Belarus is rapidly slipping into Russia’s economic orbit, with dependence spanning key areas – from energy and trade to finance, investment, and the defense industry.
According to intelligence, Moscow is increasingly shaping the trajectory of Belarus’s economy, especially in foreign trade. A large portion of Belarus’s exports goes to Russia, with about a quarter destined for third countries via the use of Russian infrastructure. Logistical access to ports, rail routes, and tariffs is effectively coordinated from Moscow, so up to 90% of Belarus’s exports are dependent on the Russian Federation.
Financial integration is also deepening: after sanctions against the Belarusian banking sector and the disconnection of four state banks from the international payment system, Minsk has fully switched to Russian payment systems. In the currency market the situation is similar: about half of the National Bank’s currency basket is the Russian ruble, and changes in the Russian economy are immediately reflected in the Belarusian ruble’s exchange rate.
Investment dependence shows a similar dynamic: the share of Russian capital in foreign direct investment has approached 70%. Russia effectively remains the main source of external financing for Minsk. Belarus’s obligations to the Russian Federation stand at about $8 billion, and Moscow agreed to a seven-year restructuring of payments, tightening political-economic control.
A separate area has become the defense industry: since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Minsk has stepped up cooperation with the Russian defense-industrial complex; at least 300 state enterprises have redirected to fulfill Russian defense contracts.
Key implications for sovereignty and the economy’s maneuverability
“Taken together, these processes create a situation in which Minsk’s room for economic maneuver is significantly narrowed, and strategic decisions are determined solely by the Kremlin’s political-economic priorities.”
– Intelligence
In the context of sanctions circumvention, they mention a new export route: goods first go to Russia, and then – via the Turkish port of Gebze – to external markets. These schemes underscore Minsk’s deep economic dependence on Moscow and the limits on its ability to autonomously regulate domestic and foreign policy.
Overall, the situation indicates that Belarus is increasingly intertwining its economic processes with the Russian component, affecting sovereignty and the economy’s maneuverability.