A recent Times of Israel blog post by Canada-based activist Shabnam Assadollahi attempts to diagnose the failures of the Iranian opposition by clinging to a nostalgic and exclusionary vision of the past. While the author laments that the “logic of 1979” has never ended, her solution – a return to a centralized, secular monarchy – suggests a different kind of stagnation. By labeling any movement for ethnic rights or federalism as “separatism” and dismissing the diversity of the Iranian political landscape, the article reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people, particularly its marginalized minorities.

Assadollahi’s primary target is what she calls “separatism,” a term long used by both the Pahlavi dynasty and the current Islamic Republic to delegitimize the grievances of Iran’s ethnic groups. To characterize the pursuit of ethnic justice and federalism as an “assault on Iran’s future” is to ignore the reality of a multi-ethnic nation.

For decades, Kurds, Baluchs, Arabs, and Turks have sought nothing more than the right to their own languages, cultural expression, and a say in their local governance. Framing these basic human rights as a threat to “territorial integrity” is a tactic of fear intended to preserve a Persian-centric hegemony. A truly democratic Iran cannot be built on the forced assimilation of its parts; it must be built on a voluntary union of equals.

The author presents a “modern monarchy” as a stabilizing, “supra-ideological” force. However, for the Kurdish people, the Pahlavi era was defined not by stability, but by systematic suppression. From the brutal crushing of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946 to the execution of Kurdish leaders and the banning of the Kurdish language in schools, the monarchy’s record is one of centralist authoritarianism.

The “historical continuity” Assadollahi speaks of is, for many, a continuity of trauma. The Pahlavi regime’s reliance on the SAVAK secret police to silence ethnic dissent paved the way for the very revolutionary fervor that erupted in 1979. To suggest that a return to this system – one that historically viewed Kurdish identity as a security threat – is the only “national alternative” is to ask Iran’s most oppressed populations to trade one form of centralist tyranny for another.

It is no coincidence that this narrative is finding a home in Israeli media. In recent years, there has been a visible shift in certain Israeli political circles toward promoting the Pahlavi family as the sole credible alternative to the Islamic Republic. By hosting these viewpoints, media outlets like The Times of Israel appear to be participating in a geopolitical strategy that favors a “known quantity” – a return to the pre-1979 status quo – over the unpredictable, grassroots democracy demanded by the Iranian people.

This alliance between monarchist circles and Israeli interests is transparent. It seeks to impose a top-down leadership on a movement that, since the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, has been defined by its decentralization and its inclusion of ethnic voices. The Kurdish slogan “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” was the spark that ignited the most recent uprising; yet, the monarchist narrative seeks to sideline the very people who started it, labeling their political aspirations as “dangerous.”

The author is correct that Iran needs a “firm break” from the past, but that break must include a departure from the exclusionary nationalism of the Pahlavi era just as much as the religious totalitarianism of the current regime.

The future of Iran does not lie in a “modern monarchy” that polices ethnic identity under the guise of unity. It lies in a pluralistic, secular, and federal democracy that recognizes the rights of all its citizens.

One-sided defenses of a failed dynastic system only confirm that some within the opposition – and their international supporters – are more interested in restoring an old order than in building a new, inclusive Iran.

Born in Marivan, in Iran’s Kurdistan province, the author is a PhD student in sociology in Tehran. *He publishes under the name Fuad Mariwan, a pen name adopted for safety reasons.