The Donald Trump administration’s newly released National Security Strategy marks a fundamental redefinition of how the United States understands national power. Unlike previous strategies that emphasized military posture and alliance diplomacy, the revised NSS places economic security at the core of American national security. Supply chain resilience, industrial capacity, energy independence and technological leadership are no longer supporting instruments; they are now strategic objectives in their own right.

For South Korea, this shift is not incremental. It represents a structural transformation that requires a comprehensive reassessment of national strategy across economic, industrial and geopolitical domains.

One of the most striking features of the new NSS is the unusually frequent and explicit reference to South Korea, often mentioned alongside Japan. Traditionally, Korea has been viewed primarily as a front-line security ally on the Korean Peninsula. The updated strategy goes further, explicitly recognizing Korea as a core industrial and technological partner in Washington’s effort to rebuild critical supply chains and reduce strategic dependence on China.

Such direct inclusion in a US strategic document is rare and significant. It reflects not only rising expectations for Korea, but also growing recognition of Korea’s technological sophistication and industrial weight in the global system.

Korea’s industrial ecosystem — spanning semiconductors, shipbuilding, steel, petrochemicals, automobiles, batteries and energy — is deeply embedded in global supply chains that now intersect directly with US strategic priorities. Against this backdrop, Seoul and Washington have announced plans for more than $200 billion in accelerated Korean investment in the United States, covering sectors such as semiconductor equipment, small modular reactors, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

These investments are substantial. Yet the scale of capital flows alone does not guarantee strategic benefit. Without a clearer and more institutionalized framework for coordination, there is a risk that Korea’s contributions will be absorbed in a fragmented, transactional manner — generating limited long-term leverage or reciprocal gains. Strategic alignment cannot be improvised project by project; it must be deliberately designed.

A similar shift is unfolding in the maritime and defense-industrial domain. The US Navy’s ambitious fleet expansion and modernization plans face serious industrial bottlenecks that US shipyards alone cannot resolve. As one of the world’s most advanced shipbuilding nations, Korea is increasingly viewed as an indispensable partner in naval construction, maintenance, repair and overhaul and long-term fleet sustainment.

Under the proposed $150 billion MASGA — Make American Shipbuilding Great Again — framework, Korean industry could support US naval ship construction and gradually participate in more advanced areas of naval modernization. If structured as genuine co-development rather than simple subcontracting, such cooperation could reshape the industrial foundation of the US-Korea alliance and elevate Korea’s role from supplier to strategic partner.

These opportunities, however, come with mounting expectations. The new NSS signals a transition from traditional “burden sharing” toward what increasingly resembles “burden shifting,” in which allies are expected not only to contribute, but to assume greater financial, industrial and security responsibilities in support of US strategic objectives.

For Korea, which continues to face direct and existential threats from North Korea, this shift carries serious implications. Meeting US expectations may require higher defense spending, expanded operational roles in the Indo-Pacific and deeper participation in regional deterrence architectures. While defending the Korean Peninsula remains Korea’s top priority, Seoul must now confront the challenge of balancing immediate security needs with broader alliance responsibilities.

A passive or reactive posture in the face of these evolving expectations would weaken Korea’s strategic position. The central challenge is not whether Korea can meet allied demands, but whether it can actively shape the terms under which it does so. Korea must move beyond being a policy taker and assert itself as a strategic actor.

Three imperatives stand out.

First, Korea must pursue de-risking — not decoupling — from China. Given Korea’s export-driven economy and deep integration with Chinese markets, abrupt disengagement is neither realistic nor economically sustainable. Instead, Seoul should adopt phased diversification strategies in critical sectors such as semiconductors, critical minerals and advanced batteries. This approach reduces strategic vulnerability while preserving economic stability and diplomatic flexibility.

Second, Korea should proactively position itself in sectors where the United States faces acute capacity gaps. Shipbuilding, small modular reactors, petrochemical infrastructure, offshore engineering and maintenance, repair and overhaul capabilities represent areas of clear Korean strength. Rather than passively joining US-led initiatives, Seoul should insist on co-design and co-production roles that generate durable industrial and technological returns.

Third, Korea must extend the NSS’ economic-security logic toward a broader Global South strategy. As geopolitical blocs harden, new growth opportunities are emerging across Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Through pragmatic, interest-based partnerships — sometimes independently, sometimes in close coordination with Japan, Europe and other allies — Korea can diversify economic ties, expand strategic influence and reduce exposure to intensifying US-China rivalry.

Ultimately, the new NSS confronts Korea with a defining question: Will Seoul remain reactive to external pressures, or will it emerge as a strategic actor capable of shaping the evolving global economic-security order?

If Korea leverages its industrial strengths, aligns domestic policy with shifting geopolitical realities and expands its strategic reach beyond traditional theaters, the NSS can become a catalyst for national transformation rather than an added burden. Korea’s competitiveness over the coming decade will depend not on how much it is asked to contribute, but on its ability to lead, innovate and define its own strategic future.

Man-Ki Kim

Man-Ki Kim is a professor at the KAIST Graduate School of Future Strategy, specializing in global public procurement, defense acquisition innovation and global strategic trends. He also serves as a senior adviser at Yulchon. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. — Ed.

khnews@heraldcorp.com