Lessons of Ukraine for Taiwan, China

The reign of strategic ambiguity is over. Or maybe not. Long live the new era of strategic ambiguity.

Washington’s Taiwan policy, its response to a China attack, has been shrouded in would-they, would-they-not uncertainty since the United States established diplomatic relations with Beijing in the 1970s. Joe Biden ditched this approach in 2022 when he pledged a US military response to an invasion of the island. This, in turn, has been upended by US President Donald Trump, which is, well, your guess is as good as mine. But strategic ambiguity does not end there.

Trump is less than committed to the defense of Ukraine. And his resolve concerning NATO seems far from wholehearted.

Ukraine and Taiwan are starkly different but both are in extreme danger. Taiwan, with a population of 23 million is an island, with 100 miles of seawater, not including its outlying islands, separating it from the Chinese mainland. Ukraine, and its 39 million population, shares a land border with Russia. Both are facing existential threats from larger nations that view them with predatory instincts.

Ukraine has shown that necessity is the mother of invention as its defense tech sector has achieved significant breakthroughs. Under wartime conditions, it is churning out drones and establishing rapid-production capabilities. The irony, of course, is that with this innovation, warfare is reverting back to the dug-in trenches and advances measured in yards of the Great War, as it was called before we started numbering global conflicts.

Ukraine’s new weapons and tactics could help define Taiwan’s ability to deter and survive a potential military conflict. This would not be just a land-based deterrent but would crucially deploy drones over the Taiwan strait.

China, too, has taken on board the lessons of Ukraine; invasions are hard.

In terms of geography, Russia had it relatively easy. It shares a long land border with Ukraine that is largely flat with some rolling hills. Conditions from approximately May to October allow for military operations that are essentially unhindered by weather or terrain conditions. An invasion of Taiwan would present greater challenges.

Late spring and early autumn provide the best window of opportunity for China to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan when relatively moderate conditions prevail.

The island has few beach-landing sites, a mountainous spine, subtropical terrain, and several large cities, all of which present major obstacles to military conquest even if the Taiwan Strait could be conquered. You don’t have to be a student of D-Day in 1944 to realize that amphibious operations are among the most difficult of all military operations. They also require air superiority prior to beginning the invasion to protect vulnerable troop transports. Chinese President Xi Jinping has a dilemma to overcome.

Ukraine’s skies have been protected by American intelligence and American missiles, it is not too much to expect, even with a Trump White House, that Taiwan’s air defenses would be enhanced by the US.

The island, about 6% the size of Ukraine and surrounded by water, would also be, in theory, defended against air attack by US battleships.

This is crucial as China is considering a naval blockade. A drone fleet capable of targeting vessels and submarines is of vital importance to Taiwan. There are some in the US administration pushing for a formal defense partnership between Ukraine and Taiwan. This will require American support and encouragement. The US would benefit from closer cooperation between Taiwan and Ukraine. It should persuade Taiwan to purchase Ukrainian defense technology and the creation of long-term commercial partnerships.

Not since the Cold War has there been such a burst of defense-weaponry innovation.

Ukraine is the pathfinder for low-cost, scalable defense technologies that are already reshaping modern warfare. Its output, often improvised, has established a weapons ecosystem that is a world leader.

It would be a dereliction of duty if Taiwan squanders the opportunity to inherit a strategic advantage by failing to learn from Ukraine.

For too long, Taiwan refused to invest in defensive systems that actually complicate Beijing’s invasion plans. Prestige platforms, photo opportunities, rewarded a “size matters” type of outlook.

Submarines and expensive hardware that look impressive on paper were funded without enough forward planning.

This, thankfully, has changed, in large part due to Ukraine’s example. Taipei now appreciates that drones, sea mines, land mines, and dispersed missile systems provide a better deterrent than traditional “big toys.” Taiwan’s procurement strategies now favor systems that make an amphibious assault or blockade significantly more costly.

Both countries have reason to doubt America’s willingness to come to their aid. But this prospect, while not welcomed, is not the harbinger of a doom-laden scenario it would have appeared to be, say, just six months ago.

Ukraine and Taiwan have factored in Washington’s reluctance to their defense plans. Just in time.

In 2027, Beijing will mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army. The temptation to invade Taiwan will be extreme for the decision makers in Zhongnanhai, the leadership compound just off Beijing’s Tiananmen Square.

But cooler heads may have an opportunity to point out that failure to achieve a rapid subjugation of the island could extract a heavy price not just in human terms but politically as well, including possible regime change in Beijing. They will also factor in how the Russian leadership has been isolated and sanctioned in the West. Ukraine’s inspirational resistance is shaping not just its own future. No scope for strategic ambiguity there.

The views expressed are the author’s and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.