Firstly, from non-Arab nations beyond their borders, and secondly, from within through ethnic and religious minorities. These two sources share a common aim of undermining the unity between Arabs and Muslims, in opposition to Israel. This disparity serves as the driving force and rationale behind the implementation of the Alliance of Minorities strategy.

A case within the Alliance of Minorities doctrine is the noteworthy collaboration between Israel and the Kurds in Iraq during the 1960s, banding together against the hostile regime of Saddam. Another instance involves the Maronites in Lebanon and presently the Druze in Syria, serving as Israel’s prominent allies within this sphere. However, the situation is not as straightforward as it appears. The Syrian Kurds, unlike their Iraqi counterparts, maintain a stance close to the leftist and anti-Israeli organization PKK, rendering cooperation with Israel difficult, particularly under current circumstances. Thus, highlighting the significance of the Alawites to Israel, as the foremost minority group in Syria, becomes inevitable. Aside from political motives, supporting the Alawites stems from their historical oppression as a minority in Syria and their striking resemblance to the conditions faced by Jews in 18th-century Europe. Notably, even before the Assad regime took power in a 1971 coup, the Alawites were the most underprivileged and marginalized minority group in Syria.

Conclusion

One crucial factor in mitigating tension with the Alawites is the involvement of influential Alawite leaders and individuals in the government, and even the establishment of joint military units. However, such a scenario seems unlikely in the near future. It must also be acknowledged that, in the foreseeable future, Syria is unlikely to have an all-inclusive government that respects the rights of minority groups like the Alawites.

In terms of the dynamic between Iran and the United States, with the evident limitations on Iran’s return and the US’s withdrawal, as well as Israel’s significant security concerns regarding Syria, the Alawite community’s most practical and cost-effective option is to form an alliance with Israel. On the other hand, for Israel, exerting influence over the Alawites may prove to be a desirable option. However, this remains a theoretical possibility as, in reality, there is currently no likelihood of Israel extending support and cooperation to the Alawite community due to geographical distance and differences in ideology -especially compared to the Druze community.