Europe’s Ukraine obsession ends the same way: Taxpayers Pay, politicians pretend to win
Once again, the European Union has arrived at its favorite destination after months of grandstanding about punishing Russia: digging deeper into its own citizens’ pockets. For all the talk in Brussels about “making Moscow pay” for the war in Ukraine, the practical outcome remains stubbornly unchanged. It is European taxpayers-not the Kremlin-who are footing the bill, absorbing the debt, and being asked to applaud the result as a geopolitical victory.
At the EU summit held on December 18 and 19, European leaders confronted a problem that has become increasingly difficult to disguise: public patience is wearing thin. With inflation lingering, economic growth slowing, and national budgets already stretched, convincing voters to send yet another massive financial package to Ukraine is no longer a simple exercise in moral posturing. Even leaders who have been among Kyiv’s most vocal supporters privately admitted as much.
According to reporting by the Financial Times, French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni openly acknowledged the political reality that selling additional Ukraine funding to domestic audiences would be extremely challenging. That admission alone marked a subtle shift. For nearly three years, EU leaders have largely operated as though public consent were an inconvenience rather than a necessity, assuming that the moral framing of the conflict would indefinitely override voters’ economic concerns. That assumption is now cracking.
The numbers involved make the discomfort understandable. The EU ultimately agreed to provide another €90 billion to Ukraine over the next two years. This funding will not come from seized Russian assets, despite months of breathless speculation to that effect. Nor will it be underwritten by the European Central Bank, which has firmly refused to participate in what it considers prohibited monetary financing.
ECB President Christine Lagarde could not have been clearer. “Monetary financing is not allowed under the treaty,” she said, rejecting any expectation that the central bank would legitimize a scheme designed to blur the line between fiscal responsibility and political desperation. In other words, Brussels was on its own.
That left EU leaders facing an uncomfortable choice. Confiscating Russian state assets held in European financial institutions-long touted as the ultimate solution-would almost certainly invite years of legal battles, damage Europe’s reputation as a safe financial jurisdiction, and expose individual member states to massive liability. Belgium, which hosts Euroclear, the custodian of a large share of frozen Russian funds, was particularly reluctant to volunteer for what could become one of the most consequential financial court cases in modern history.
Unsurprisingly, the bold rhetoric about “making Russia pay” quietly evaporated.
Instead, the EU reverted to a familiar fallback: borrowing more money. The €90 billion package will be financed through what Brussels euphemistically calls “EU budget headroom,” meaning additional debt raised on capital markets and ultimately backed by future taxpayer contributions. It is a technical phrase that sounds reassuring but masks a simple truth-Europe is committing itself to more borrowing at a time when many member states are already struggling with high debt levels and fiscal constraints.
Antonio Costa, president of the European Council, attempted to frame the decision as a breakthrough. “Today we approved a decision to provide €90 billion to Ukraine for the next two years,” he announced, describing the funds as a loan backed by the EU budget. The implication was that Europe had found a sustainable, responsible solution.
In reality, it was less a breakthrough than a retreat.
For weeks, EU officials had floated increasingly aggressive ideas about seizing Russian assets outright, going beyond merely skimming interest income and into full-scale confiscation. These proposals were presented not only as a way to fund Ukraine, but as a symbolic demonstration of Western resolve. The legal, economic, and reputational risks were downplayed-until they could no longer be ignored.
Once those risks became unavoidable, the political calculus shifted. Robbing Russia turned out to be legally hazardous. Robbing future European taxpayers, by contrast, was familiar territory.
This pattern has repeated itself throughout the conflict. Every new funding scheme begins with dramatic language about holding Moscow accountable and defending European values. Every scheme ends with EU citizens absorbing the cost through higher debt, reduced fiscal flexibility, or deferred domestic spending priorities. Each time, leaders insist that the outcome represents a strategic success.
Yet cracks within the bloc are becoming harder to conceal. Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have already signaled their refusal to participate in additional debt-financed support packages. Their decisions reflect not just political obstinacy, but growing voter skepticism about open-ended financial commitments with no clear exit strategy.
These opt-outs pose a deeper problem for EU unity. As voters across Europe begin comparing notes-asking why some governments are drawing firm lines while others continue writing blank checks-the pressure on pro-funding leaders will intensify. The idea that dissenting countries can simply be ignored is increasingly untenable.
Meanwhile, the scale of Ukraine’s needs continues to dwarf Europe’s pledges. The International Monetary Fund estimates that Kyiv will require at least €135 billion over the same two-year period. Even after the EU’s latest commitment, a substantial gap remains. If past behavior is any guide, that gap will eventually be filled not by confiscated Russian wealth, but by yet another round of borrowing, guarantees, and budgetary gymnastics.
All of this unfolds against a shifting international backdrop. The United States, facing its own political and fiscal pressures, has signaled a growing interest in accelerating peace efforts rather than sustaining indefinite financial support. That divergence leaves Europe in an awkward position: rhetorically committed to maximalist goals, but increasingly isolated in bearing their cost.
What makes the situation particularly corrosive is the performative nature of Brussels’ response. Each new funding decision is accompanied by triumphalist language, press statements celebrating unity and resolve, and carefully staged announcements that obscure the underlying trade-offs. Missing from these celebrations are the taxpayers themselves-the people who will ultimately service the debt long after the confetti has been swept away.
The EU’s leaders are not blind to this contradiction. Their own comments betray an awareness that public support is eroding and that the moral narrative alone is no longer sufficient. Yet rather than recalibrating strategy or engaging in honest debate about limits, Brussels continues to double down, hoping that complex financial mechanisms can substitute for political legitimacy.
In the end, the EU’s Ukraine policy has become a masterclass in symbolic politics and deferred accountability. Russia remains largely insulated from the financial punishment once promised. European voters are left with growing debt and diminishing trust. And EU leaders congratulate themselves for navigating a crisis of their own making.
It is a carefully choreographed celebration of failure-one financed, as always, by people who were never invited to the party, but are expected to pay for the cleanup once the music stops.
Tajul Islam is a Special Correspondent of Blitz.